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1. PROFESSIONAL DOSSIER
1.1. Account of professional training and experience since pre­
qualification.
1.2. Analysis of Clinical Practice;
Presentation of a case of probable malingering detectable by 
neuropsychological assessment and evidence of premorbid and current 
functioning. Lessons to be learned for the neuropsychologist.
An account of medico-legal neuropsychological assessment(s) and 
information from medical records, in a case of an insurance claim for the 
effects of a head injury. This case provides illustrations of many of the points 
of discussion in each of the other dossiers of the portfolio. For example: the 
nature of the post-concussional syndrome, the definition and expected 
outcome of minor head injury, and the effects of compensation (First Review); 
Reluctance of the clinician to diagnose malingering; the detection of under­
performance by neuropsychological assessment; detection by non­
psychometric clinical information; the importance of premorbid and peri- 
morbid information (Second Review); Detection by specialised procedures 
(Research project).
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2. ACADEMIC DOSSIER
2.1. First Review; Post Concussional Syndrome, Compensation, and 
the Prospect of Malingering.
Abstract;
The neuropsychologist in court can be faced with difficult questions 
concerning claims of persistent disability following a minor head injury (MHI).
It is generally accepted that MHI can result in pathophysiological changes, i.e. 
brain injury, which can give rise to a range of symptoms of impaired physical, 
cognitive and emotional functioning, known as postconcussional syndrome 
(PCS). In most cases this disturbance is temporary, but a minority continue to 
suffer (increasingly subjective) symptoms. As PCS endures, the evidence of 
brain injury underlying significant disability diminishes, and psychological 
factors seem increasingly to play a part. The presence of a compensation 
claim is disproportionately involved, although the evidence of recovery after a 
claim is equivocal. Finally, there is clear evidence that a high proportion of 
those claiming compensation are consciously exaggerating their symptoms,
i.e. malingering.
2.2. Second Review; Non-Psychometric Methods of Detecting 
Neuropsychological Malingering.
Abstract;
Studies suggest that neuropsychologists are not good at detecting 
malingering when faced with test results alone, but even given opportunities 
for a fuller assessment, are reluctant to confirm, sometimes even consider, a 
hypothesis of malingering. It is argued that malingering should be routinely 
considered in medicolegal neuropsychological assessments, and non­
psychometric information is a vital contributor to these assessments. The 
sources, and methods of enquiry, and indications of such non-psychometric 
information are reviewed. The Review comprises three parts: Evidence of 
inadequate assessment; Consideration of premorbid functioning; 
Consideration of symptom history and current functioning.
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PART THREE: RESEARCH DOSSIER
Title: The Detection of Malingering of Neuropsychological Impairment 
by Specialised Procedures, and the Contribution of Response Latency.
Supervisors: Dr Jonathan Foulds (1999-2000); Dr Marie Clark (2001-2).
Background:
There is a growing body of evidence that under-performance in 
neuropsychological assessments is common in cases of claims for 
compensation, and disproportionately so among the less severely head 
injured.
There is also evidence that neuropsychologists are not good at detecting such 
under-performance using standard instruments, and other sources of clinically 
relevant information can be overlooked. Even when assessment is correctly 
broad-based, evidence of the diagnostic validity of extraneous information is 
lacking, and further, many authors suggest a reluctance of clinicians to 
diagnose malingering.
It is now clear that all assessments of cognitive functioning in compensation 
claims should include specialised procedures for the detection of under- 
performance, and, since such procedures tend to be of low sensitivity, several 
methods of detection should be employed in any assessment.
Specialised procedures are few, and based on even fewer principles, which it 
is assumed are not known to the naïve malingerer. In the current information 
revolution, this assumption can only become less tenable. It is therefore 
important to develop new techniques and enhance the sensitivity of existing 
ones. Furthermore, many existing tests, though widely recommended, have 
little normative or validating data.
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The Present Study was designed to provide some guiding data from local 
populations for a battery of tests of under-performance, and to test the 
diagnostic validity of a new and relatively untested dimension of an existing 
test: response latency in a computerised forced-choice recognition test.
Methodology:
Four groups will be formed, with in excess of 20 participants in each:
1. Patients with minor head injuries (MHI) complaining of post-concussional 
symptoms (PCS).
2. Uninjured participants (“Normals”)
3. Patients with severe head injuries and documented cognitive impairment 
(“Disabled”).
4. Uninjured participants encouraged to simulate the effects of head injury on 
the tests (Simulators)
Groups will be compared using one-way analyses of variance for each score 
dimension of the test battery (maximum 6 comparisons) using the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons.
Participants will be tested on a battery of tests, including a measure of 
response latency in one of the tests, and it is hypothesised that the simulators 
will perform worse on the tests than all other groups, while those with PCS will 
not differ from normals on the tests, and will not score lower than the Disabled 
group.
Approval has been obtained from the Local Research Ethics Committee of the 
Mid-Sussex NHS Trust. Participants will be recruited from staff at the 
Princess Royal Hospital, Haywards Heath, patients recorded with head injury 
at the A&E department at the Princess Royal, patients given 
neuropsychological assessments at Hurstwood Park Neurological Centre, and 
attenders of Headway Hurstwood Park day centre, Newick.
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THE PROFESSIONAL DOSSIER
CONTENTS
Curriculum Vitae
Case Study:
The Neuropsychological Assessment and Medico-Legal Case 
of a ‘Probable Malingerer’.
The Neuropsychological Assessment 
Subsequent Analyses:
Detailed Analysis of the Other Psychologists’ Reports 
The Medical Chronology 
The Existing and Subsequent Literature 
Conclusions 
References
Appendix 1: Test Results
Appendix 2: Some of the Lessons Learned
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CURRICULUM VITAE
Occupation: Clinical Psychologist, Primary Care and Neuropsychology
Mid Sussex NHS Trust
Clinical Psychologist, Adult Mental Health & Neuropsychology 
Private Practice
Date and Place of Birth: 19*^  December 1952, Manchester, UK
PART ONE: EDUCATION
1964-72 William Hulme’s Grammar School, Manchester
1973-76 University of London BSc (Hons) Human Biology
1976-77 University of Kingston Postgraduate Cert. Education
1977-78 University of Aston in Birmingham MSc Applied Psychology
1979-81 University of Surrey MSc Clinical Psychology
PART TWO: PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
1978-79 Psychological Technician, Adult & Adolescent Mental Health
Solihull Area Health Authority
1979-81 Probationer Clinical Psychologist (Professional Training)
SW Thames RHA / University of Surrey
1982-83 Clinical Psychologist, Adult Mental Health
Brighton Health Authority
1983-86 University Lecturer, Clinical Psychology, and 
Senior Clinical Psychologist, Elderly Mental Health
University of Surrey / SW Surrey Health Authority
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1986-89 Senior Clinical Psychologist, Neuropsychology, Adult Mental Health
Mid Downs Health Authority, Sussex
1989-92 PhD Graduate Student in Clinical Psychology,
Fordham University, New York
May-Aug Locum Principal Clinical Psychologist, Neuropsychology
1990 & 91 Ticehurst House Hospital Head Injury Unit, Sussex, &
Unsted Park Medical Rehabilitation Centre, Godalming, Surrey
1992-93 Clinical (/Health) Psychologist, Orthopaedics and Neuropsychology
Unsted Park Medical Rehabilitation Centre, Godalming, Surrey
1993-95 Clinical Psychologist, Neurological Rehabilitation
Rowans Rehabilitation Unit, Plymouth Community Trust
1995- Clinical Psychologist, Primary Care & Neuropsychology
Mid Sussex NHS Trust
PART THREE: FURTHER EDUCATION & TRAINING
1982-83 training in Family Therapy
1985 training in Small Groups Teaching
1986 Coaching Certificate, English Football Association
1986-89 training in management
1989-92 Fordham University, New York, USA (Scholarship)
Graduate Student in Clinical Psychology 
All required courses and supervised training practica passed 
Masters and Doctoral Comprehensive Examinations passed 
(Research and Internship to be completed)
1994-96 BPsS Special Group in Clinical Neuropsychology, London 
Two-year Post-Qualification Course in Clinical Neuropsychology
1995-96 SETRHA Training in Psychodynamic Psychotherapy 
One-year Introductory Course
1999- University of Surrey: Psych.D.
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THE PROFESSIONAL DOSSIER
CASE STUDY
of the
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
and
MEDICO-LEGAL CASE
of a
‘PROBABLE MALINGERER’
Abstract
PM was the subject of a medico-legal neuropsychological assessment. He 
had already been assessed by two other experienced psychologists. My 
assessment provided evidence of under-performance, but my initial 
conclusion, influenced by conflicting medical opinion, and by the opinions of 
the other psychologists, fell short of diagnosing malingering.
However, subsequent analysis of all neuropsychological reports, of a large 
collection of medical records, and of subsequent academic literature, has led 
me to a final conclusion of probable malingering.
Note: For the purposes of confidentiality, not only of the client, but also of the other psychologists 
involved, all personnel have been given pseudonyms, and although time perspective has been 
maintained, all dates, except for literature references, have been changed.
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Background - Solicitor’s Brief
Mr PM was a 49-year-old male who was referred for medico-legal 
neuropsychological assessment in October 1983, five years after he suffered 
a head injury in a road accident, on 3^  ^October 1978.
PM was referred by a firm of solicitors, acting on behalf of the insurers of the 
other driver, “the defendant”, who were dealing with a claim made by PM, “the 
plaintiff’, seeking compensation for injuries said to have been sustained in the 
accident.
The solicitor informed me that PM was a bus driver. He was riding his 
motorcycle through the depot yard on his way home. The other driver was 
leaving work in his car, and a collision occurred when the car drove into the 
side of the motorcycle. PM, who was wearing a crash helmet, was thrown 
onto the road, and may have been knocked unconscious. He was taken to 
hospital, where cerebral concussion, and a soft tissue injury of the neck were 
diagnosed. He was given a soft collar and allowed to go home. The next day 
he visited his GP complaining of headache.
I was asked to conduct my assessment without prior reference to two other 
psychological assessments, one made routinely within the NHS, the other on 
behalf of the plaintiffs solicitors.
THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
I saw PM on six occasions, each lasting two hours, in November and 
December 1983, using an unusually wide battery of tests. It was my practice 
to be prepared to use several tests, particularly for memory and information 
processing, where minor injuries are involved, or where the genuineness of a 
subject is questioned. Questions regarding subtle deficits are more likely to 
be answered this way, as are questions of inconsistency. In this case, I did
9
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not feel that these questions had been adequately answered by standard 
testing, so the procedure became prolonged. As it turned out, using several, 
seemingly redundant, tests, provided me with important evidence of 
inconsistency.
Interview
PM had just turned 50. He told me briefly about the accident, adding that 
since then he had been told that he was unconscious “for minutes”. His first 
memory after the accident was of getting into the ambulance. He recalled 
waking the next day with a very bad headache. Consequently, he told me, he 
could not move his head. Both he and his wife explicitly and insistently 
recollected his going to his GP that day.
Since then, PM reported, everything had gone downhill, with his complaints 
primarily being about impaired cognitive function, particularly memory. When 
asked for examples of forgetting, he said, “everything”. He had trouble 
remembering what happened yesterday, and he would lose objects. He had 
difficulty concentrating, and there was now “not enough room” in his head to 
do mental arithmetic, at which he used to excel. He told me he had not been 
able to resume a course in computer training, because the knowledge he had 
gained had gone. PM told me he used to help friends with mechanical 
problems, but he couldn’t any more because of concentration and memory 
problems. He used to bake bread, but he’d had to give it up, and he used to 
play musical instruments. He was nowadays “re-learning” to play the piano, 
practising daily. He claimed he used to be a regular cinema-goer, but now 
didn’t bother, and he did not remember films made before his accident, even 
when they appeared on the television. Nor, for that matter, did he remember 
well other events that had occurred before his accident. He also told me that 
his memory had “stepped down” three years previously, and had stayed at 
that lower level ever since. He noticed at this time, for example, that he’d 
forgotten, half way to the garage, why he was going there; he lost his car in 
town by forgetting where he’d parked it; he’d even lost his dog, by leaving it
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tied to the post office for over 2 hours. Consequently, he would not drive to 
town or walk the dog to the shops. He was no longer working, he told me, 
because his PSV licence had automatically been suspended following a head 
injury, and because he had been off sick for six months, with headaches and 
concentration problems, and trouble remembering his bus routes, after which 
he was retired on medical grounds.
There was a helplessness in PM’s reports of everyday life. PM presented as 
an intelligent man with poor concentration and suspect memory. He did not, 
subsequently, present any evidence that he had lost the intellectual abilities to 
solve practical problems, such as the risk of losing a parked car. Yet PM 
never gave a single example of how he overcame the problems of which he 
complained. On the contrary, he seemed determined to be thwarted by his 
condition. He would happily talk of his frustration at returning home without all 
the groceries his wife had told him to get, seemingly without it occurring to 
him, or his wife, that even uninjured people use a shopping list. (Also, PM 
was in rehabilitation therapy with a psychologist, a colleague. Dr Stoke who 
later confided in me that PM was not responding to coping strategies, such as 
making use of a diary.)
PM was fully co-operative throughout all sessions, although he became 
somewhat less enthusiastic in the latter sessions. PM was able to apply 
himself to the tasks throughout each session, and there was no evidence of a 
deterioration in performance over the two hours (which included a break). 
However, at each subsequent session PM would complain that following the 
previous one he had had a headache and found it difficult to sleep.
11
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Summary of Results 
(See Appendix 1 for details of tests used, and results)
The MART (National Adult Reading Test) score indicated a premorbid 
WAIS-R (Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised) full-scale IQ of above 
average levels (>70^  ^%ile).
The WAIS-R sub-test age-related scaled scores were average or slightly 
higher, with the exception of those of Arithmetic, Digit Span and Digit Symbol, 
which were below average (<30^  ^%ile), or well below average (<20**^  %ile), 
and the impression thereby gained was of acquired impairment in attention 
and information processing speed.
However, it was in his responding to an Arithmetic question that my 
suspicions were first raised about PM’s genuineness. On being asked to 
subtract £7.50 from £18, PM puffed and blew unconvincingly for 40 seconds, 
before giving the wrong answer. When asked later, he repeated the question 
over and over, apparently unable to make the calculation while simultaneously 
retaining the question. After 90 seconds, he gave up, unable to give a 
response. In contrast, PM had managed to recall more complex arithmetic 
questions, and answer them correctly, some with even longer delays. Later 
still, PM was shown the question written, and provided the correct answer, 
verbally, immediately, with an expression conveying that he could do these 
sums easily, but not totally in his head. To me, he was ‘protesting too much’, 
and I concluded that the pattem of responding to the Arithmetic questions was 
unusual, and not convincing of genuine organic impairment.
On the WMS-R (Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised), the scores obtained 
were consistently of an average level, or a little above average, even after a 
delay, with the exception of a Digit Span task, and Visual Memory Span, on 
repeat testing of which there were signs of inconsistency.
Furthermore, the very low Attention/Concentration Index was at odds with the 
Memory Indexes obtained, although I was unaware of the significance of this
12
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at the time, merely noting that this set of scores was unusual, and inconsistent 
with each other, and with some WAIS-R performance.
On the AMIPB, scores were much more variable, ranging from well above 
average (>80^  ^%ile) to abnormally low (<5^  ^%ile) and in general painted a 
picture of impaired verbal and non-verbal memory. This contrasted markedly 
with the WMS-R results. I had seen before differences among different 
memory tests, but noted that the differences obtained on this occasion were 
extraordinary, and indicated widely fluctuating performance.
On the BVRT (Benton Visual Retention Test), administered the day after the 
AMIPB, no significant discrepancies were observed.
On tests of information processing, the scores were below average, well 
below average, and abnormally low. Insofar as they were consistent with 
each other, they were also consistent with the impression of impairments in 
information processing speed and in attention / working memory on the 
WAIS-R and WMS-R. In contrast, throughout, PM made few or no errors on 
these tests, representing above average performance in this respect.
The below-chance response
The result which gave me the greatest disquiet with regard to the genuineness 
of PM’s performance was a score on the Warrington Recognition Memory 
Test. Words were recognised to a well-below average level (just below 20*  ^
%ile), but the performance on Faces was much worse. The score was 18, 
and ‘below chance’: the probability of obtaining this score by chance is 0.024. 
Furthermore, the score obtained was far below the lowest score listed in the 
norms (36), and three standard deviations below the mean of the worst 
scoring patient groups in the standardisation samples. I concluded in my 
report that PM was “on some level, consciously or otherwise, actually 
recognising material, and yet avoiding its selection, choosing instead an 
unfamiliar face”.
13
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Professional Dossier. Case Study.
Specialised tests
On more single-purpose tests of under-performance, PM showed some 
deviance, if not so markedly as on the WRMT.
On the 15 Items Test, all 15 figures were correctly recalled, with the figures in 
almost perfect order, with therefore no suggestion of under-performance.
On a 15-word recognition task, the Word Recognition List, only one word was 
identified. This compared with recall scores of 4 and 6 after 15-word lists 
were presented in the same way during the AMIPB, and, according to Lezak 
(1983, p 621), this pattern “raises the possibility" of feigning or non­
cooperation.
On the Dot-Counting Test, PM’s responses were generally slower than norms 
given in Lezak (1983), although, as was PM’s characteristic, generally correct, 
with only one, minimal, error. Trends were somewhat irregular, and, 
according to Lezak (1983), “more than one pronounced deviation,” from a 
linear trend, “raises the likelihood that the patient is not acting in good faith ”. I 
tentatively concluded that this pattern “was patchy and inconsistent, and 
suggested an interference in functioning beyond that usually seen with brain 
injury”.
Doubts about conscious malingering
Despite the fact that I had evidence of under-performance, I was very 
reluctant to arrive at a conclusion of malingering. There were several factors 
involved in this hesitation.
1. Contradictory evidence
PM’s performance as a whole did not appear to be obviously false. Apart 
from those occasions listed above where PM’s responses were suspect, there 
were many more opportunities which PM did nof take to emphasise his
14
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weaknesses. For example, almost the entire WMS-R was performed at 
average levels or better. His performance on the WAIS-R was impaired only 
in parts, and according to a plausible theme, of slowed information 
processing. He scored above average on WMS-R Visual Memory, and on 
one visual memory test in the AMIPB, and he did not do badly on the BVRT. 
And he passed the 15-Item test of malingering.
Furthermore, despite apparent difficulties on the way, PM tended to arrive at 
the correct answer, or make minimal errors, throughout the assessment. For 
example, having spent two minutes struggling with a percentage calculation, 
why did he then provide the right answer?
2. The influence of a senior colleague.
I had been in post for about six months, and had not been working in 
neuropsychology for some years prior to this. In a nearby department was a 
senior colleague, who had been working for five years on a busy neurosurgery 
ward, and prided himself on keeping up with the fast moving action and 
demands of the ward. This neuropsychologist. Dr Stoke, was a strong and 
confident personality with a formidable reputation locally and regionally, and 
had a research interest in persistent post-concussional syndrome. He had 
assessed PM 18 months previously within his NHS practice, and was seeing 
PM and his wife for rehabilitation. Informally we talked about the case, and Dr 
Stoke made it very clear to me that he sympathised with PM’s plight (as was 
in-keeping with the philosophy of his research programme, that persistent 
post-concussional symptoms (PCS) arose from organic brain impairment). Dr 
Stoke told me that he had tested PM before, finding memory impairment, and 
intimated to me that PM was in genuine difficulties, and that I should “not be 
too hard on him” in my report. The patient’s medical notes contained a brief 
and rather incomplete summary of Dr Stoke’s findings, together with a report 
strongly expressing a view of brain injury.
His report to the neurologist read: “You have said this man is suffering from 
Post-Concussional Syndrome, and may have implied that there is a functional
15
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element to his complaints. I have taken much time to assess the case and 
disagree. ... He displays most of the ‘classic’ signs of head injury, and his 
symptoms have not substantially recovered or improved in the years since his 
injury”.
From my point of view at the time. Dr Stoke knew more than I did about mild 
head injury, and about PCS. He also knew PM better than I, having had 
some fortnightly sessions of rehabilitation therapy with him and his wife, which 
were in progress at the time.
3. The third psychologist’s report
After my assessment I was sent the report of a psychologist. Dr Ireland, a 
Fellow of the BPsS and a retired head of department, who was acting on 
behalf of the plaintiff, and who concluded that PM was suffering from the 
effects of a brain injury. And there was a range of medical experts gathered 
by ‘the other side’ who shared this opinion. It was not until later that I came to 
question Dr Ireland’s conclusion.
4. The question of intention
The solicitor wanted to know whether PM was injured or faking, one or the 
other. I explained that his condition could involve both brain injury and 
exaggeration, and further, that such exaggeration could be produced with 
varying degrees of conscious intention, or self-deception. PM (and his wife) 
had been preoccupied by his disability over many years; his life outside the 
home seemed to revolve around the local Headway centre, and it seemed 
that Dr Stoke was having difficulty helping PM to shift from his sick role. It 
was possible, therefore, that many of his difficulties derived from ‘core beliefs’ 
and his underperformance was less than conscious.
5. Inexperience
I had spent some years working in neuropsychology; I was accustomed to 
clients telling me the truth, and doing their best, and I had not knowingly come 
across many malingerers. My experience with frank malingering was limited.
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to my recollection, to one or two rather obvious and straightforward cases with 
relatively minor claims.
My experience with mild head injury was also fairly limited, and I was not fully 
conversant with the literature, but my understanding of the controversy 
surrounding mild head injury was that it could result in actual brain injury 
which had previously been unrecognised, and that the effects could persist for 
years.
Initial Opinion
In forming my initial opinion, I was therefore bending over backwards not to 
label PM a malingerer, and to accommodate where I could the views of the 
two other psychologists and various medical experts, who had assessed him. 
(And their view, of organic impairment, seemed subsequently to be supported 
by an Order of the Court of Protection, concluding that PM was incapable of 
managing his affairs.)
However, more careful analysis of the reports of Dr Stoke and Dr Ireland 
revealed their conclusions to be questionable. Furthermore, several other 
pieces of evidence emerged from medical reports, other medical records, and 
from subsequent literature, which suggested deception by PM, and for which 
an explanation of unconscious motivation would come to appear to be more 
and more tenuous.
17
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SUBSEQUENT ANALYSES 
Detailed Analysis of the Other Psychologists’ Reports
Dr Ireland’s Reports
Dr Ireland unquestioningly accepted PM’s reports of intolerable headache, 
worsening on effort and concentration, and an inability to concentrate for 
more than twenty minutes, and concluded that PM “consumes so much 
energy processing information that he is vulnerable to rapid and extreme 
exhaustion”. Yet in both his assessments, PM underwent cognitively 
demanding procedures of 2% hours each, without any report of headache or 
tiredness.
Dr Ireland found that PM’s memory was “just, but only just, outside the normal 
range”, while relying on some unusual tests. One was the Williams test of 
Delayed Recall (Williams, 1968), which does not get a mention in Lezak (1983 
or 1995), and uses a normative group of 50, all of whom were younger than 
PM, and a patient sample, only 12 of whom were in PM’s age group. Another 
test was the Rey figure, for which Ireland did not cite his norms, but Lezak 
gives French norms from 1944. A third was the Benton Visual Retention test, 
and the last was the Wechsler Memory Scale, 1945 edition. Dr Ireland, who 
was the first to test PM, did not explain why he did not use the most widely 
used memory tests of the time, the WMS-R and the AMIPB.
Dr Ireland arrived at a vague implication of brain damage, and that “it is not at 
all likely that he will be able to harness his considerable intellectual ability”, 
from: average scores for Digit Span and Arithmetic, a well below average 
Digit Symbol, well-above average, and average, WMS scores, a score only 
just outside the “normal range ” on the Williams, and having the suggestion of 
impairment on the Benton and Rey tests.
Dr Ireland conducted a second assessment some years later, when he would 
have had access to Dr Stoke’s and my reports. He made no reference to
18
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either, except to dismiss hugely contradictory results with the comment that 
PM had had to make long journeys for some of his assessments, and “for this 
reason the variation ... can be explained”. Apart from being not true -  PM 
lived in the same area as Dr Ireland, and no more than two miles from the 
hospital site where all other testing took place -  such an explanation could not 
fit the bizarre and irregular pattern of results, as will be seen later.
In the second report. Dr Ireland now described PM’s “attention span” to be of 
two hours, without an explanation of this large (and convenient) change in 
capacity. He said that PM’s recall of the Rey Figure was better than 
previously, but gave “a clear indication of deficit”. Previously, his score on this 
test had been “half a point below the cut-off between deficit and no deficit”.
Dr Ireland did not explain how a score better than half a point below the cut­
off can give “a clear indication of deficit”.
Dr Ireland did not use a single test of verbal memory, and did not repeat the 
WAIS-R, despite the clear contention, throughout the case, of inconsistency. 
He did, however, repeat Digit Span, and, without revealing the score (apart 
from to say that it was average) came to the conclusion of brain damage 
directly from the fact the string lengths forward and backwards were the 
same. In fact, this result is very close to one which Lezak (1995, p 359) 
describes as reflecting the patient’s lack of effort.
Dr Stoke’s Report
Dr Stoke deduced frontal lobe damage from “frequent non-perseverative 
errors” on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), when it is perseverative 
errors which are considered indicative of ‘frontal’ damage (Heaton, 1981), and 
from the use of only two (unnamed) letters in Verbal Fluency, when the 
standard procedure is three. When pro-rated to three letters. Dr Stoke’s 
results are classified as “High Normal” in Lezak (1995).
On two tests, the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT), and the 
Warrington Recognition Memory Test (WRMT), PM obtained scores which 
were extraordinary even among brain-injured patients. The RBMT (First
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Edition) is a test with a very low ceiling, useful with patients who would barely 
register a score in the more widely used tests, the WMS-R and the AMIPB.
Dr Stoke did not arrive at final scores from the protocol, but if he had, he 
would have obtained scores which were six standard deviations below the 
norm, and worse than 80% of the standardisation sample patients, who had 
substantiated, severe, brain injuries.
On the WRMT, the higher score, for Words, was 3 standard deviations below 
the norm, and below the average for the patient sample with identified left 
hemisphere lesions. The score for Faces was at chance, and three standard 
deviations below the average of patients whose lesions were firmly 
established by brain scan.
Yet Dr Stoke drew the conclusion of brain damage in this patient, for whom 
CT and MRI scans were normal, and did not comment even on the possibility 
that these results were artificially produced.
Indeed, in a case which was disputed for ten years, when the question of 
faking was openly debated, and a neurologist, cited by the plaintiff’s solicitor, 
himself was of the view that the deficits were psychological, neither Dr Ireland 
nor Dr Stoke conducted a single test of malingering, nor demonstrated any 
consideration of the hypothesis of under-performance as an explanation for 
their results.
Comparison of Results of Tests Repeated in Assessments 
From scores derived from statements in both reports, it was possible to make 
comparisons between three of the four assessments. The assessments were 
conducted by Dr Ireland in 1981, 3 years post-accident, by Dr Stoke six 
months later; by myself in 1983, (and again by Dr Ireland in 1988, but not with 
comparable tests).
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Dr Stoke’s estimate of Performance 10 was 124, Dr Ireland’s 110, and mine 
30 points lower than Dr Stoke’s, at 93. Full-scale IQs showed a similar 
pattern of discrepancy.
Some error may have been attributable to pro-rating, but even at the level of 
sub-tests, there were differences in Scaled Scores, on the same tests, as 
large as six points, or two standard deviations. Digit Span, the source of Dr 
Ireland’s claims of brain damage, was measured on six occasions, with scores 
varying from the 25^  ^to 95*^  percentiles.
Nor was it a matter of a systematic difference in scoring styles, for, on the 
WMS-R, the discrepancy between Dr Stoke’s and my findings was in the main 
reversed: Dr Stoke found below average memory Indexes, and abnormally 
low for Delayed Memory, while I found them to be average or better. 
Conversely, Dr Stoke found an above average Attention/Concentration Index, 
while I found one almost two standard deviations lower.
Thus, using the two major assessment instruments with the most widespread 
use, and the most demonstrable reliability, PM is supposed to have lost 30 IQ 
points in 18 months, while his delayed memory had improved within this 
period, from the 2"  ^percentile to an average level, all while PM was 
complaining his memory was deteriorating. At least his complaint had the 
support of tests of his working memory, which indicated a deterioration from 
the highest fifth percentile to the lowest. And all this between fourth and fifth 
year post-injury!
There is no neuropsychological explanation for these results, nor a 
psychometric one. The patient’s performance was clearly unreliable, and 
there were no longer any consistent grounds for diagnosing brain injury.
On the contrary, there were many grounds for concluding that PM had been 
under-performing, and growing reason to suspect that this had been 
intentional.
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The Medical Chronology
PM’s many and complex medical records show that he was signed off sick, 
with a variety of medical complaints, for a total of 5 weeks in 1976, 12 weeks 
in 1977, and 4 weeks in the period to October, the date of the accident in 
question, in 1978.
When he was 17 and in the Royal Marines, he reported to the sick bay with a 
3-year history of visual problems with his left eye, which became attributed to 
his right eye a week later. The Medical Officer found his acuity, with 
unobtrusive testing, to be normal, and considered the complaint “functional”.
The records also reveal that, in August 1975, PM had been involved in a 
previous accident at a funfair, for which he had made a claim for 
compensation, for damage to his back, over the next 3 years. There are 7 
entries in the medical records to the end of 1975, indicating a visit to the GP 
or specialist, with reference to the lower back pain attributed to that accident,
6 more in 1976, 5 in 1977, and 8 more in 1978, before the case was settled 
(unsuccessfully, it appears), just after PM’s motor cycle accident, at the end of 
1978. In the records of the next ten years, only one more reference is made 
to that first complaint. The records suggest the possibility that PM’s 26 
encounters with doctors were more to do with his compensation claim than 
any injury.
PM was given a soft collar to wear for a few days after his (second, 1978) 
accident. Six weeks later he was seen by a specialist concerning his back 
injuries from the previous accident. He was referred for this examination on 
13 October, ten days after the latter accident, yet no mention was made in 
that referral of head or neck (or memory) symptoms. At the examination, in 
November, the consultant’s report makes no mention of the collar, and it can 
be assumed PM was not wearing it, and also makes no mention of the second 
accident, headaches, or any other related symptoms, saying “much of the 
session was spent finalising his [first] litigation”.
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Conversely, when, 15 months later, PM saw an orthopaedic surgeon with 
respect to his complaints following the second accident, he was wearing his 
collar, (for no reason that the surgeon could determine), and the doctor 
reports that PM denied any other illness or injuries in his history, despite his 
being signed off work for 21 weeks in the 3 years prior to the accident. PM 
made no mention of the previous accident and his back injuries, for which he 
had visited a doctor 26 times, and had made a 3-year compensation claim.
Furthermore, he denied or minimised this medical history in other medical 
examinations, some of which were conducted in the presence of his wife (who 
might have been expected to correct his poor recall). He told two specialists 
involved in the second accident that the previous back injury was insignificant, 
and the symptoms had disappeared after “a few weeks”.
Mr and Mrs PM explicitly and emphatically had told me they visited the GP the 
day after his 1978 accident, yet the records do not record a visit until eleven 
days later.
Loss of consciousness at the time of the accident
There is no evidence whatever listed in contemporaneous medical records of 
loss of consciousness at the time of the accident. The GP reported no loss of 
consciousness, as did the A&E department, for whom this symptom is a 
criterion for overnight admission, and who sent him home. The only report of 
loss of consciousness, and this of seconds or minutes, is from PM himself, 
who by definition would not actually know (he told me he'd “heard” this 
information). None of his colleagues reported that he was knocked out, and 
the defendant stated that PM got up and walked to the office. And yet “loss of 
consciousness of several minutes” found its way into reports, including Dr 
Stoke’s, based solely on the word of a compensation claimant, years after the 
event. The phrase then became reified as fact, and incorporated into the 
understanding of the case by other experts, who had partly depended on the 
earlier reports.
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Delayed onset of “memory loss”
Memory loss is not mentioned in records until two months after the accident, 
when PM is described as “slightly more forgetful”, and it is mentioned in this 
light until as late as 1981, after which there is no more mention in the GP 
notes of memory problems. Instead, “his memory has gradually deteriorated 
over the last year” is noted in a neurology report of July 1981, almost three 
years after the accident. After this, memory complaints, exclusively to 
specialists involved in the compensation claim, became more dramatic over 
time, until they were listed as the most important symptom by Dr Ireland, ten 
years after the accident.
Headache, the chief symptom for two years after the accident, was also a 
frequent complaint for many years before it.
The Existing and Subsequent Literature
In the years after my assessment the literature was to offer much support of 
the malingering hypothesis.
A review of the literature (see this Portfolio: Academic Dossier: First Literature 
Review) shows that no controlled study has shown deficit on standard 
neuropsychological tests one year post mild head injury, in patients not 
making compensation claims.
An attention/memory span higher in reverse than forward was said to be 
“rarely seen,” and “probably reflects the patient's lack of effort” by Lezak 
(1995, p 359).
A WMS-R Attention/Concentration Index notably lower than General Memory 
was to be taken by several authors as indicative of deception (Mittenberg et a! 
1993; Iverson et a! 2000).
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Millis (1992) and Millis et al (1994) showed that the Warrington Recognition 
Memory Test could be used to identify exaggeration, and one team of 
researchers (Greiffenstein et al 1994) listed four characteristics of mild head 
injury patients which were taken to identify ‘probable malingerers’. They were:
• two neuropsychological test scores indicating severe impairment
• a symptom history contradicted by records or surveillance
• total disability in work or major social role after one year
• claims of remote memory loss
The authors required two of these criteria to be met. PM’s case arguably met 
all four. These authors later (Greiffenstein et al 1996a) confirmed Lezak’s 
(1983) view and demonstrated that a Word Recognition List score less than 
the first trial of the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (equivalent to List Learning 
of the AMIPB) is characteristic of ‘probable malingering’.
Slick et al (1999) described below-chance scoring on forced-choice tests as, 
“short of confession, the ‘gold standard’ for malingering”.
And late-onset of symptoms was confirmed in subsequent literature as 
‘improbable’ and therefore not representative of genuine impairment (see 
Binder & Rohling 1996; Pankratz & Binder, 1997; Reynolds 1998).
Finally, amongst other corroborations, my own research (see Research 
Dossier) shows that PM’s response latency in the Dot Counting test is much 
more representative of the Simulators’ performance than the ‘Disabled’ 
participants, and this performance would today classify PM as under­
performing.
However, there was, and is, a continued absence from the literature of a 
definitive guide to the Intentlonallty of under-performance. The consensus, 
indeed, the apparently unchallenged view, is expressed by Ruff et a! (1993):
"With respect to evaluating what is conscious and unconscious, we may have 
reached the limits of science only to enter into the realm of metaphysics. Thus a 
separation between conscious and unconscious is typically an educated guess for 
any diagnostician.”
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CONCLUSIONS
It is my “educated guess”, on the balance of probabilities, that PM had been 
intentionally under-performing - malingering - during my assessment, and 
those of Drs Ireland and Stoke and others. I base this conclusion principally 
on the grounds of
• a premorbid history of a “functional” complaint
• the pattern of medical complaints before and after his previous 
compensation claim
• inconsistencies in PM’s own accounts of his history and symptoms, 
many of which were made in the presence of his wife
• inconsistencies between these accounts and the evidence of severity 
of the injury
• inconsistencies between these accounts and the medical records
• highly inconsistent performance on tests
• extreme and inadequate self-management, with implausible 
justification
• confirmatory findings in the subsequent literature
I learned, or was reminded of, many professional lessons by this case (see 
Appendix 2.) For example, medico-legal assessments take considerably 
more time, and involve various, more thorough investigations than routine 
assessments within the NHS; it is better to make those investigations early, 
rather than be pushed into them by subsequent controversy; it helps to have a 
good knowledge of the literature; and, of course, basic skills of assessment 
and scientific method should not be overlooked.
While it was reassuring to read of the faith of medical colleagues in the 
reliability and validity of psychological assessments, and disturbing to suspect 
that this trust was misplaced, one cannot generalise from these observations 
in a single case. However, the evidence in this case that the possibility of 
malingering was underestimated, indeed overlooked, is echoed in the
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literature (Rogers & Cavanaugh, 1983; McMordie, 1988; Faust ef a /1991; 
Lees-Haley et al 1996; Resnick, 1988; Iverson & Binder, 2000).
An important implication of this case, and from the literature, therefore, is that 
medico-legal assessments should always include the hypothesis of 
malingering, and that this hypothesis should be tested from a variety of 
perspectives, including the use of more than one specialised procedure 
(Franzen et al 1990; Binder, 1993; Slick ef a /1999; Sweet, 1999; Iverson & 
Binder, 2000).
This implication is explored in the works of the other Dossiers of this Portfolio.
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APPENDIX 1
Results of the Neuropsychological Assessment
1. National Adult Reading Test (MART). Errors: 14. Predicted premorbid WAIS-R FSIQ: 
113
2. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
Verbal Tests Raw Score
Digit Span 
Vocabulary 
Arithmetic 
Similarities
Performance Tests
Picture Completion 
Block Design 
Digit Symbol
12 
53 
8 (-13+) 
9
15 
28 (-36) 
29
Age Related 
Scaled Score 
8 
11 
8 (-11+)
10
10 
11 (-13) 
6
Pro-rated Verbal 
IQ:
95 (-100)
Pro-rated 
Performance IQ:
92 (-94)
3. Adult Memory and Information Processing Battery (AMIPB) 
Story Recall: 25-50
5-25
<10
0<10
Immediate: estimated percentile range:
Delayed:
Retained:
Total: estimated percentile range:
Interference:
Post Interference: “
Intrusions (0 )
Recognition (from list of 60): List A: 12/15;
Copy: correct, at least average score
Immediate: estimated percentile range:
Delayed:
Retained:
Design Learning: Total: estimated percentile range:
Interference:
Post Interference: “
Intrusions:
Information Processing A: Task A Total: 30. Below cut-off, and sample lowest.
Writing speed: estimated percentile range: <10
List Learning:
Figure Recall:
40-60
<5
75
List B 2/15; Intrusions: 0
75-90
25-50
10-25
25-35
40-60
<10
25-50
4. Wechsler Memory Scale -  Revised (WMS -  R) (administered before AMIPB)
5.
6.
Verbal Memory Index:
Visual Memory Index:
General Memory Index: 
Attention/Concentration Memory Index: 85
Delayed Memory Index:
Benton Visual Retention Test (BVRT) 
Observed Number Correct: 7;
Expected Number Correct: 8;
103
110
105
103
Errors: 3, including 2 rotations 
Errors: 2
Warrington Recognition Test (WRMT) 
Words: Raw 42;
Faces: Raw 18;
Face discrepancy:
Percentile 20; Scaled 7
Percentile 0 (31=1  ^%ile) Scaled <4 (36=SS of 4)
24 (largest for this age group was 11 )
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7. Trail-Making Test
Trail A: Time; 51 secs; Errors; 0 approx 5-20*^  %ile
Trail B: Time: 131 secs; Errors: 0 approx 5-20'  ^%ile (Spreen & Strauss‘98).
8. Stroop Neurological Screening Test:
Colour Task: 12 responses in 72 secs, 0 errors (<10“’ %ile)
Colour-Word Task: 77 responses in 120 secs, 0 errors.
(3^  ^%ile in 18-49 age group; 2 f* in >50 age group)
Tests of Under-Performance
9. 15 Items Test: Total score: 15 (after non-standard 15 second exposure)
10. Word Recognition Test: Recognition score: 1
11. Dot Counting
Grouped Dots: 0 errors. Ungrouped Dots 1 error.
Grouped dots counting time in excess of b.d. sample (28 dots time 3x longer)
Ungrouped dots counted more quickly than b.d. average.
Graphs almost touch and intercept at two points.
Supplementary Measure: The MMPI-2
The programmed report for the obtained profile ran to several pages, but included the 
following interesting characteristics for subjects who had shown similar profiles:
Validity. Valid profile, but self being presented in improbably favourable light.
Affect Emotional over-control; possible underlying depression
Somatic: Ineffective resolution of feelings results in physical complaints, typically pain, 
frequently vague and unusual often located in extremities: arm, leg, neck and head. 
Complaints may be unconsciously expressed and produce secondary gain.
Personality /  Behaviour. Dependency usually prominent. Attempts to meet needs in 
unobtrusive yet manipulative ways.
Poor tolerance for stress and pressure; dissatisfied, moody, restless, unstable.
Over-concern about body functioning; complain a great deal; complaints can be vague 
and include chronic fatigue, weakness and pain without a clear organic basis. When 
documented medical problems exist, exaggeration of symptoms is likely. Somatic 
symptoms may be used as an expression of dependency and used to manipulate.
Minimal responsiveness to therapy. Physical symptoms may be unconsciously used for 
secondary gain, such as avoidance of responsibility.
Diagnoses: psycho-physiological reaction and hypochondriasis, but also conversion 
reaction, and somatoform disorder. BUT: even though functional disorders are
correlated with this profile, this profile cannot be used to reliably distinguish between 
functional disorders and actual physical disorders.
However, it should be noted that similar profiles are also shown by people with head injuries 
and genuine physical complaints.
31
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Professional Dossier. Case Study.
APPENDIX 2: Some of the Lessons Learned
1 Allow a great deal of time for the case. Medico-legal work requires a great deal of 
additional preparation, far in excess of NHS work. Routine clinical neuropsychological 
assessments might usefully carry the disclaimer: “This is not a medico-legal report, and it 
should not be used for legal purposes without further involvement of the author”.
2 Do not assume you will cross that bridge when you come to it. It is better for you to 
prepare your case as though it will reach trial, and the trial were starting tomorrow.
3 Use standard forms, and stick to protocols. Record details of test scores & performance.
4 Conduct the assessment with the explicit acknowledgement of the hypothesis of under­
performance. But: judgement of malingering is reported to be poor when based on standard 
test scores alone. (See Second Literature Review.) So ...
... Always include, in cases of claims for compensation, a battery of tests designed to detect 
under-performance. The rate of malingering in compensation claims has been estimated to 
exceed 50%. (See Literature Review to Present Study). Green et al (2001) argue that the 
testee’s effort is five times more influential than actual brain damage in compensation claims, 
and Green (2001) warns that U.S. insurance companies will not pay for neuropsychological 
investigations which have not formally assessed motivation.
... One test of under-performance is not enough. PM completed the 15 Item Test almost 
perfectly. If this test had been used alone, as it has by many neuropsychologists (Lees-Haley 
1996) the client would have passed the test of under-performance. Iverson & Binder (2000) 
recommend that this particular test is not used in isolation, but that proscription could be 
applied to any test of under-performance. (See Literature Review to Present Study).
5 Carefuliy examine, and record, the client’s report, and behaviour. It was this ability, 
demonstrated by medics, and not psychologists, which had an important bearing on the 
credibility of PM’s presentation. (See Second Literature Review.)
6 Seek out and carefully examine other medical evidence. (See Second Literature Review.)
7 Seek out and examine other records. (See Second Literature Review.)
8 Compile a Medical Chronology A valuable way of understanding the plethora of details 
from a variety of sources was demonstrated to me by the barrister, who compiled a medical 
chronology from the GP notes, hospital records from different sources, significant 
correspondence, and medical reports.
9 Trust the evidence in front of, rather than behind, your eyes. See “Clinical Judgement in 
Neuropsychology” in Faust et at (1991).
10 Make all your evidence available for public scrutiny, even if only by those so qualified. 
There is a tension between the need to present evidence, and the need to preserve the 
security and integrity of psychological methods and tests. It would be helpful if there were a 
means of submitting a confidential appendix for the scrutiny of qualified personnel, but not to 
be disclosed to lay personnel, including the disputants.
11 Thoroughly review the relevant literature, which in this case, revealed that:
a) There is a limit to the controversy and uncertainty of Post Concussional Syndrome. (See 
Binder 1997, and First Literature Review).
b) There is justification in the literature for describing below-chance scores as evidence of 
intentional deception, but...
c) ... There is no test of ‘degree of conscious intention: the most important question asked of 
the neuropsychologist in such a case depends upon his/her opinion for an answer. See Ruff 
et al 1993; Greiffenstein et al 1994.
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THE ACADEMIC DOSSIER
FIRST LITERATURE REVIEW
POST-CONCUSSIONAL SYNDROME. COMPENSATION, 
AND MALINGERING. AN ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE FOR THE 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIST IN COURT.
Abstract
The neuropsychologist in court can be faced with difficult questions 
concerning claims of persistent disability following a minor head injury (MHI). 
It is generally accepted that MHI can result in pathophysiological changes, i.e. 
brain injury, which can give rise to a range of symptoms of impaired physical, 
cognitive and emotional functioning, known as Postconcussional Syndrome 
(PCS). In most cases this disturbance is temporary, but a minority continue to 
suffer symptoms. As PCS endures, the evidence of brain injury underlying 
significant disability diminishes, and psychological factors seem increasingly to 
play a part. The presence of a compensation claim is disproportionately 
involved, although the evidence of recovery after a claim is equivocal. Finally, 
there is clear evidence that a high proportion of those claiming compensation 
are consciously exaggerating their symptoms, i.e. malingering.
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INTRODUCTION
Post-Concussional Syndrome (sometimes referred to as Post-Concussional 
Symptoms), or PCS, is a collection of symptoms, some or all of which 
frequently follow a head injury, but none of which is a pathognomic sign of 
injury to the brain. Symptoms can be somatic (headaches, dizziness, fatigue) 
cognitive (poor concentration, memory) and/or emotional (anxiety, depression) 
(Jacobson 1995). Since these symptoms can be the result of brain injury, but 
are also reported in other conditions (such as following non-head-injury 
trauma, and in psychological disorders) it is frequently unclear how the 
symptoms have originated in a particular case, and the relative contributions 
of organic impairment and psychological factors are the subject of continuing 
debate in general. In medico-legal cases of compensation following a head 
injury, the neuropsychologist is required to disentangle these contributions, as 
well as consider a third: that of malingering.
In the first half of the twentieth century, following the development of workers’ 
compensation schemes, such subjective reactions to any injury were 
frequently referred to as “accident neurosis” or “compensation neurosis”, an 
unclear diagnosis which belonged more to lawyers than to medics. This 
conservative view is neatly summarised by the rather cynical and oft-quoted 
aphorism: “A compensation neurosis is a state of mind, born out of fear, kept 
alive by avarice, stimulated by lawyers, and cured by a verdict” (Kennedy, 
1946).
According to Levy (1992), “no serious research was carried out” into 
compensation neurosis during the first half of the twentieth century. Until, in 
fact, Henry Miller, a neurologist, delivered his now famous two-part paper on 
“Accident Neurosis” to the Royal College of Physicians (Miller, H, 1961a, 
1961b). These lectures represented a landmark study which firmly 
established the conservative view of accident-, or compensation-, neurosis, 
and was as influential in the courts, as it was contentious in the literature, for 
the remainder of the century (Kelly, 1975; Levy, 1992; Mayou, 1996).
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Studying 200 cases of claims for compensation for whom he had provided a 
medico-legal report, Miller described “accident neurosis” as a heterogeneous 
syndrome of psychological reactions to trauma “ ranging from gross 
conversion hysteria at one end to frank malingering at the other”. He argued 
that its presence was inspired by the availability of compensation, reporting 
that in most cases the condition improved when the claim for compensation 
was settled. He also observed that accident neurosis occurred 
disproportionately more in those patients with the mildest injury, and they lost 
more work than more severely injured patients.
Importantly, Miller managed to conflate post-concussion syndrome (PCS) with 
accident neurosis. PCS was a known complication of brain injury, although a 
debate certainly existed as to whether the subjective symptoms were 
organically or psychologically caused (Russell, 1932 & 1961, Symonds, 1962). 
At one point in his article. Miller ascribes the same symptoms to both 
conditions, and although the terms ‘accident neurosis' and ‘compensation 
neurosis' have fallen out of fashion since, PCS has carried the stigma of 
Miller’s imputations ever since.
This review is designed to assist the neuropsychologist in court, and its aim is 
to review the evidence on the nature of PCS, particularly the long-term variety, 
and to review its relationship to claims for compensation, and malingering.
The review will first examine the evidence on persistent PCS, and then 
consider the possible influence on symptoms, of claims for compensation, and 
the potential incidence of malingering.
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WHAT IS THE NATURE OF PERSISTENT PCS?
Note: studies in this review are concerned with mild, or minor, brain injury, 
where most of the PCS debate resides. Generalisations are hindered by a 
lack of agreement on the definition of this level of injury (see Appendix).
The first description given the name Post-Concussional Syndrome is 
attributed by Gasquoine (1998) to Russell (1932). Excluding cases of 
compensation, Russell found that persistence of the symptoms was not 
related to the severity of the injury as measured by Post-Traumatic Amnesia 
(PTA - see Appendix). In later research, Russell (1961) found that PTA was 
related to the presence of cognitive effects such as problems with speech, 
memory and arithmetic, but not with anxiety, depression, dizziness or 
headache. It was inferred that the cognitive signs therefore related to organic 
impairment, while the more subjective and emotional symptoms suggested the 
contribution of psychological factors.
This view largely holds today (e.g. Gronwall, 1991; Lishman, 1988) although 
the relative contribution of each remains uncertain. Lishman (1988), in a 
review which clearly demonstrates how PCS can be shaped by the non- 
organic factors of pre-existing personality, by circumstances of the accident, 
and by subsequent life circumstances, argues that both psychological and 
organic factors “inevitably act together” (echoing Symonds, 1962). He also 
notes that those studies which have emphasised organic influences have 
used subjects within weeks of their injury, and have looked at cognitive 
functions, while the research proposing non-organic factors has investigated 
patients who complain of the more subjective symptoms many months and 
years after the injury. Lishman accordingly proposes a model of organic and 
psychosocial influences with the former predominating in the early stages, and 
being replaced by the latter over time.
There is a large literature of the organic effects of mild head injury (MHI) which 
has been reviewed repeatedly in recent years (e.g. Jacobson, 1995; Binder
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1997 & Binder et al 1997; King, 1997; Bernstein 1999), but the debate within it 
most relevant to the neuropsychologist in court concerns the evidence of 
enduring brain injury in adults. Whereas Trimble's (1981) oft-quoted article, 
demonstrating early organic effects of mild brain injury, has received support 
from recent MRI studies (see King 1997), there is little or no direct evidence of 
longer term organic impairment. Binder (1997), King (1997) and Jacobson 
(1995) cite a single study (Ruff et al 1994) as showing deficits in frontal lobe 
glucose metabolism (shown by positron emission topography (PET) scanning) 
in patients with persisting neuropsychological deficits, and there is a similar 
study by Varney et al (1995), but all reviewers cast doubt on the validity of 
such evidence for several reasons, such as small, selected samples, and no 
or inadequate controls, but not least the fact that such changes can be shown 
in psychological states such as depression (Jacobson, 1995, Bench et al 
1993).
There is another study listed by Bernstein (Sangal & Sangal, 1996), which 
demonstrated slowed visual evoked responses (P300 latencies) six months to 
nine years post-injury. However, the sample was very small, and again P300 
abnormalities have been shown with depression and other disorders (Mialet, 
1996). Furthermore, the diagnostic utility of EEG findings in this area is 
dismissed by Binder (1997), quoting two scholarly bodies who have 
investigated it. (American Academy of Neurology: Therapeutics and 
Technology Assessment Subcommittee, 1989; American Psychiatric 
Association Task Force on Quantitative Electrophysiological Assessment, 
1991). And Binder (1997) states categorically that there is neither human nor 
animal experimental evidence permanent axonal damage following MHI.
The rest of the debate chiefly concerns evidence of long-term impairment on 
neuropsychological tests. Bernstein (1999) lists several that show rapid 
recovery after MHI, and some large studies which show no differences 
between MHI subjects after one year and controls on a wide range of 
neuropsychological measures (e.g. Dikmen eta l 1995, Levin eta l 1987) but a 
few (including one of his) which “offer some support for long term impairment”.
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of a year or more, mostly of attention and information processing speed. 
However, bewilderingly, Bernstein includes in his review several studies of 
more severely injured subjects, and, although he acknowledges that litigation 
is an important variable in MHI studies, he proceeds to ignore It in his review.
Bernstein observes, ambiguously, that “there is suggestive evidence for long­
term neurobehavioral impairment, but the evidence is not strong ... While it is 
now virtually uncontested that the majority of mild head injuries result in good 
recovery, it is still uncertain what deficits persist in which people and why ... 
[MHI] “maybe associated with long-term, subtle, neurobehavioral impairment. 
Nonetheless, further work is required to determine whether this is in fact the 
case” (italics added). Bernstein inserted the word “subtle” in 
acknowledgement of Binder’s (1997) findings.
Binder (1997), who was faithful to his brief of MHI, was less confident. His 
meta-analysis produced a barely significant result, and tiny effect sizes. The 
largest was 0.2, the equivalent of 3 points in the Attention/Concentration Index 
on the WMS-R, a value smaller than that test's measurement error. (By 
contrast, an effect size of financial incentives on measured impairment had 
been previously found to be .47 (Binder & Rohling, 1996). Binder concludes 
that “it should not be assumed that symptoms present... months after a mild 
concussion are synonymous with a diagnosis of traumatic brain injury”.
Indeed, there is no controlled study which reports impairment on standard 
neuropsychological tests one year after minor head injury, in patients not 
claiming compensation, and all reviewers fail to make this important point.
Leininger et al (1990) come close to denying this statement, looking at 53 MHI 
patients, between 1 and 22 months post-injury, but mostly within a year.
These subjects showed lower neuropsychological test scores than controls, 
but the majority of the patients were in litigation, and the non-litigants were not 
compared separately to controls, and nor were they assessed for claiming 
compensation outside a court (see Binder & Willis, 1991, Binder, 1993).
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A few studies do report enduring neuropsychological evidence of impairment, 
but with respect to subtle, attentional deficits, detected with specific tests, 
often only observable under special conditions of stress. They are worth 
listing for the medico-legal neuropsychologist, for the unusualness of the 
subject, the subtlety of the deficit, and for the difficulty in attributing the finding 
to organic impairment due to a single MHI.
For example, Ewing et al (1980) found impaired auditory vigilance under 
hypobaric conditions 1-3 years post-injury. However, a very small sample of 
ten students was used, and the effect was influenced by the extreme scores of 
just one or two subjects, one of which was more than mildly injured.
Arcia & Gualtieri (1994) found information processing to be slower than 
controls at an average of 0.85 years post-MHI. However, these were patients 
from a neuropsychiatry clinic, and no account is made of the patients' 
emotional status or whether or not they were involved in compensation claims.
Cremona-Meteyard & Geffen (1994) found visuospatial selective attention to 
be slowed in a small sample of Australian-rules football players one year post­
injury. Compensation status is not mentioned, but one might assume that it 
would not pertain among these sports injuries. However, the sample was very 
small and highly selected, the subjects had acquired previous head injuries, 
the controls were not matched, being elite tennis players, and alternative 
explanations for the findings, such as emotional status, or the possibility that 
those with slower reactions might be more likely to acquire the injury, were not 
considered.
Cicerone (1996) found slower processing speed, only under demanding dual­
task conditions, in MHI patients at least 6 months after injury, and did look at 
litigation status, which he considered had no effect in his sample. However, 
medication was noted to have an effect, and the author comments that a 
minimum of more than half of his sample of 15 were suffering from 
depression.
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In all of these interesting studies of subtle enduring impairment, at this level of 
deficit it is very difficult to exclude the effects of disturbed emotional state, 
such as depression, which might well be part of the clinical picture of those 
complaining of persistent PCS (Mooney & Speed, 2001) as it is of other levels 
of brain injury (Atteberry-Bennett et a /1986; Newman & Sweet, 1986; Satz et 
al 1998; Glenn et al 2001 ; McCauley et al 2001 ; Holsinger et al 2002) and 
which itself is known to interfere with cognitive functioning (Binder & Willis 
1991; Cohen eta l 1982; Massman eta l 1992; Vollmer-Conna eta l 1997; 
Williams, et al 2000). As Mialet et al (1996) observe: “impaired attention is a 
cardinal feature of clinical depression”.
Or as Binder (1997) concludes: “there is no evidence that the cognitive deficits 
found in clinical [MHI studies] are distinguishable from the cognitive deficits 
common to a variety of psychiatric and medical conditions”.
Therefore it can still be concluded that no large-scale controlled studies exist 
which show survivors of a single minor head injury, not in compensation 
claims, to have impaired neuropsychological functioning, after 1 year, where 
the deficits are not so subtle they could be attributable to other factors such as 
depression, or medication.
Furthermore, PCS can be associated with a range of other factors, such as 
previous head injuries, an older age group, substance misuse, and premorbid 
psychosocial problems, and of course compensation claims, and all these 
factors invariably are not controlled out.
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Methodological Problems of Research,
and the Consideration of Base Rates.
Bernstein (1999) lists in detail the many methodological problems in this 
research area, including inappropriate controls. On the one hand some 
studies may have overestimated patients' improvements by not repeating 
tests on controls, and therefore not allowing for practice effects, (a criticism 
which is dismissed by Levin et al (1987). On the other hand, and perhaps 
more importantly to the neuropsychologist in court, many studies used 
patients without comparison to uninjured controls, thereby overlooking base- 
rates in the normal population.
An example of base-rate studies is that of Fox et al (1995) who found that 
PCS symptoms, including concentration difficulties, were common among 
psychiatric patients, while McLean et al (1983) found that PCS symptoms 
were common in non-psychiatric controls, although the symptoms tended to 
be more emotional than cognitive. (See also McLean et al 1984; Gouvier et al 
1988, and the other Review in this Portfolio: Clinical Methods of Detecting 
Neuropsychological Malingering, for discussion of the importance of base 
rates.)
However, perhaps the study which is most helpful to the neuropsychologist in 
court is that of Mittenberg (1992). Mittenberg asked non-injured controls not 
only what PCS symptoms they experienced in ‘normal life', as it were, but 
what they would expect to suffer after a head injury, while asking (MHI) 
patients with long-term PCS about their symptoms and how they had been 
before the injury. The researchers not only found that PCS symptoms were 
common in the non-injured, including unreliable memory, fatigue, and 
concentration problems, but that the expectations by the non-injured group of 
what it would be like to be head-injured, were “virtually identical " to the actual 
symptoms of the head injured.
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Most revealingly, the symptoms common among the uninjured, such as 
forgetting where the car was parked, losing keys, forgetting why they entered 
a room, etc., were significantly underestimated in the patients’ assessments of 
their own premorb/d functioning. These very ‘symptoms’, among others, were 
reported by up to a third of Mittenberg’s controls, and yet denied by over 90% 
of the patient’s’ recollections of their own premorbid functioning. Mittenberg 
concludes that expectations play as much a role in determining PCS 
symptoms as the head injury itself, and proposes a useful model of 
aetiological sequence.
Summary
To summarise the research on PCS: subsequent findings suggests that Miller 
was correct in his initially implied assumption that PCS is distinct from general 
“accident neurosis” in that it can have a neurophysiological substrate, at least 
in the early stages of recovery. But it also suggests that, despite his many 
critics, he was not so far from the subsequent consensus in his view that 
persistent subjective symptoms not accompanied by organic signs seem to be 
a matter of psychological adjustment, since there is a lack of clear evidence of 
enduring, marked, organic impairment of cognitive functioning following MHI.
Whether long-term PCS is a matter of poor psychological adjustment to a 
physical injury, (as is modelled to occur in other chronic complaints such as 
chronic fatigue, or persistent pain (e.g. Surawy eta l 1995; Turk, 1992)), or 
whether, as Miller argues, it arises in the context of compensation, and is 
“cured by a verdict”, is the question now to be addressed.
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PCS, COMPENSATION, AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF MALINGERING
Miller’s (1961) case was that compensation acts as an incentive to the over­
reporting of symptoms, and this has received some support in the literature, 
especially in recent years. Binder & Rohling (1996) conducted a meta­
analysis which showed more abnormality and disability in patients with 
financial incentives, despite less severe injuries. This review is useful, not just 
because of its method of statistical overview of 17 carefully selected 
representative reports, covering over 2000 subjects, but also because the 
studies are exclusively about head injury, of all severities, and because of its 
findings about contributory factors which the neuropsychologist can take into 
account. The review found that compensation-seeking was more related to 
indices of psychological, rather than organic involvement, such as lack of 
clinical signs of CMS injury at 24 hours, late onset of complaints, shorter PTA, 
and positive signs on neuropsychological tests of under-performance. 
Interestingly, the authors also noted that failure to return to work was also 
related to shorter PTA.
These findings have been supported by a growing number of studies which 
show MHI patients in compensation claims scoring lower on simple memory 
tests than more severely injured patients (e.g. Green eta l 1999, Green & 
Iverson 2002), and that effort on tests has a far greater effect on score deficits 
than severity of injury (Green et al 2001).
Cook (1969) demonstrated that in a large sample of 449 minor head injuries 
sustained in sport, where the question of compensation was less relevant, 
post-concussional symptoms were of brief duration if they occurred at all, and 
that absence from work was unusual and not prolonged, averaging 3 days. In 
a later study (Cook, 1972), this author looked at a sample of 63, gleaned from 
patients who had been admitted to hospital with MHI. In this sample, time off 
work was longer and more frequent, but Cook noted that those not claiming 
compensation lost some 24 days on average, while those who were making or
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considering daims lost a lot more; an average of 88 days. Cook’s study does 
not extend to settlement of claims.
In a “carefully controlled prospective study” of 66 younger men with MHI, 
Wrightson & Gronwall (1981) found an average of a little over 3 days’ work 
lost. All patients were back at work within a month, including a handful who 
received compensation. However, the authors note that 4 of the total still 
complained of mild symptoms after 2 years. In fact, this was not a controlled 
study. In the sense that no proper control subjects were used, and the findings 
at two years are barely meaningful considering base rates among the 
uninjured (see above).
Rimel et al (1981) followed a large sample of MHI patients in Virginia, and 
found a high proportion (34%) with loss of employment at 3 months, (although 
they do not state the employment rate of their sample before injury), 
surprisingly few of whom reported involvement in litigation. This study is held 
to challenge Miller’s reported view that PCS is only seen in compensation 
situations (see also McClelland et al 1994). But Miller did not actually state 
this. He argued that “accident neurosis”: persistent, subjective symptoms in 
the absence of organic signs, was related to compensation. Admittedly, he 
confused this with PCS, but he acknowledged the latter as a 
“pathophysiological”, if short-term, condition.
McKinley et al (1983) found no differences between claimants and non­
claimants on cognitive tests and relatives’ reports of PCS, with claimants 
reporting “slightly more” symptoms. There was actually a clear trend for 
claimants to over-report, and in any case all subjects had sustained severe 
injuries, and one might expect more parity of measured impairment, in and out 
of litigation, in these cases.
Another perspective is provided by Schrader et al (1996) who found PCS was 
no higher than controls, for those who had suffered whiplash 1-3 years 
previously, in Lithuania, a country where few motorists are covered by
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insurance, and there is “little public awareness of whiplash”. This exactly fits a 
prediction of Miller’s.
Actual follow-up studies after the settlement of “accident/compensation” cases 
are surprisingly few, and most of these have not used standardised 
assessment procedures (Binder (R) eta l 1991), and none of those listed by 
Binder were about MHI and PCS.
One of them, Weighill, 1983, notes that follow-up studies are difficult and few 
because of uncooperative or untraceable patients. In those few studies 
reviewed, none of which involves head injury, mostly being back- and neck- 
injuries, Weighill finds little support for Miller’s view in principle, noting that 
while most post-compensation cases do return to work, the majority are to 
lower-paid or lower status jobs.
Mendelson, an Australian psychiatrist, frequently found his testimony in 
support of a claimant to be frustrated in court by reference to the Miller 
papers, and conducted his own review. He concluded that all studies 
published since Miller had shown his conclusions about return to work to be 
incorrect (Mendelson, 1982). This and other works of Mendelson (1981,
1985, 1995), are often quoted as finding poor return to work after settlement, 
but as with Weighill’s review, the cases are not concerned with PCS, being 
usually spinal, rather than head injury. Where Mendelson does refer to a 
head injury study, it is that of Kelly & Smith (1981), who found 22 of 26 
patients not working at settlement were still not at work at follow-up, mostly 
over a year later. However, this was out of a sample of 43 patients who, in 
turn, were obtained out of 800 available, and the authors fail to explain this 
selection. Even Mendelson (1985) expresses doubt about this finding.
Tarsh & Royston (1985) selected a sample of 35 of “the most difficult of all” 
claimants with “accident neurosis”, cases that had severe somatic symptoms 
such as bizarre gait or incomprehensible pain, where there was no 
demonstrable organic pathology. None of the cases concerned head injury.
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Only twelve of these returned to work, either before, or up to five years after 
settlement. The authors suggest that family over-protectiveness and support 
for the patient's sick role maintained their disability, but this conclusion rests 
on the validity of their selection of “accident neurosis” cases. This study would 
have benefited from a control group of similar patients who did not go through 
litigation.
In another uncontrolled study. Binder (R) (1991) and colleagues sought to 
assess 25 patients (with unspecified injuries and) with resolved lawsuits, 17 of 
whom complied. “Although some subjects developed chronic psychological 
problems after the injuries ... follow-up after... settlement... showed that 
most subjects eventually had substantial remission of psychological 
symptoms.” However, good outcome was related to the shortness of delay 
between injury and settlement, and the length of time following settlement 
(and not the length of time since injury), so it was argued that the lawsuit itself 
exacerbated psychological symptoms.
The only other settlement follow-up study, after Kelly & Smith (1981), to use 
head injuries, comes from a series of studies at the Royal Victoria Hospital, 
Belfast. Fee & Rutherford (1988) took some trouble to follow up 44 of 46 
continuous (therefore ‘random’ or at least unselected) patients who had been 
admitted to the hospital and for whom medico-legal reports had been written. 
They compared these to 145 “general” patients with MHI who had been the 
subject of previous research.
Fee and Rutherford were able to show that 43% of the litigants were 
symptom-free by the time the medico-legal report was written, on average 
about a year after the accident. In the 9 further months, on average, before 
settlement, this proportion had risen to 61%, while only a further 5% resolved 
in the year following settlement. However, the 57% of litigants showing 
symptoms at one year was much higher than the patients from the general 
group, of whom only 14% had symptoms at one year. And even after 
settlement, three years after injury, significantly more of the litigants, 34%,
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were reporting symptoms, than did the general patients after one year (14%). 
No evidence could be found to suggest any organic basis for the higher 
symptom rate, and the authors infer that litigation has a prolonging effect on 
symptoms (although they never explain what these symptoms are), but they 
found complaints unrelated to duration of settlement (in contrast to Binder et al 
1991). The authors conclude that a condition of post-traumatic neurosis 
results from an interplay of organic and psychological factors, and suggest 
that “there may be a critical period from accident to settlement beyond which 
the effects of associated emotional stress become relatively fixed”. 
Unfortunately, and surprisingly, these authors apparently did not ask their 
subjects about return to work in their interviews.
The Contamination of Malingering
Fee & Rutherford admit they did not examine their subjects for malingering, 
stating their unsubstantiated impression that malingerers formed “a very small 
percentage of the total”. Evidence from other studies suggests that this 
assumption could have been an under-estimate (see below). The researchers 
merely asked their subjects, by questionnaire, about the presence of certain 
symptoms. Half the sample did not return the postal questionnaire, and were 
subsequently visited by one of the authors. It is not inconceivable that 
malingerers, interviewed by the very authors of their medico-legal reports after 
settlement, would still endorse such enquires. It is entirely possible that Fee & 
Rutherford’s disproportionate number of claimants reporting symptoms at one 
year is inflated by malingerers, who chose not to disabuse their investigators 
of their impression at follow-up, and continued to exaggerate.
In contrast, Youngjohn at a! (1995) used the obvious but surprisingly little- 
used method of testing their sample of 55 litigants directly for malingering, 
using established specialised testing procedures. Using conservative 
interpretations of the results of malingering tests of relatively low sensitivity, 
these authors found good evidence of under-performing in at least 48% of
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their sample. 72% of their patients, all of whom had sustained MHI, 
performed worse on a simple forced-choice digit recognition test than the 
average of a sample of patients with identifiable brain damage. They also 
reported symptoms (on the MMPI) more extremely than those with brain 
damage.
Youngjohn’s findings are supported by similar studies (Heaton et al 1978; 
Millis,1992; Greiffenstein eta l 1994; Binder & Kelly, 1996; Binder, 1997; and 
Schmand eta l 1998) all of which suggest a base rate of under-performance in 
litigants to be at least 50%. (See Present Study Literature Review.)
Significantly, authors who do not consider malingering to have contaminated 
their results tend, like Fee & Rutherford, not to have tested their subjects for 
under-performance. Where researchers have used specific tests, they have 
found below-chance and abnormal scores in a significant proportion of their 
sample. (For detail, see Literature Review, Research Dossier, this Portfolio.)
This is an important development, since it demonstrates that any studies using 
subjects who are, were or might be involved in compensation claims, are likely 
to be contaminated by intentional under-performance. It also provides support 
to Miller’s claim that compensation acts as an incentive to the over-reporting 
of symptoms.
On the other hand, the picture of return to work after the settlement of claims 
is practically empty with regard to head injuries, and the literature regarding 
other types of injury tends to disagree with Miller, showing a rather gloomy 
outlook for post-settlement cases. However, Miller’s argument was not that 
people with compensable injuries recovered after settlement, but that those 
with accident neurosis do. Even so, the sparse evidence in the literature does 
not support this view.
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CONCLUSIONS
Firstly, post-concussional syndrome needs to be distinguished from accident 
neurosis. PCS was established as a diagnosis well before Miller’s 1961 
article, in which he does acknowledge its “pathophysiological” underpinnings. 
There is a wealth of evidence of an organic basis to the cognitive elements of 
early PCS.
For the majority, PCS symptoms resolve, but a ‘miserable minority’ (Ruff et al 
1986) of MHI sufferers report persisting symptoms enduring beyond a year 
after injury. Such symptoms are seen as being predominantly psychological. 
There is no evidence of gross neuropsychological deficit persisting to this 
degree, but there is some, limited, evidence of subtle cognitive dysfunction, 
but at the level which can be seen in psychiatric and other medical conditions. 
At this stage, persistent PCS takes on the look of the psychophysiological 
manifestations of other chronic illness, such as chronic pain and chronic 
fatigue syndromes, but also. Miller would argue, “accident neurosis ”.
What distinguishes accident neurosis from chronic illness and disability. Miller 
would argue, is that the severity of symptoms is inversely related to the 
objective evidence of organic impairment, and that symptoms are dependent 
upon the existence of compensation. Despite repeated opposition in the 
literature, strong support for this view comes from an authoritative source in 
mild head injury. Binder & Rohling’s (1996) meta-analytic review showed 
more abnormality and disability in patients with financial incentives, despite 
less severe injuries. This view is sustained by Green et al’s (2001) large study 
of effort on tests in compensation claims.
However, there is less support for Miller’s notion that accident neurosis 
disappears after compensation is settled. As far as non-head injuries are 
concerned, many complaints are found to continue beyond litigation, and re­
employment is by no means the norm. The same might be true for PCS, but 
the studies purporting to show this are rare and equivocal.
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Moreover, for PCS at least, the important finding is that a considerable 
proportion of those reporting PCS and claiming compensation show clear 
evidence of exaggerating their symptoms and under-performing on 
neuropsychological tests. At this point, PCS begins to merge with accident 
neurosis, as Miller saw malingering at one end of its spectrum, and this 
repeated finding does offer support to the idea that persistent PCS can be a 
function of the claim for compensation.
The message for neuropsychologists is clear: just as all cases of persistent 
PCS following a minor head injury should be carefully examined for the 
contribution of psychological factors to the patient’s discomfort, so all cases 
where there is even a possibility of a claim for compensation, should be 
carefully examined for the contribution of malingering, and this examination 
should always involve the use of specialised tests to detect under­
performance.
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APPENDIX
THE UNCERTAIN PARAMETERS OF MINOR/MILD HEAD INJURY (MHI)
or
MILD TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY (MTBI)
There is a relatively wide variation in the definitions of Minor, or Mild, Head Injury, or 
Mild Traumatic Brain Injury. Researchers describe this type of injury as involving a 
brief loss of consciousness, but the criterion duration of unconsciousness varies -  
from no loss of consciousness (Gennarelli, 1982, cited by Binder, 1986), through less 
than 5 minutes (Millis, 1992), less than 10 minutes (Bazarian et al 2000), less than 15 
minutes (Von Wild & Terwey, 2001), not exceeding 20 minutes (Barth et al 1983, Ruff 
et al 1994), or 30 minutes (Bernstein, 1999; Kay, 1993), up to less than one hour 
(Dikmen et a /1986; Merskey & Woodforde, 1972).
The patient’s score on the Glasgow Coma Scale, a measure of depth of coma now 
apparently widely used in accident and emergency centres in the UK and the US, is 
used more consistently in the literature. The criterion is usually that the patient’s 
score is never recorded at lower than 13. (This score would usually mean that the 
patient was responding to questions and commands but was disorientated or 
confused.) However, for the definition by Bazarian et al (2000), GOS is no less than 
15, while for Dikmen et al (1986) and other authors (Rimel, 1981; Jagger, 1984) the 
criterion allows a more severe “12 or more”. Van der Naalt (2001) separates “Minor” 
from “Mild” Head Injury, by arguing that the former is characterised by GOS of 15 with 
“transient” loss of consciousness and PTA (see below), while the latter has GOS 13- 
14, with clouded consciousness and variable PTA. Hsiang et al (1997) make a 
similar construction.
The GOS score is crudely related to outcome for more severe head injury. For 
example, those with very low scores on admission are more likely to die, or suffer 
severe disability, but the relationship is by no means uniformly linear, and can 
disappear at the level of mild head injury. King’s (1997) review finds no support for 
the usefulness of GCS as a measure of mild head injury.
75% of minor head injuries (GCS of 13 or more) admitted to hospital in San Diego 
had a GCS of 15 (Kraus & Nourjah, 1988), and many others not seen immediately 
after the injury would almost certainly score 15.
Length of post-traumatic amnesia (PTA) is the third major criterion. PTA is the 
period between head injury and the return of continuous memory - which therefore 
covers both unconscious and (usually longer) conscious periods - and, over the 
whole range of severity of head injury, is a crude predictor of outcome.
PTA is used with wide variety to delineate mild head injury in the literature. Russell & 
Smith (1961) originally defined MHI as resulting in a PTA of less than one hour, and 
that measure is echoed recently by King ef a /(1997), and, for “very mild traumatic 
brain injury” (TBI) by Voiler et al 1999. However, this is limited to no more than 10 
minutes by Bazarian et al (2000), and extended to less than 7 hours by Cattelani et al
(1996), deriving from the work of Ommaya and Gennarelli (1974), and further, to 
“most of the day of injury” (Iverson et al 2000), and finally to less than 24 hours 
(Cicerone, 1995) the last two authors citing a definition by authority of the American 
Congress on Rehabilitation Medicine Committee (see Kay, 1993).
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However PTA is considered unsatisfactory as a quantitative measure (Gronwall & 
Wrightson, 1980), especially over short periods, which makes it particularly 
questionable for minor head injury (Binder, 1986). Kay et al (1971) found that length 
of PTA poorly predicted the later development of PCS among those with minor head 
injuries. This point is re-iterated both for PTA and GCS in mild head injury, by King
(1997).
Gronwall (1991) notes that no objective system exists of determining PTA that lasts 
less than 24 hours. It is measured by various means, of questionable reliability, or 
validity or both: occasionally prospectively by questionnaire (of which there are 
several types, some measuring orientation, others memories), but traditionally 
retrospectively, by asking the subject to recall their earliest post-injury memories. For 
a historical review of this measure, see Forrester et al (1994).
Even when PTA is carefully measured, Wrightson & Gronwall (1981) found that it 
does not correlate with duration of symptoms, or with time off work in mild head 
injuries, and these authors cite several other studies with similar findings.
Additional criteria are used, such as length of hospital admission, but again 
inconsistently: Millis (1992) uses no admission, while Barth et al (1983) require less 
than 48 hours, Rimel et al (1981) state 3 days, and Cattelani et a/’s (1996) definition 
allows an admission of up to a week.
More thorough authors specify extra criteria such as absence of skull fracture 
Bernstein (1999), or of scan evidence of intracranial lesions, or signs of focal 
neurological impairments, such as hemiparesis or dysphasia, (Levin etal 1987; 
Goldstein and Levin, 1995) but even here there is deviation. “Complicated MHI ” can 
include brain abnormality such as haematoma on CT scan (Iverson et al 2000), and 
Kraus & Nourjah (1989) specifically include skull fracture, brain contusions, 
haemorrhage and other intracranial injury, while Williams et al (1990) demonstrate 
that patients so classified are different, and more similar to those with moderate 
closed head injuries.
Williams et al make the crucial observation that “the non-uniform inclusion criteria 
for mild CHI... may account for inconsistencies in the extent of 
neurobehavioral recovery reported in various studies.” The presence or 
absence of complicating lesions, for example, could make dramatic differences within 
the whole field of effects and outcomes following minor head injury, so it is advisable 
for the neuropsychologist carefully to check the definition of minor head injury for the 
sample for whom claims of effects of injury are made, and whether this definition 
matches the subject of a particular assessment.
Commenting on all these criteria as predictors of outcome, Parker (1994 & 1996) has 
observed that there is not a close relationship between such measures as loss of 
consciousness, GCS, or PTA and outcome within the overall range of brain injury, but 
particularly in MHI. Indeed Parker notes an inverse relationship between head 
impact severity and headache frequency and severity (see also Nordhoff et al 1996, 
Yagamuchi, 1992).
For References see First Review.
61
M.J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Academic Dossier. Second Literature Review.
THE ACADEMIC DOSSIER
SECOND LITERATURE REVIEW
NON-PSYCHOMETRIC METHODS OF DETECTING 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL MALINGERING
Abstract
Studies suggest that neuropsychologists are not good at detecting malingering 
when faced with test results alone, but even given opportunities for a fuller 
assessment, are reluctant to confirm, sometimes even consider, a hypothesis 
of malingering. It is argued that malingering should be routinely considered in 
medico-legal neuropsychological assessments, and non-psychometric 
information is a vital contributor to these assessments. The sources, and 
methods of enquiry, and indications of such non-psychometric information are 
reviewed.
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EVIDENCE OF INADEQUATE ASSESSMENT
It has been demonstrated that healthy volunteers, who have read a magazine 
article on common symptoms of head injury, can produce a profile on a brief 
battery of neuropsychological tests which is nearly identical to that of head- 
injured patients (Kerr et al 1990). Not surprisingly, then, neuropsychologists 
have been criticised for not being good at detecting malingering when faced 
with test results. Franzen at al (1990) conclude that “studies involving 
evaluation of [standard] assessment results by professional 
neuropsychologists [in detecting malingering] generally show poor accuracy”.
Rogers at al (1993) complain of “the notable absence of any positive research 
findings that demonstrate neuropsychologists' ability to detect feigned 
cognitive deficits”. These conclusions are based on studies such as those by 
Heaton at al (1978), and three different studies by Faust and others (1988), in 
which, typically, neuropsychologists are sent test battery profiles and asked 
for their opinion. In some studies, the blind experts are informed that some of 
the profiles have been compiled on subjects simulating malingering. Little or 
no background information is provided. Detection of malingering is found to 
be low under these conditions, and the harshest author, David Faust, arrives 
at the conclusion that neuropsychological evidence should be given “little or 
no weight” in court! (Faust, 1991).
The work of Faust and others has been said to “unjustly malign the field of 
clinical neuropsychology” (McCaffrey and Lynch, 1992), and rightly criticised. 
Bigler (1990) points out that the research designs do not approximate the 
actual decision-making process that the clinician encounters in practice. 
Schmidt (1989) likens Faust's methodology to asking psychologists to change 
a light bulb using a chair with “one false and two missing legs”. Schmidt 
argues that the neuropsychological assessment stands on four legs; test 
results (provided by Faust); relevant records (insufficiently provided); 
“collateral reports” (information from other sources); and, fourthly, information 
from the clinical interview. The studies by Faust and others crucially fail to
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provide adequate data for three of these four bases. (See also Trueblood and 
Binder, 1997).
Nonetheless, those studies serve to remind neuropsychologists that 
malingering may not be detected by standard test results alone. And yet, 
there is evidence that many neuropsychologists do not properly utilise the 
evidence which may be available for a conclusion of malingering, if they 
consider it at all.
Rogers & Cavanaugh (1983) consider that many clinicians take the 
truthfulness of their client for granted, and are not sufficiently wary of 
falsification. Iverson & Binder (2000) agree that clinicians may be reluctant to 
address malingering behaviour, even in the face of strong evidence, for fear of 
mislabelling, among other reasons, while Resnick (1988) argues that mental 
health professionals “have a low index of suspicion” for malingering, because 
of the wide range of competing hypotheses with which they are more familiar, 
and cites a case of mutism following a head injury, in which 11 psychiatric 
reports failed to address the possibility of malingering, before a suspicious 
neurologist noticed the patient talking freely on the train home from a medical 
assessment (Miller & Cartlidge 1972).
In a survey by McMordie (1988), 35% of neuropsychologist respondents failed 
to endorse compensation as a factor in post-concussion syndrome (PCS - see 
First Literature Review) and 21% positively stated it had no effect, while Lees- 
Haley et al (1996), reviewing a sample of neuropsychological reports used in 
litigation in 21 states in USA and Canada, found only one specific test of 
malingering, and that in only eight of 100 reports. Furthermore, this test has 
low sensitivity - only the most obvious malingerers are identified -  and use of 
this test alone has been described as “improper” and “questionable forensic 
practice” (Iverson & Binder, 2000).
Furthermore, Faust ef a / (1991), authors of experience in medico-legal cases, 
claim that in many cases in which they have been involved, clinicians have
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made no effort to obtain background information, only later to find in court that 
someone else has, and the records contradict what the neuropsychologist has 
accepted as fact. Several other authors cite legal cases in which important 
premorbid data are overlooked by the neuropsychologist only to come to light 
later, to the embarrassment of the ‘expert’. (See examples below.)
If inadequate assessment of malingering can be readily identified from the 
North American literature, one might expect the position to be no better in the 
UK, where medico-legal cases might be less prevalent. Indeed, one only 
needs look to a high-profile case of recent years to find evidence of insufficient 
investigation of malingering. When General Pinochet was assessed for his 
capacity to stand trial early in 2000, the neuropsychologist involved was 
reported to have spent only one hourwWh the General, administering standard 
intellectual and memory tests (Franklin & McSmith, 2000). She did refer to the 
question of faking, stating that “... his performance on both memory and 
intelligence tests declined only in relation to the difficulty of the task [and] was 
consistent across all tasks”, but this is not a well-validated method of 
detection. Even this expert, it appears, charged with this enquiry of 
international legal and political significance, failed to make use of any one of a 
range of tests that are specifically designed to test for malingering (see 
Introduction in Research Dossier).
Heaton et al (1978) concede that the information missing in their study, and in 
similar studies by Faust and others (listed above) “might contribute to the 
diagnostic accuracy of the clinician”. The italics are added: the literature 
reviewed below would suggest that Heaton et al underestimate the vital 
importance of historical, clinical, and qualitative information in helping the 
neuropsychologist to detect malingering. Indeed, it is in matters of incongruity 
between information about the subject’s background, current circumstances, 
complaints and behaviour that much of the neuropsychological evidence of 
malingering lies, quite outside the domain of psychometric testing. At the very 
least this information is required as a context only in which the 
neuropsychological data can make any sense. As Ruff et al (1993) argue: ”it
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is exactly the consistency or inconsistency between the clinical interviews and 
the psychological test performance that allows for the determination of 
malingering."
CONSIDERATION OF PREMORBID FUNCTIONING
Sbordone & Guilmette (1999) present the relevant case of a 47 year old male 
who had been in a road accident 3 years previously, and complained of 
numerous cognitive and somatic problems. He reported that he had 
graduated from high school with high grades, and had been earning $100,000 
per year as a construction superintendent. Based on the interview and test 
scores a neuropsychologist concluded widespread cognitive impairment of 
functioning, ranging from severe to profound, as a result of severe brain 
damage incurred in the accident, and the patient could not hope to be 
competitively employed, or even live independently. The authors continue;
“3 months later ... another neuropsychologist ... carefully reviewed the patient’s 
medical records, which revealed that the patient had not been rendered 
unconscious, and was alert and oriented at the scene of the accident ... that the 
patient also had a pre-existing history of severe cluster headaches, chronic low back 
pain, orthopaedic problems, head trauma, psychiatric problems and alcohol and 
drug abuse. A review of the patient’s academic records revealed that he had only 
completed nine years of formal education, and had been diagnosed with attention- 
deficit hyperactivity disorder, and had been placed in a special education class for 
severe learning problems ... that the patient was frequently absent or tardy, and was 
frequently described by his teachers as irresponsible, manipulative, impulsive and 
aggressive. Additional records revealed that this patient had been incarcerated in 
the past for insurance fraud, burglary, selling drugs, driving under the influence, and 
use of heroin and cocaine. The second neuropsychologist also learned that two 
days prior to testing, the patient had fallen down a flight of stairs while intoxicated, 
and had injured his lower back, which resulted in his drinking a quart of gin the night 
before testing. In addition the patient admitted that he had taken several pain killers 
just prior to testing, which caused him to feel confused and disorientated. He also 
admitted that he had developed an intense dislike toward the examiner, and had felt 
very stressed during testing, and had frequently entertained thoughts of physically 
assaulting the examiner.”
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This example illustrates, rather dramatically, the abundant reasons why a 
neuropsychological test profile alone is insufficient for the clinician to draw 
conclusions about his/her client, particularly where the possibility of 
malingering is under consideration - as it should be in any medico-legal 
context.
Reynolds (1998) & Putnam et al (1999) present two similar cases where quite 
bogus presentations were used by neuropsychologists as the basis of their 
faulty conclusions, only for the clinicians later to be embarrassed in court by 
conflicting pre-accident evidence. Devault & Long (1988) present another 
such case, from criminal law.
One of the first, and primary, considerations of the neuropsychologist is the 
assessment of premorbid functioning. Nies & Sweet (1994) argue that “there 
appears to be no justification for clinicians to focus exclusively on test data” 
and recommend a detailed clinical history that includes elicitation of premorbid 
ability levels and attainments, especially when these can be verified 
objectively, such as in school or occupational records.
Premorbid intellectual functioning is often estimated from test data, and 
demographic variables such as years of education, occupation and age (see 
Putnam et al (1999) for review). However, there is no such convenient way of 
determining premorbid levels of other neuropsychological functioning, and the 
correlation of many such functions with IQ tends to fall to zero at higher than 
average IQ (Dodrill, 1997 & 1999). This situation may be helped by the 
publication of the new Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2002) 
which purports to be correlated with memory, but in any case, a careful and 
objective analysis of the subject’s premorbid status in terms of academic 
achievement and occupational success is important. Moreover, the claimant’s 
complaints will be predominantly of subjective complaints and everyday 
performance, such as matters of health, pain, coping, and ability to perform a 
job. It is therefore necessary to make as broad an analysis as possible of the 
subject’s functioning premorbidly.
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For example, Fenton et al (1993) found that those with persisting PCS 
following a head injury, had experienced twice as many life events or social 
difficulties in the year preceding injury, as those whose PCS had resolved. 
Also, the incidence of substance abuse is found to be “remarkably high” 
among head injured populations (National Head Injury Foundation, 1988). It is 
likely that much of this correlation pre-exists the head injury, as it has been 
estimated that a half to a third of US hospital admissions for head injury are 
intoxicated (Jacobson, 1995). As Binder (1997) asserts: “A history of alcohol 
abuse could explain some symptoms because of the toxic effects of alcohol or 
the presence of psychological problems associated with alcohol abuse”.
Many other symptoms complained of following head injury, and particularly 
minor head injury, around which a great deal of medico-legal battles are 
fought, might also have been present to some degree premorbidly. As 
Dikmen & Levin (1993) observe: “A common mistake in clinical practice is 
automatically to attribute the cause of difficulties observed in patients ... to the 
head injury ... morbidities seen after mild head injury may have predated the 
injury, or it is possible that pre-existing injuries may compound the effects ...” 
Some of these may be clearly evident from careful scrutiny of the client's 
medical records, such as frequent visits concerning anxiety, headaches, 
certificates for days off work, etc., but many will be more minor, not 
necessarily in medical records, and perhaps not readily admitted to by the 
complainant who is convinced all his/her troubles began with the injury in 
dispute.
Such “morbidities” include post-concussional symptoms. These symptoms 
are associated with head injury, and are frequently the subject of dispute in 
compensation cases concerning minor head injury (see First Literature 
Review, and its Appendix).
See also Reynolds (1998) for a list of “records to consider reviewing in the 
evaluation of patient's history in the context of litigation”, although, of course, 
such enquiries will require the prior consent of the client, (and it is likely that
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more records (such as school, military, occupational, prison) are; a) kept, and 
b) made available, in the US, than in this country).
Withholding consent to the release of such information might raise the 
investigator's suspicions, and may be counter-productive: getting an accurate 
picture of pre-existing conditions is important from both the plaintiff's and the 
defendant's point of view, as well-researched negative findings can support 
the plaintiffs claim. As Parker (1994) advises, in an article clearly addressed 
to the advocate for the plaintiff: ‘At trial, make the point that unless there is 
evidence for the effect of a given condition, then dysfunctions can be 
attributed to the accident if i t ... could reasonably have caused the 
neuropsychological disorder”.
Distorting, or withholding relevant information about premorbid functioning 
should alert the neuropsychologist, but, like almost all other pieces of 
evidence gleaned in the assessment, does not by itself indicate malingering. 
Slick et al (1999) caution that “patients may become highly sensitized 
(particularly in medical-legal settings) to any cognitive failings, and it is 
possible to falsely attribute pre-existing symptoms to an accident, report a 
higher than actual level than pre-morbid function, catastrophize or over-report 
current symptoms or have difficulty reporting symptoms precisely without 
intending to deceive" (italics added), (qv Mittenberg et al 1992)
Nonetheless, Binder (1992c) presents a case where a client lied about his 
educational background, and as a result Binder now routinely obtains 
transcripts, and warns: “failure to obtain educational records is exhaustively 
criticised in a book designed to assist attorneys in destroying the credibility of 
expert testimony of psychologists & psychiatrists”, referring to (an earlier 
version of) Faust etal 1991).
Too perfect a history should also arouse the neuropsychologist's suspicions. 
As Simm (1974) notes, the malingerer might, in providing a history, “not 
uncommonly deny even the slightest evidence of the normal insecurities to
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which all men are heir”. Not all of these “insecurities”, or everyday complaints, 
many of which are the very symptoms of PCS, will have achieved the 
significance to have been recorded in official sources. The GP records may 
indicate the persistence of some, but otherwise, the neuropsychologist should 
be aware of the not inconsiderable base-rates of symptoms often reported 
after, and attributed to, a head injury, but actually also found frequently in the 
absence of head injury.
Base Rates
Putnam et al (1999) cite a study in a university medical centre, which 
concluded that many PCS symptoms are not unique to head injury. More than 
40% of students surveyed endorsed headaches, word-finding difficulty and 
depression, while 32% complained of memory problems. However, this is a 
remote reference, and Putnam et al do not explain how these problems were 
defined. Nonetheless, findings of PCS symptoms among other, non-head 
injured patients, as well as in ‘healthy’ populations, are now commonplace. 
Iverson & McCracken (1997) found a high rate of PCS symptoms among 
chronic back pain sufferers. Butcher et al’s (1989) work on developing the 
MMPI-2 found up to a third of normal adults endorse the item “I feel tired a 
good deal of the time”, while 40% endorse “I forget where I leave things.”
Similar findings of high prevalence of PCS-like symptoms among normal and 
non-head-injured populations are reported by Lees-Haley and Brown, 1993; 
Kessler et al 1994; Fox et al 1995; and Shine et al 1996; while Mittenberg 
(1992) demonstrates that people with persistent post-concussional symptoms 
tend dramatically to under-report their symptoms premorbidly.
Therefore it appears that symptoms which are seen following minor head 
injury, and which are frequently the subject of legal claims for compensation, 
are seen in many circumstances other than head injury, and it is incumbent 
upon the neuropsychologist to search just as diligently for such impairment in
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the patient’s premorbid history, as in the current presentation. (Of course, 
one’s pre-existing symptoms may be worsened by a head injury, and a person 
may be predisposed to catastrophe following a minor head injury - the so- 
called ‘eggshell plaintiff case. But see Greiffenstein & Baker (2001) for an 
argument against this from a unique longitudinal study.)
For a useful summary of clinical questions for estimating premorbid 
functioning, see Ruff and Richardson (1999). This summary is adapted for 
Appendix 1.
CONSIDERATION OF SYMPTOM HISTORY AND CONCURRENT
FUNCTIONING.
As with evidence of premorbid functioning, consulting the most objective 
sources of evidence is recommended. “The primary focus of assessment, 
particularly in disputed or complex cases, should be a careful evaluation of the 
original records”, writes Pankratz (Pankratz & Erickson, 1990). “In my 
experience, the proper diagnosis usually emerges with surprising clarity”.
Are the complaints consistent with the evidence of the injury? This question is 
most exercised in the case of minor, as opposed to more severe, injuries. In a 
meta-analytic review of studies of head injury and financial incentives. Binder 
& Rohling 1996 conclude that “ ... the effect of monetary incentives is more 
powerful for patients with mild head injury than for those with moderate or 
severe injury.” And it is with reference to this level of severity that the 
literature on the assessment of malingering predominates. (See Appendix to 
First Literature Review for definitions.)
Recovery from minor head injury
People with minor head injuries can be expected to recover completely. 
There are disputes as to whether post-concussional symptoms are still
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objectively measurable after 3 months (see First Literature Review) but as 
Reynolds (1998) says: "In at least 90% of cases of mild head injury, there is a 
substantial recovery and a return to work and other significant life pursuits 
within 6 months of the injury”. (See also McLean eta l 1983; Prigatano, 1990; 
Kay et al 1992; Greiffenstein Baker & Gola, 1994; Binder & Rohling, 1996; 
Levinson & Reeves, 1996).
Substantial recovery and return to work for 90% may be reassuring to most 
patients, but they aren't much use to the neuropsychologist in a medico-legal 
case because s/he has to consider the possibility that s/he is dealing with one 
of the “miserable minority” (Ruff et al 1986), and this principle would apply 
even if the recovery figure were 99%.
Nonetheless, symptoms shown after one year - and the neuropsychologist will 
usually be conducting a medico-legal assessment after this time - are widely 
considered to be of psychological origin (Binder 1997) - or indeed, of 
intentional origin: some researchers have used disabling symptoms reported 
after one year as a qualifying criterion (amongst others) of “probable 
malingerers” (McLean et a /1983; Prigatano & Amin, 1993; Greiffenstein et al 
1995).
For example, McLean et al (1983) found no difference in unemployment after 
one year, between mildly head injured subjects and controls, while 
Greiffenstein et al (1996a) conclude that “a claim of minor head trauma being 
the proximate cause of joblessness a year later can be termed an improbable 
outcome”. This is often the nearest the neuropsychologist can get to a 
definition of malingering. In the world of brain injury, as Reynolds (1998) says, 
there is no such thing as an “impossible outcome”, but “severe disability 
persisting over the long term following mild head injury ... is an improbable 
outcome”, and “improbable outcomes do support the hypothesis of 
malingering as the most probable outcome”. With such outcomes the burden 
of proof shifts to demonstrating that the claimant is not malingering.
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In this field of uncertainty and hedging, Binder (1997), after a thorough review, 
makes some reassuringly firm statements: “severe disability ... long after 
MHT [mild head trauma] is not caused by brain dysfunction, nor is severe 
retrograde amnesia with autobiographical memory loss ...
... and, “there is no evidence that the cognitive deficits found in clinical 
[studies] of MHT patients are distinguishable from the cognitive deficits 
common to a variety of psychiatric and medical conditions"...
... and thirdly, “there is neither human nor animal pathological evidence of 
permanent axonal damage after MHT.”
It may be useful for the neuropsychologist in court to know that there is little or 
no evidence of neuropsychological deficit one year after a minor head injury. 
The only objective findings of impairment at one year are in small samples of 
unusual cases, and suggest very subtle effects, and at this level these effects 
could be produced by emotional states such as depression (itself a common 
corollary of persistent PCS) (see First Literature Review).
So the neuropsychologist has empirical grounds to suspect malingering before 
any testing is started, when presented with complaints of severe disability 
attributed to a minor head injury of a year or more earlier.
Late Onset of Symptoms
A sign which should cause concern is the reported late onset of the symptoms 
or disability. Binder and Rohling (1996) noted not only that the more mildly 
head injured were more likely to seek compensation, so were those who 
claimed late onset of symptoms. Late onset symptoms are reported as not 
characteristic of brain injury, and in the case of mild injury are less likely than 
immediate symptoms to have an organic basis (Reynolds 1998, Binder & 
Rohling 1996).
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Gouvier et al (1992) showed that PCS symptoms can worsen under stress, 
and argued that returning to work before recovery is complete could uncover 
hidden deficits which only emerge under stress (which, incidentally, can 
produce psychological symptoms of its own), and it is possible that in this way, 
later onset of symptoms could be seen following a minor head injury. Apart 
from this example, I have found no neurophysiological rationale for, nor 
neuropsychological findings of, the onset, or worsening, of symptoms 
occurring months after a minor head injury, and claims of such, without 
evidence of increased stress such as proposed by Gouvier, should therefore 
be considered as describing highly improbable outcomes (see Pankratz & 
Binder, 1997).
Over-Inclusion and Exaggeration
Another sense in which the presenting symptoms are not consistent with the 
medical evidence can be in the over-inclusiveness of reported symptoms. 
Rogers at a! (1993) point out that most genuine head-injured patients will 
suffer from some, but not all, of the symptoms associated with head injury, 
that it is extremely unusual for the patient to endorse all symptoms suggested 
to him/her, and that those who do, raise the question of exaggeration. These 
authors recommend a useful method of investigating this possibility, while also 
exposing another source of inconsistency, in the patient’s report. The 
assessor should use open-ended enquiries of the patient as exhaustively as 
possible initially. In this way, the actual ideas about his/her own symptoms 
can be elicited from the patient. Over-inclusiveness may be detected at this 
point, but if later, a check-list of symptoms is administered and the patient 
suddenly discovers a long list of new symptoms, this can be regarded with 
suspicion. Using a check-list should be done carefully, however, as it runs the 
risk of educating the patient in terms of expected symptoms, and Rogers at a! 
recommend the insertion of non-relevant or bizarre symptoms, which can 
serve to weaken the ‘education’ of the patient, and also can be used 
themselves to detect ‘over-over-inclusion’.
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Check lists of Qualitative Clinical Signs
Several authors offer suggested check-lists of qualitative clinical signs, which 
in their opinion should alert the examiner to the possibility of simulation by the 
client. Curiously, no two sets of guidelines are the same.
For example, Greiffenstein et al (1994) developed a method of selection of 
real-world malingerers which they argue is reliable and replicable, which they 
call “convergent improbable outcome selection”. This method entails selecting 
from “litigating post-concussion cases” those clients who show more than one 
“improbable outcome”, such as: total disability in a major social role after one 
year; extremely low scores on more than one neuropsychological test; clear 
contradiction between symptom history and objective source; and remote 
memory loss (e.g. not recognising family members, or the tools of one's 
trade). Greiffenstein et a/’s purpose was to be able to validate specific tests of 
malingering, but their method is itself an aid to the neuropsychologist as a 
check-list of phenomena which should alert him/her to the possibility of 
malingering.
Iverson (1995) offers a 5-point recommendation to clinicians, listing sources of 
inconsistency and implausibility in the patient’s presentation. Several more 
authors offer such check-lists of diagnostic criteria to look out for (e.g. Lezak 
1983; Pankratz & Binder, 1997; Pankratz, 1988; Greiffenstein eta l 1994,
1995; Faust & Ackley, 1998; Ruff & Richardson 1999; Slick et al 1999; and 
see Sweet 1999b for a list of comprehensively detailed strategies). Some of 
the components are listed above, and some are concerned with actual 
neuropsychological test results, an area of detection not covered by this 
review.
The most comprehensive list of non-psychometric indicators of under­
performance is given by Ruff & Richardson (1999). However, even this is not 
exhaustive, and it is reproduced in Appendix 2, modified extensively to include 
additional findings by the other authors listed above. Ruff & Richardson
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caution that the signs are not pathognomic by themselves, but should be 
considered as contributory indicators.
CONCLUSIONS
Rogers et al (1993) lament that “the notable absence of any positive research 
findings that demonstrate neuropsychologists' ability to detect feigned 
cognitive deficits is unsettling”. Indeed, there is evidence that 
neuropsychologists are not good at detecting malingering, albeit from blind 
reading of bare test results. It is too easily argued that given Schmidt’s (1989) 
‘three other legs of the stool’, neuropsychologists would make full use of the 
extra clinical and background information, and be able to identify 
inconsistencies which would combine to build a case for malingering.
Several authors express the opinion that mental health clinicians, including 
neuropsychologists, are reluctant to diagnose malingering, and the literature 
suggests that when researchers estimate malingering, or the influence of 
financial incentives, among their litigant head-injured subjects, their estimates 
are low (such as Fee & Rutherford, 1988), but when they are explicitly and 
carefully looked for, these factors are often found to play a much larger part 
(e.g. Heaton eta l 1978; Millis 1992; Greiffenstein eta l 1994; Youngjohn eta l 
1995; Binder & Kelly, 1996; Binder & Rohling, 1996; Binder, 1997; and 
Schmand, 1998.) These all suggest a base rate of under-performance in 
litigants to be around or greater than 50% (see First Literature Review, 
Academic Dossier; and Introduction, Research Dossier).
In addition, there are several case examples of neuropsychologists involved in 
actual court cases who seem to rely on a single clinical interview and 
neuropsychological assessment for their conclusions. This is, after all, the 
modus operandi of standard clinical work within the MHS, and it comes as no 
surprise to this author that standard methods are applied to cases with a legal 
dimension.
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Firstly, then, the neuropsychologist needs to appreciate that the legal 
dimension brings with it the greatly increased probability that the client is not 
performing optimally, and s/he must always accept under-performance, 
however motivated, to be a viable alternative hypothesis to explain his/her 
findings.
Secondly, the neuropsychologist must step outside his/her normal clinical role 
of investigating premorbid abilities, and seek objective records of 
performance, shortcomings or health problems.
Thirdly, the neuropsychologist must accept that protracted disabling 
symptoms of a minor head injury are predominantly subjective, and cannot be 
distinguished from after effects of non-brain injuries. Furthermore such 
symptoms are frequently found in the uninjured population, and the 
neuropsychologist’s assessment should be balanced by an awareness of the 
‘base-rate’ literature.
Fourthly, the neuropsychologist, armed with an understanding of the natural 
history of post-concussional symptoms, needs to examine a wide array of 
data, from within and outside the consultation, for congruence: e.g. between 
complaints and objective injuries; between subjective reports and other 
sources of information about the subject’s behaviour and functioning; between 
test scores; and between these and the other indicators of functioning.
The literature offers a wide range of suggested investigations, of premorbid 
and current functioning, of which the neuropsychologist needs to make use, if 
the psychometric results are to have any meaning. However, Franzen et al 
(1990) remind us that although cross-examining relevant records, collateral 
reports and clinical presentation makes logical sense, there have been no 
empirical investigations of the value of these variables. It is true that the 
suggestions in the articles cited above are derived from a mixture of 
experience and empirical research, and no formula is given by which 
malingering can be definitely identified, but it is self-evidently a hidden
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phenomenon, and it does seem to be frequently missed. The 
neuropsychologist who conducts these wider investigations will be more 
soundly placed than the one who later is embarrassed by contradictory 
evidence which s/he had overlooked.
Finally, as is recommended by many of the procedural check-lists in the 
literature, the neuropsychologist must make use of the small armoury of tests 
specifically designed for the detection of malingering - much more use, 
indeed, than the literature suggests is the case (e.g. Lees-Haley et al 1996). 
However, since such procedures, although capable of providing powerful 
incriminating evidence, tend to be of low sensitivity (Iverson & Binder, 2000) 
the importance of making the above, broader investigations is not diminished 
by their use.
The use of specific tests of malingering within a broader, medico-legal 
neuropsychological assessment warrants a review of its own, and will be dealt 
with in another part of this portfolio.
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APPENDIX 1: Clinicai Questions for Estimating Premorbid Functioning after Traumatic
Brain injury
Physical-medical status
What is the family medical history (e.g. cause of death of parents, grandparents etc.)?
Are there genetically-transmitted deficits or conditions?
Were there complications in utero or in the birth process?
Are there pre-existing neurological illnesses (e.g. seizure disorders, meningitis, exposure to 
toxins, drug addictions or malnutrition?)
What are the major illnesses or injuries that have been sustained (e.g. polio, diabetes, 
migraines, back pain)?
What treatments have been provided (e.g. medication, surgery, EOT, etc.)? 
Emotional-psychosocial status
Did the patient suffer from psychiatric illnesses prior to the accident (e.g. affective disorders 
including depression, schizophrenia, personality disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder)?
In the absence of psychiatric illnesses, does the individual have a particularly vulnerable 
personality style which existed prior to the accident (e.g. over-achievement, insecurity, 
grandiosity, quick to anger)?
How would the clinician have expected this individual to react emotionally to a TBI (i.e. what 
were the key defence mechanisms by which such a crisis would have been handled)?
Cognitive-neuropsychological status
What were the strengths and weaknesses within the individual’s pre-existing cognitive 
functioning? Among the weaknesses, were there particular cognitive disabilities? (e.g. 
learning disabilities, dyslexia, dyscalculia)?
Was there a premorbid history of serious alcohol or substance abuse which may have 
impaired cognition?
Were there any medical illnesses which may have compromised condition prior to TBI?
Were there significant emotional or psychosocial problems which compromised premorbid 
cognitive functioning levels (e.g. prolonged periods of depression, social withdrawal, antisocial 
traits?)
To what degree has education influenced the level of cognitive functioning (i.e. over­
achiever,” “under-achiever”, lack of education or opportunity, availability of supportive 
education)?
Did [other] factors, such as finances or illness in the family, influence the educational levels 
obtained?
Psychosocial status
In what sort of family structure was the TBI patient raised? Was the family dysfunctional, and 
were abuses tolerated?
How did the family cope with crisis situations, both individually and as a unit, prior to TBI? 
What roles were assigned to the various family members? How were conflicts resolved?
Was the family, as a system, open to input from the outside?
How did the TBI patient resolve psychosocial conflicts prior to the trauma? Did premorbid 
trends exist to focus on certain problems while ignoring other? Was the patient active vs. 
passive, responsible vs. irresponsible, etc.?
Were physical vs. emotional vs. cognitive problems dealt with differently? What labels or 
attitudes would be applied to TBI deficits?
Vocational and financial status
What degree of importance did the patient assign to his/her work or vocational status? Were 
the work habits erratic or inconsistent, or was the patient a workaholic who lived to work?
What was the financial situation of the patient at the time of the TBI? Was the patient living 
with unreasonable debt, or too close to the edge without financial buffers.
{adapted from Ruff & Richardson, 1999).
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APPENDIX 2: Potential Indicators of Insufficient Effort
Premorbid indicators
Antisocial or Borderline personality traits
Prior incapacitating injuries
Prior claims for injury
Poor work record or job satisfaction
Intolerable life conflicts
Behavioural indicators during examination
Uncooperative or inconsistent co-operation: suspicious, aloof, ill at ease, unfriendly, evasive 
Test performance
Frequently responds with “I don’t know”
Missed random items in a test comprising items with increasing difficulty 
Easily gives up on more difficult items 
Spurious results (e.g. unexplained outliers)
Inconsistent profile within test battery or between tests across battery 
Malingering-like performance on direct measures of malingering
* Resistance, antagonism, avoidance or bizarre response on standard tests
* "Going blank”, improbable confusion, or attentional absences during testing
* Several near misses (“Ganser”-like responses) to simple questions
* Inconsistency between test findings and observed/reported behaviour
* Inconsistency between test findings, diagnosis and expected patterns of recovery
Patients presenting post-morbid complaints
Description of events surrounding accident in great detail
Endorsement of an unusually large number of symptoms
Absurd or preposterous reporting of symptoms
Non-selectivity of physical, emotional or cognitive symptoms
Over-idealised functioning or lack of reasonable difficulties before accident
Inconsistencies in symptom reporting itself
“Functional” findings on other medical examinations
* Improbable symptom history given diagnosis and expected patterns of recovery
* Lying to healthcare providers
* Denial of any positive current abilities
* Late onset of cognitive complaints
* Total, or significant partial, retrograde amnesia, or remote memory loss
* Inconsistency between reported symptoms and observed / reported behaviour
Reported or observed activities of daily living 
Engaged in activities not consistent with reported deficits 
Discrepant capacity between work and recreation 
Refuses employment with partial disability
* Total disability in a major social role.
For personal injury litigants
* Presence of external incentive 
Significant financial stressors
Resistance or lack of seeking reasonable remedies 
Lack of reasonable follow-through on available treatments 
Attributing all life’s problems to accident 
Blaming others for all life’s problems
Seeking unnecessary examinations and treatments without consulting experts
And, generaliy:  ^ , ,
*The above are not better accounted for by neurological, psychiatric or developmental
conditions. fadgpted from Ruff & Richardson (1999). Additional authors’ contributions marked *.)
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THE RESEARCH DOSSIER
THE PRESENT STUDY
THE DETECTION OF MALINGERING OF NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL 
IMPAIRMENT BY SPECIALISED PROCEDURES. AND THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE LATENCY.
Abstract
152 volunteers were selected for four groups: uninjured controls (‘Normals’), 
patients with minor head injuries complaining of persistent post-concussional 
symptoms (PCS), more severely brain injured patients, who were disabled by 
their injuries (‘Disabled’) and uninjured participants who simulated the role of 
malingering of the effects of a head injury (Simulators). All groups were tested 
on five different tests of malingering, each yielding a number of measures, 
many of which were developed for this study.
One previously little used, and under-developed measure is that of response 
latency, measured within a forced-choice test, the Tests of 
Neuropsychological Malingering (TNM).
On almost all measures, the Simulators were found to perform at lower levels 
than the ‘Disabled’ group, according to prediction, while the ‘Disabled’ group 
performed at lower levels than, or equally to, the other two groups, depending 
on test difficulty. The performance of ‘Normal’ and PCS groups did not differ 
on virtually all the tests.
An analysis is made of the discriminating characteristics of each measure, 
with eleven measures identifying at least half of the Simulators, while also 
correctly classifying at least 90% of the Disabled group. Response Latency on 
the TNM was found effectively to discriminate between these groups, and its 
usefulness as an addition to the small battery of existing tests of 
neuropsychological malingering is discussed.
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Rationale
The pursuits of this Portfolio were inspired by two medicolegal cases, of 
probable malingering. The first, presented as the Case Study in the 
Professional Dossier of this portfolio, inspired the enquiries of the two 
Literature Reviews of the Academic Dossier, and the general need to explore 
and develop methods of detection. The second involved an apparently more 
sophisticated claimant, who openly acknowledged the transparency of the 
methods used to detect under-performance, and therefore avoided detection 
directly by these methods. They included modern, computerised tests of 
covert simplicity, on which the claimant scored correctly, stating, insightfully, 
that “they were too easy for me”. However, the claimant demonstrated what 
appeared to be an extraordinary slowness on the tests, which was 
automatically and unobtrusively measured. The diagnostic problem was: how 
unusual was this response? How characteristic of his kind of brain injury, and 
how characteristic of malingering? Unfortunately, the test did not make use of 
its response latency data, and no normative information was given. The 
problem was not adequately solved, and the case came to an uncertain 
conclusion, and a different one than it might othenA/ise have done.
The case demonstrated a need to improve our methods of detection of 
underperformance, and suggested that response latency might provide a 
means of doing so.
If the first case provided the thrust for the investigations of this Portfolio, then 
the second provided its cutting edge, and the primary focus of the present 
study.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The following literature review will first examine the incidence of malingering, 
which, it will be argued, appears to be considerably higher than has been 
estimated previously (e.g. Sweet, 1999).
It will then elaborate on the three current specialised psychometric methods of 
detection, including a range of tests, their strengths and weaknesses, and 
current limitations in their evaluation.
Finally, it will focus more closely on the development of the third of these 
methods, forced-choice testing, its evolution into computerisation, and its 
undeveloped potential of utilising response latency as an unobtrusive, and 
difficult-to-simulate, measure of under-performance.
The whole review is designed to underpin the design of the present study, and 
to introduce a number of test procedures, and justify their inclusion in the 
present study.
It is possible that frank underperformance is unconsciously motivated. The 
degree of motivation is a matter well worth considering, and of increasing 
significance in medicolegal neuropsychological assessments (Green, 2001; 
Green et al 2001). However, the degree of intention is regrettably beyond the 
scope of this Portfolio, and will not be debated in these pages. For the 
purposes of the following review, the terms ‘malingering’ and ‘under­
performance’ will be interchangeable, and a degree of intention will be 
assumed. (For views on the consciousness of under-performance, see Noy 
1975; Walsh, 1991; Mittenberg eta l 1992; Ruff ef a /1993; Jacobson, 1995; & 
Turk & Rudy, 1992.)
89
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Research Dossier. The Present Study.
Estimates of the Incidence of Malingering
Binder (1990) proposed that neuropsychologists are very reluctant to 
diagnose malingering, and this seems to be reflected in McMordie’s (1998) 
survey of neuropsychologists, 35% of whom failed to endorse compensation 
as a factor in post-concussion syndrome, while as many as 21% positively 
stated it had no effect. Furthermore, Lees-Haley et al (1996) found a test for 
malingering in only 8% of a sample of American neuropsychological reports 
used in litigation, and then it was a single, weak test that is not recommended 
to be used alone (Iverson & Binder, 2000). (See Second Literature Review.)
Williams (1998) argues that “because malingering represents a dishonest 
activity, the reporting of its presence ... is only done when ... the examiner has 
overwhelming evidence”, while Wedding & Faust (1989) claim that clinicians 
“are primed to infer pathology and deny malingering [which is therefore] 
probably greatly underreported by clinical practitioners.”
Estimates of incidence commonly name a range, e.g. Gouvier et al (1998): 
“estimates vary from low (2-7% - Schretlen, 1988) to very high (64% - Heaton 
ef al 1978)” but these are misleading. Listing ranges of estimates in this way 
might lead the naïve reader to conclude that the 'true' or most common rate 
lies somewhere in between, but this would be to overlook the methods of 
measuring the degree of malingering in the samples observed, and the nature 
of the samples themselves. Just as not finding a significant effect in research 
methodology does not prove the absence of the effect, so finding very low 
levels of malingering does not prove levels were not higher, or would not be 
higher in different populations.
In fact, the repeated impression from the literature is that where estimates of 
malingering are low, either the population is not relevant, or the method of 
detection has been weak, and conversely, where the method of detection is 
more robust, estimates are considerably higher, and also suggest the 
presence of even higher levels of as yet undetected malingering.
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For example, the lowest estimates are among studies involving clinical 
judgement, often retrospective, or from different populations. Schretlen’s 
(1988) 2-7% derives from studies of 1946 and 1953 in military settings, i.e. 
feigning injury to avoid duty, a far cry from modern claims for compensation 
for head injuries.
Miller & Cartlidge's (1972) estimate of 30% is from all neurological cases (i.e. 
not just minor head injury (MHI)) seen for medicolegal reports, and is based 
on nothing more or less than retrospective clinical judgement.
Guthkeltch (1980), like Miller & Cartlidge, reported on consecutive 
medicolegal cases. The cases were all of head injury, and the author defined 
“accident neurosis”, in this case a euphemism for malingering, as obviously 
inconsistent or exaggerated symptoms, and estimated that this was not 
particularly common, identified in only 6.8% of the patients. Such 
exaggeration was exemplified as claiming not to be able to stand, but being 
seen to walk after the examination; claiming unemployment through disability 
in one town and working in another. This is clearly an estimate of the most 
extreme, careless or highly investigated malingerers, and could under­
represent by far the actual proportion.
Fee & Rutherford (1988) claimed that malingerers formed “a very small 
percentage of the total” of followed-up MHI litigants, on the grounds of 
impression based on clinical questionnaires (see First Literature Review for 
critique), while Cullum et al (1991) estimate malingerers to be in “a significant 
minority” of medicolegal cases, without any supporting data.
By contrast, a much higher estimate of incidence comes from a study using 
empirically based indicators. Heaton et al (1978) found that 64% of 42 
litigating clients with head injuries were identified as malingering by a 
discriminant function analysis of standard neuropsychological test and MMPI 
scores, which had been derived from a study using simulator malingerers 
(healthy volunteers instructed to role play malingering behaviour).
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Greiffenstein et al (1994) took 106 consecutive referrals for 
neuropsychological evaluations. 73 of these were of minor head injuries, “the 
majority” of which were referred by insurance companies or lawyers. Of 
these, 43, or 59%, met at least 2 of the researchers' 4 criteria of “probable 
malingerers” i.e. 2 or more scores suggesting severe impairment (> 3 SD from 
expected); improbable symptom history contradicted by records or 
surveillance; total disability in work or major social role after one year; and 
claims of remote memory loss.
Other soberingly high estimates emerge from studies which use very 
convincing methods of detection. The most useful technique for identifying 
malingering is forced-choice testing (FCT), which is described in more detail 
below. Its strength lies in the ability of the examiner to compare scores to 
chance levels, and thus identify response patterns of very low likelihood, even 
if the subject had no ability at all in the domain being tested, usually a 
deceptively easy test of attention that can be managed even by severely 
head-injured subjects.
According to Slick ef al (1999), “no case of false positive errors have been 
reported when malingering was confirmed by performance below chance on a 
forced-choice test”, and Binder (1992b), “positive results on forced-choice 
testing are diagnostic of deliberate deception,” but then the format's weakness 
lies in its low sensitivity (its ability correctly to identify all under-performers). 
Thus it should be borne in mind that studies using stringent methods of 
detection will provide figures of incidence of malingering which are 
conservative, under-estimates.
Trueblood & Schmidt (1993) studied 106 consecutive MHI referrals who were 
pursuing litigation, and identified 15% as malingerers, either by below-chance 
scoring on a forced choice test (7.5%) or for glaringly low scores on other 
procedures. While this overall estimate of 15% is lower than obtained by 
other authors, it does provide a reminder that for every proportion of 
malingerers identified by below chance FCT scores, there may well be a
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similar proportion of malingerers hidden in the sample. (Indeed, in the work of 
Binder & Willis (1991), simulator behaviour suggests that this hidden 
proportion is as much as five times larger).
Many useful studies have been carried out in the last decade by Binder and 
others, using a FCT procedure, the Portland Digit Recognition Test (PORT).
Binder (1993) found 17% of MHI litigants to score below chance on the PDRT. 
As a less conservative measure. Binder used a cut-off of the lowest score 
obtained by a group of patients with established brain injury who were not 
claiming compensation. 33% of Binders MHI litigants scored lower than this, 
echoing an earlier finding (26%) by Binder & Willis (1991). Even this is a 
conservative estimate of those under-performing, as MHI performance would 
be expected to be better than the most severely impaired group, indeed at 
normal levels, on this deliberately simple test.
Binder used 3 groups of head injuries. An MHI group, and one of two groups 
of more severely injured patients, were seeking compensation, the other 
brain-injured group was not. 17% of the MHIs and 3% of the brain-injured 
litigants scored significantly below chance, while the scores of 33% and 18% 
respectively fell below the lowest score of the non-compensation-seeking 
patients with documented brain injury. This design is unusual, and provides 
us with the useful indication that a significant proportion of those diagnosed 
with more severe brain injuries can be expected to under-perform in testing 
(see also Slick et al 2000, below, and Green et al 2001).
Binder & Kelly (1996) found 30% of a sample of MHI litigants scored lower 
than all of a sample of more severely injured on a FCT. However, nearly all of 
a sample of simulators scored above this cut-off, and a less conservative, but 
still fairly stringent cut-off was used, of the score at the second percentile of 
the brain damaged group. Using this cut-off, 43% of the MHI litigants were 
identified as exaggerating. This is a valid adjustment, since it is reasonable to 
assume that the disabilities of the 2% most severely injured genuine patients
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would be obvious, and such patients would not reasonably be falsely 
classified as malingerers.
In the last decade, computerised FCTs have been developed. Slick et a/’s 
(2000) use of the Computerized Assessment of Response Bias (CARB) 
suggested that 8% of moderate-to-severely brain-injured, and 24% of MHI 
claimants, were malingering, while its combined use with indicators from the 
California Verbal Learning Test suggested a base-rate of malingering among 
moderate-to-severely brain-injured claimants to be as much as 32%.
Similarly, using a huge sample of 1752 compensation cases in 13 
neuropsychology practices, Allen et al (1998) found 30% of subjects to fail the 
CARB, with individual practice rates varying from 21% to 76%.
Youngjohn et al (1995) looked at 55 consecutive MHI compensation clients.
Of these, 15% scored significantly below chance on FCT, but 48% of this 
sample were identified as under-performing when higher cut-off, and other 
specific indicators, were used. Also, as many as 72% scored lower than the 
average of Binder’s (1993) sample of cases of documented head injury. As all 
the MHI clients could be expected to score higher than this average, 
Youngjohn’s figures are in this sense among the highest estimates of potential 
malingering among MHI claimants, and could be interpreted to suggest that 
the majority of MHI claimants can be expected to malinger, a suggestion that 
may come as a surprise to a significant number of neuropsychologists (q.v. 
McMordie, 1988), and is in contrast to the recent opinion of Sweet (1999), 
based on the findings of only three authors, that malingering occurs in well 
under a majority of cases.
Similarly, Millis (1992) gave the Warrington Recognition Memory Test, a 
clinical test of FCT format, to MHI litigants who claimed cognitive impairments 
severe enough to prevent a return to work, and found that 50% scored lower 
than any of a sample of moderate- and severely- brain injured rehabilitation
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patients (who were not claiming compensation), and 70% of the litigants 
scored lower than 90% of the patients.
These indications of startlingly high incidence of malingering cannot be said to 
be restricted to the litigious culture of North America. In Holland, Schmand et 
al (1998) used a FCT paradigm with a recognition test called the Amsterdam 
Short Term Memory Test. Patients with well established brain injury and 
memory disorders scored 87-90 out of a maximum of 90. Simulators scored 
below this, while of patients with whiplash injuries and complaining of 
cognitive impairment, 29% scored below a cut-off of 86, and among those in 
litigation the proportion was twice this - 61%.
Thus, global estimates of the incidence of malingering are misleading, and the 
studies cited for very low incidence are invariably not related to the area of 
interest here. The next lowest estimates tend to come from ‘clinical 
judgement’ often a retrospective afterthought, while estimates based on 
studies actually designed to detect the presence of malingering, usually with 
very conservative methods which sacrifice sensitivity for specificity (see 
below) offer much larger estimates, with a growing body of literature, using 
convincing designs (see below), now suggesting a base rate of malingering in 
the majority of cases of MHI litigation, or some ten times the actual incidence 
of persistent cognitive deficit following MHI (Binder et al 1997).
In fact, it is being shown that testing motivation is now a prerequisite of the 
assessment of compensation cases. Green et al (2001), in an enormous 
analysis of 900 compensation claims, have demonstrated that by far the 
largest determinant of score variation was sub-optimal effort, accounting for 
50% of the variance, and that deficits on neuropsychological tests related to 
this factor were almost five times larger than those related to the factor of 
brain injury (ten times larger in cases of mild head injury).
Therefore tests of malingering are of crucial importance to the 
neuropsychologist in the civil court, and should be utilised in every
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medicolegal case undertaken by the neuropsychologist. However, the tests 
are few, and generally of low sensitivity. Developing new tests, and 
improving discriminant validity, would benefit the neuropsychologist, 
and this was the general aim of the present study.
Methods Utilised by Special Procedures for Detecting Malingering
Sensitivity and Specificity
The main problems of using standard neuropsychological tests to detect 
malingering are of low sensitivity and specificity. The sensitivity of a test is its 
ability to detect the presence of the attribute where it actually exists, measured 
as a percentage of those with the attribute who are identified by the test. A 
test's specificity is the degree to which the test can exclude those without the 
attribute - the percentage of those without the attribute correctly identified.
The higher the sensitivity and specificity of a test, the better its discriminating 
power. However, there is typically a tension between these two properties: 
adjusting a test’s cut-off score in order to increase its sensitivity and capture 
more ‘true positives’ invariably entails including ‘false positives’, and 
decreasing specificity, and vice versa. Thus these terms can vary for any one 
test, depending upon decision-making criteria, and expressions of either term 
are only meaningful when given in relation to the other. In this text, a test’s 
sensitivity will always be given in relation to the specificity at that level, often 
abbreviated to two percentages (e.g. “82% at 93%” refers to an 82% 
sensitivity obtained at a level of 93% specificity).
In assessing malingering, the neuropsychologist will wish to minimise ‘false 
positives’, usually at the expense of ‘false negatives’. That is, s/he will lower 
the criterion of any assessment so that genuinely compromised patients will 
not fall below it, but increasing the risk of not identifying potential malingerers 
who thus become positioned above the cut-off. The sensitivity of a test in this
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context is therefore only meaningfully expressed at high specificity levels, and 
the standard of minimum acceptable specificity for the purposes of this review 
will be set at 90% (as suggested by Greve & Bianchini, 2002).
Studies often report a correct classification rate: the total percentage of 
subjects correctly classified, which can be rather hollow supporting evidence. 
For example, a test showing 80% correct classification rate might identify 
100% of simulating malingerers, but this test would not be of practical use if its 
specificity was only 60%, labelling 40% of genuinely injured subjects as 
malingerers.
Validity of Claims for Test’s Discriminating Power
Two other factors should be borne in mind when evaluating research claims 
for tests. Firstly, discrimination studies which use actual patient samples, in 
whom some underperformance might be expected, provide more useful data 
in this context than those which use volunteer simulators, although their 
‘sensitivity’ scores will be relatively low, since not all patients in a ‘suspected’ 
group (e.g. MHI compensation seekers) will be under-performing, whereas 
virtually all simulators will be. Secondly, studies which find the best 
separation of groups by post-hoc discriminant function analysis, or regression 
formulae, will show artificially high discriminating power, which will need 
revalidating with other groups, typically yielding lower results, whereas those 
studies applying cut-offs established beforehand (as in the clinical situation) 
will provide the most meaningful discrimination of data. Therefore, the most 
powerful support for a test comes from studies using actual patients, with pre- 
determinable or established decision cut-offs. It is these qualities which make 
the above-mentioned studies, by Binder with others, by Youngjohn, Millis, and 
by Schmand, such robust and startling estimates of the incidence of 
malingering.
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Detection of Malingering on Standard Neuropsychological Tests.
There is a literature, which will not be reviewed here, on the detection of 
under-performance on standard neuropsychological tests. Suffice here to say 
that discriminating power with standard tests is generally very low. That is, 
features which may raise the question of underperformance, like lower than 
expected scores generally (Trueblood, 1994; Schwartz et al 1998), 
inconsistency with regard to item difficulty (Rawling & Brooks, 1990; Parker, 
1996), or in particular subtests like Digit Span (Greiffenstein et al 1994; 
Mittenberg eta! 1995), or orientation (Suchy & Sweet, 2000) or in subtest 
scatter (Iverson & Binder, 2000), or in comparisons such as General Memory 
Index vs. Attention/Concentration of the WMS-R (Mittenberg et a! 1993) are:
a) not made by all, or even many, malingerers, and
b) perhaps more importantly, are made by some people with cognitive 
impairment (and even those without) who are making optimal effort.
As has been demonstrated (see Faust eta! 1991), malingerers or simulators 
can produce score profiles which are indistinguishable from genuine profiles 
on standard neuropsychological tests. However, there is one notable 
exception in such tests: the Warrington Recognition Memory Test (WRMT) 
(Warrington 1984), a standard test of FCT format, and therefore suitable as a 
specialised test (see below).
Specialised Tests of Malingering
What the neuropsychologist needs is a test on which the performance of 
brain-injured and under-performing subjects can be distinguished. This is 
achieved to one degree or another by three methods, which will be reviewed 
below. When reviewing studies of neuropsychological malingering, 
preference will be given to those studies which include:
- real life probable malingerers (subjects who have provided other convincing 
evidence of under-performance), or:
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- comparisons of claimant vs. non-claimant samples of MHI, or:
- simulators, when compared with patients with brain injury.
The ideal comparison group would be of non-litigating patients with recent 
minor head injuries whose (temporary) deficit was evident in standard 
neuropsychological tests. This would provide a useful gauge of the effects of 
minor head injury at their worst. Unfortunately, I have found no study which 
has used such a group. Most studies use comparison groups of people with 
more severe brain injuries. These are useful groups but suffer from 
heterogeneity, and often affect the specificity of the test under consideration. 
Thus, if cognitively very impaired subjects score below a cut-off on a test they 
will be misclassified as malingerers. Such problems tend to force downwards 
the optimal cut-off scores, and the sensitivity of a test.
Studies will not be included in this review if they merely compare simulators to 
normal subjects. These studies do not offer data on the test’s discriminative 
validity in selecting between malingerers and what the malingerers purport to 
be: brain injured individuals.
Specialised Test Method 1: Floor Effect Tests
One method is to find a test on which even people with severe cognitive 
impairment can pass, but which has the appearance of difficulty, and lures the 
malingerer into overdoing their mistakes. These tests are known as “floor 
effect” tests.
The simplest of these is a hybrid of standard assessment procedure and 
specialised test: Wiggins and Brandt (1988) offer the Autobiographical 
Interview, a list of 14 questions of personal identity, with recall of previous 
meals, and the interviewer’s name. The authors report that brain-damaged 
amnesics were able to answer virtually all items, while student simulators 
often failed the items. Unfortunately their sample of amnesics was tiny (n = 4). 
Surprisingly, this simple procedure does not appear to have been re-validated.
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One of the most commonly mentioned floor-effect tests is the Rey 15 Item 
Memory Test (Rey 1964). This involves the immediate recall of 15 letters, 
figures or shapes, which are grouped into largely similar, and mostly highly 
familiar, sequences. The design of the test is to appear difficult in its 
presentation, but be deceptively easy, such that people with compromised 
cognitive function will recall most, if not all of the design, while malingerers, 
expecting cognitive impairment to interfere with ‘memory’, will overdo their 
mistakes, beyond those of the genuinely impaired.
The best figures for this test come from Arnett et al (1995), comparing 
simulators with a neurologically impaired group, with a sensitivity of 64% and 
specificity of 96%, using a particular scoring system, and very low cut-off, 
which would lose sensitivity in many other studies. Similarly high figures were 
reported by Greiffenstein, Baker & Gola, 1994, impressively separating 
‘probable malingerers’ from other claimants with persistent PCS by 63% 
sensitivity at 93% specificity, but less effectively from more severely injured 
(63% at 88%). However, this performance was not maintained on revalidation 
(Greiffenstein et al 1996a): 64% at 78%, using more severely brain-injured. 
Millis and Kler (1995) managed to identify 57% of established malingerers with 
100% specificity, but used very small groups of n = 7. An interesting study by 
Lee et al (1992) separated 38% of litigating neurological out-patients, when 
compared with non-litigating in- and out- patients, at 95% specificity.
On the down side, several authors have found the test not useful as a 
detection instrument, returning figures as low as 5% at 60% (Guilmette et al 
1994), the main problem being that the Rey is too sensitive to genuine 
memory impairment, particularly in more severe form. Schretlen et al (1991) 
came to similar conclusions.
The problem with this test is that it seems not actually to be a “floor” test, as 
several subjects, usually with rather severe cognitive impairment, have been 
shown to score variously below the maximum. Thus its specificity is 
compromised. Furthermore, several suspected, or probable malingerers, and
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simulating malingerers, are not detected with this test, perhaps because it is 
seen as being ‘too easy’: it is transparent as a test of malingering. Thus its 
sensitivity is compromised. Consequently, Iverson & Binder (2000) advise 
that this test should not be used in isolation, a caution that could justifiably be 
made about any of the specialised tests presented here. (Incidentally, some 
of these problems might be lessened if Rey’s original protocol were observed, 
in which he presents the array of figures in 30 seconds, not 10, and he 
deliberately reads out aloud each item to the subject. This would make it 
more of a floor test, but might not improve its transparency.) Interestingly, 
Iverson & Franzen (1996) recommend it is given at the very beginning of an 
assessment when its transparency might be at its lowest.
In summary, the 15-Item Test is very quickly and easily administered, and 
seems to be of uncertain, but potential value. This value might be 
enhanced with local data of the behaviour of impaired (and malingering) 
subjects, and for these reasons it was included in the tests examined in 
the present study.
Another floor effect test is the Dot Counting Test (DCT) (Rey 1941). The 
subject is given a series of cards displaying randomly dispersed dots, and 
asked to count them as quickly as possible, under timing. This series is 
followed by a similar series except that the dots are arranged in blocks, like 
the sides of a die, facilitating counting. Normal, and brain-injured subjects, 
should show a smooth progression of time as the number of dots increases, 
and should be consistently faster in counting the grouped dots. Malingerers 
might be induced to making more errors even than brain-injured, or usefully 
but less quantifiably, they might make qualitative errors like non-linear trends 
according to difficulty, or insufficient differentiation between grouped and 
ungrouped versions. Like the 15 Items Test, the test throws up a variety of 
scoring systems, different versions of which are employed by researchers. 
(Rey also suggested repeating the trials, and speculated that the performance 
of cooperative subjects would improve, while that of malingerers would not. 
This interesting hypothesis has not been tested.)
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This test was found to be a significant discriminator by Binks et al (1997), 
identifying 79% of simulators, while sparing 92% of neurological patients. 
However, this was something of an exploratory study, and arrived at its 
separation using a complex discriminant analysis of multiple systems of 
scoring. The most powerful scoring methods were found to be the number of 
incorrect counts, and “deviations from linearity” (but there is no description of 
how this is measured). No discriminating figures, and no cut-off, are provided 
for the individual scoring methods, and clearly the method awaits revalidation.
Greiffenstein, Baker and Gola (1996a) found no significant main effect in an 
analysis between impaired patients, persistent PCS patients and probable 
malingerers, using this test, but the authors admit this may have been 
attributable to their scoring method, while Rose et al (1998) only found two out 
of six scoring methods to be discriminatory, and then the performance of 
simulators was so similar to non-mild head injured subjects that, a high 
specificity - 96% - was only achieved at prohibitive cost to sensitivity - 9%. In 
this study, the DCT may have suffered not only from sensitivity to brain injury, 
but also perhaps from transparency. However, for a test of such a historic 
age, it has been surprisingly little evaluated in the literature (Sweet, 1999), 
and, given Binks's examination, one suspects its potential has not been fully 
tested. Furthermore, normative data for this test is lacking - Lezak (1995) 
provides crude figures from the original French study of 60 years ago. For 
these reasons, the DCT was included for examination in the present 
study.
Specialised Test Method 2: Violation Of Learning Principles
A second method of testing for malingering is by relying on an assumed lack 
of sophistication by the malingerer of principles of learning. One rather 
obvious principle (and one for which perhaps this assumption is too easily 
made!) is the fact that unconnected associations are more difficult to learn 
than easy ones. Gronwall (1991) recommends that below average scores on 
the easy Paired Associates of the Wechsler Memory Scale, accompanied
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by relatively less impaired performance on the harder ones, should raise the 
examiner's suspicions about the motivation of the subject.
Surprisingly, Bernard (1990) could find no previous studies of malingering 
using the Wechsler Memory Scales, despite their ubiquity in research and 
clinical practice, and studies since which examine the utility of Paired 
Associates have been almost as absent. Neither Cochrane et al (1998), nor 
Schwartz et al (1998) were able to discriminate simulators from memory- 
impaired patients using easy and hard paired associates. Nonetheless, as 
Gronwall observed, this test has some apparent clinical utility, and it appears it 
has not undergone extensive examination as a tool of detection. Indeed, the 
subtest of the original WMS has seemingly not been studied at all in this light. 
For this reason, the WMS Paired Associates (Form 1) were included for 
examination in the present study.
Another, perhaps more hidden, principle of learning is that recall is facilitated 
by recognition cues. In a two-page article, Brandt et al (1985) elegantly 
demonstrates that even severely memory-disordered patients can score 
relatively highly on recognition, while simulators can fail to respond, many 
scoring below chance in forced-choice recognition format.
This principle, and its apparent lack of familiarity to malingerers, is exploited in 
several versions of tests of recall and recognition used in studies of 
malingerers. For example, in an otherwise not very useful study involving only 
simulators and normal controls, Bernard’s (1990) work interestingly 
demonstrates that simulators’ recognition score was on average less than the 
recall score on the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT) (Rey, 1964).
A frequently used test of this phenomenon is the Word Recognition List 
(WRL) (Lezak, 1983), a list of fifteen words which are recalled by the subject 
after one presentation, after which the subject is required to select them from 
a visual presentation among 15 other, foil words. This recognition can take
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the form of forced-choice selection from pairs, which provides the examiner 
with another tool for detection (see later).
For a test publicised some time ago by such an authority as Lezak, the WRL 
has been surprisingly little researched (Sweet, 1999). Greiffenstein et al 
(1994) replicated Bernard’s finding on the AVLT, while also demonstrating that 
the WRL separated ‘probable malingerers’ (see above for criteria) from brain- 
injured patients, and from patients with persistent PCS, at sensitivities in the 
80%s, but only 80% specificity. The same authors later (1996a) replicated 
this with larger samples, and showed that when the more densely amnesic 
were removed from the patient sample (to make a comparison more similar to 
actual clinical decisions regarding mild head injury) specificity rose to a more 
acceptable 93%.
Iverson and Franzen (1996), using their own, 21-item list of words, showed 
that recall scores alone did not discriminate well between simulators and 
brain-injured subjects (5% at 100%) but recognition did (80% at 95%), as did a 
forced-choice recognition ad-hoc addendum to the Logical Memory subtest of 
the Wechsler Memory Test-Revised (WMS-R) (85% at 100%). (Notably, such 
a forced-choice format was incorporated into the next edition, the WMS-III.)
Wiggins and Brandt (1988) used their own 20-word list with forced-choice 
recognition, comparing simulators, patients and controls. Unlike Brandt’s 
earlier study, nobody scored below chance, but 20% of simulators and 8% of 
patients scored at chance (as did one of the 50 ‘normal’ controls, 
neuropsychologists should note!). Using these figures, then, their test 
appears to have discriminated simulators with 20% sensitivity at 92% 
specificity. Recall scores did not discriminate. In fact, patients scored lowest 
in this study, but a useful finding was that these severely impaired patients 
showed the recency, but not primacy, effect in recall of this long list, whereas 
‘normals’ and simulators showed both. This is another example of an even 
more well-hidden learning principle of which the malingerer might not be 
aware.
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Because the WRL has received such little evaluation in the literature, 
despite its brevity, potential, and being recommended by an authority 
such as Lezak, it was included for use in the present study.
Specialised Test Method 3:
Symptom Validity Testing, or Forced-Choice Paradigm.
The third main method of detecting malingering has a powerful, if limited, 
advantage of not depending on the performance of genuinely disabled 
patients for detection. The Forced-Choice paradigm applied to detect 
malingering of memory impairment was pioneered recently by Pankratz 
(1983), after its successful use in identifying hysterical blindness (Brady &
Lind, 1961), and malingering of deafness, and other sensory loss, by Pankratz 
himself (Pankratz et a /1975; Pankratz 1979). In the original study, on a single 
case, the complainant was shown two lights, one red one white, one of which 
would flash once. The subject was then involved in a simple distraction task 
(but which was described as difficult) for 15 seconds before being asked to 
indicate which light had flashed. After a large number of trials the subject in 
this case made significantly more errors than would be predicted by chance. 
The author concluded that his patient was recalling the correct choice of light, 
but responding incorrectly, and the inference was made that he was 
malingering.
Following this success, Pankratz claimed the term Symptom Validity Testing 
for the technique, although Forced-Choice Testing (FCT) will be used here, as 
symptom validity testing in its broadest sense could encompass the entire 
enterprise of detecting malingering.
The principal advantage of a large number of responses is that it will provide a 
sample for the subject's performance to be evaluated objectively against 
chance. Thus this paradigm uniquely provides the opportunity for the 
assessor confidently to diagnose underperformance, with the force of quotable 
probabilities (or at least very small probabilities of alternative hypotheses).
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Binder & Pankratz (1987), and Binder & Rattock (1989) followed with case 
studies involving a simpler technique - holding up a black pen or yellow pencil 
- with similar results, but the procedure was developed to a seminal form by 
Hiscock and Hiscock (1989), who introduced the idea of difficulty, in an 
attempt to lure a greater proportion of malingerers who might otherwise have 
‘seen through' the earlier techniques. They presented their patient with 5-digit 
numbers, followed by a choice of two more 5-digit numbers: the “target”, 
which the patient had just seen, and a foil. The task may have looked quite 
difficult, but target and foil numbers were quite different. An element of 
increasing difficulty was introduced by increasing the stimulus-response 
interval in stages (with no distraction), with 24 trials in each stage.
Binder (1990) took a slightly changed version of the Hiscocks' and named it 
the Portland Digit Recognition Test (PDRT), also adding distraction in the 
intervals. Binder & Willis (1991) evaluated it in a controlled study, comparing 
groups of brain injured patients in, and not in, claims for compensation, 
simulators, depressed patients and normals. All groups of patients seeking 
compensation scored worse than those not, and the results indicated that 
underperformance was not restricted to claimants with minor head injury: the 
scores of apparently more severely injured claimants were much more similar 
to MHI claimants than non-claiming impaired patients, suggesting that several 
claimants with documented impairment chose to exaggerate their disability. 
22% of MHI claimants scored below chance, while 26% scored below the 
lowest score of non-claiming brain-injured patients.
Several authors argue that ‘significantly below chance' is an unnecessarily 
strict criterion of malingering in tests in which severely disabled patients 
scored highly, and FCT sensitivity can be greatly improved without serious 
loss of specificity by raising the cut-off. For example. Slick et al (1996) found 
that by including those who score within confidence limits above and below 
chance, the Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT), a computerised FCT, 
increased its detection of simulators from 39% to 81%, and categorised more
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MHIs in compensation as under performing;- 30% from 5%, without 
misdiagnosing non-claiming brain-injured or normal subjects.
In the last decade, computerised FCTs such as the VSVT have been 
developed. Slick et a/’s (2000) use of the Computerized Assessment of 
Response Bias (CARB) suggested that 8% of moderate-to-severely brain- 
injured, and 24% of MHI, claimants, were malingering, while its combined use 
with indicators from the California Verbal Learning Test suggested a base-rate 
of malingering among mocferafe-to-severe/y brain-injured claimants to be up to 
32%!
Millis (1992) made use of a forced choice test that is part of the 
neuropsychologist's standard battery, the Warrington Recognition Memory 
Test (Warrington, 1984). 3 out of 10 MHI claimants scored below chance. 
Millis offers a range of cutting scores above chance, showing the 
discriminating power of each, but the sample is very small.
Iverson & Franzen (1998) found a cut-off of <38 in the WRMT (Words) 
correctly classified 95% of simulators, with no false positives, having 
previously established good separation with their own 21-item recognition test 
(Iverson & Franzen, 1996).
In summary, then, forced-choice tests have the advantage of clearly indicating 
intentional underperformance in those subjects who obtain scores which are 
significantly below chance. FCT methods have therefore been described as 
diagnostic of deliberate deception (Binder, 1992b), and the nearest, “short of 
confession," to a “gold standard" for detecting malingering (Slick et al 1999), 
and using this method. Binder and colleagues were able to demonstrate that 
the presence of malingering in head injury claimants was higher than had 
previously been supposed (see above). Unfortunately, even among known 
and probable malingerers these extreme-scoring subjects are in a minority 
(Binder 1993, Hiscock & Hiscock, 1989). That is, despite high specificity, 
these tests have low sensitivity (Slick et al 1999), and their purpose can be
107
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Research Dossier. The Present Study.
transparent to the subject (Millis & Volinsky, 2001). Sensitivity can be 
heightened by using higher cut-off scores, such as scores around (confidence 
levels of) chance, or below the lowest score obtained by criterion brain-injured 
patient groups (Nies & Sweet, 1994). This is immediately possible with the 
WRMT, published and used as a standard procedure, with norms for brain- 
injured groups, and Binder & Kelly (1996) have helped with their norms 
published for the PDRT. Nonetheless, FCTs are generally seen as tests of 
low sensitivity (Iverson & Binder, 2000).
Indeed, the reader is frequently cautioned that ‘valid’ (i.e. ‘not malingering’) 
scores on a FCT do not confer legitimacy on an individual’s performance 
(Wiggins & Brandt, 1988, Slick et a /1999, and see Iverson & Binder, 2000 for 
a frightening account of such a misunderstanding in court). For this reason, 
and for reasons of variable effort by the malingerer (see Rogers 1988a; Beetar 
& Williams, 1995) it is therefore recommended by experienced researcher 
clinicians that multiple specialised tests, such as all the types listed above, are 
used in any medicolegal neuropsychological investigation. (Franzen et al 
1990; Binder, 1993; Slick e /a /1999; Sweet, 1999; Iverson & Binder, 2000).
The Potential Contribution of Measuring Response Latency
The last decade has seen the development of computerised FCTs, and these 
bring with them the added advantage of precisely recording a potentially 
important feature of performance of which the examiner, and especially the 
subject, will only have a general idea: response latency.
It is widely accepted that head injury impairs attention and information 
processing speed, even following a minor injury (Gronwall & Sampson, 1974, 
Van Zomeran & Deelman, 1978). Hugenholtz et al (1988) showed that choice 
reaction time was slowed in the first weeks of recovery from MHI, and Wogar 
et al (1998) found an impairment index based on reaction time to be in 
moderate agreement with neuropsychological tests.
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However, mimicking such an impairment might be difficult for the malingerer, 
especially since additional time will be required in the process of under­
performing. Furthermore, malingerers have been reported to show unique 
patterns of response latency (Heilveil & Muehleman, 1981; Goebel, 1983; 
Resnick 1984). The estimation of response-slowing by cognitive impairment 
therefore becomes doubly difficult, and might betray the malingerer's 
deception (Brandt 1988). This seemingly under-researched suggestion 
forms the basis of the present study.
Strauss et al (1994) examined the feigning of attention deficit, and found that 
simulators were slower, (and more variable) on simple auditory reaction time, 
than patients with mild-to-moderate head injuries, and controls. Discriminant 
function analysis identified 89% of the simulators and 93% of the patients, a 
much better classification than was obtained using the PASAT test (Gronwall, 
1974).
Rose et al (1995) seem to be the first to look at response times on a 
computerised FCT, although tests measuring response latency had already 
been developed (Pritchard & Moses,1992; Conder et al 1992). Rose et al 
computerised the PDRT, and hypothesised that, in addition to identifying 
malingerers in the usual way, response latencies would be longer for 
simulators than for genuinely brain injured. In fact, the simulators' response 
times were longer than controls, but shorter than Rose’s sample of patients, 
counter to expectation. However, most of the patient sample were severely 
injured, having a modal coma duration of two weeks. The authors 
recommended future research into the clinical utility of response latency in 
identifying malingering in comparison with cases of less severe injury. This 
recommendation is the basis of the present study.
Similarly, Iverson & Binder (2000) proposed that FCT testing could be 
enhanced by measures of response latency, suggesting that “ ‘valid’ (i.e. 
apparently ‘non-malingering’) FCT scores accompanied by extremely long 
response times could be interpreted as malingering”.
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In contrast to Rose et al, Green & Iverson (2002) validated a similar FCT with 
response latencies, the Computerized Assessment of Response Bias (CARB), 
on litigants with head injuries which ranged from trivial to severe. The litigants 
with more severe injuries scored higher on the FCT and had shorter response 
latencies, than those with trivial injuries, suggesting that malingerers can 
indeed over-exaggerate response slowness. However, this research still 
remains to be published, and the issue remains surprisingly little explored.
In their study of the Victoria Symptom Validity Test, Slick et al (1996) clearly 
recorded that the response times of the subjects showing “invalid” FCT scores 
(simulators and MHIs in compensation claims) were exclusively longer than 
those with ‘valid’ scores (controls and brain-injured). The authors make little 
of this finding, merely stating that ’’response time may be a useful adjunct 
measure of symptom validity”. Strangely, there is no statistical analysis of 
these strikingly different sets of latencies. Also strangely, two related tables 
do not correspond, but the interesting findings invite corroboration. Again, 
this promising but unutilised finding forms the basis of the present 
study.
Allen et al (1998), examining a large number of compensation cases (of 
unspecified injuries) report in an abstract that those who failed the CARB also 
showed longer, and more variable, response times. Strauss et al (2000) 
showed similar effects, but in an analogue study only using uninjured 
undergraduates.
Clearly, both these interesting hypotheses remain to be adequately 
tested on a relevant clinical population, and these observations will be 
re-examined in the present study.
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Broadening FCT Dimensions to Other Modalities:
The Tests of Neuropsychological Malingering
Finally, Pritchard & Moses (1992) added the measurement of simple auditory 
and visual abilities to the memory function tested by typical FCTs, in a test 
which has subsequently been developed commercially as the Tests of 
Neuropsychological Malingering (TNM) (Pritchard, 1998). Significantly 
below-chance scores on any subtest resulted in 66% of simulators being 
identified, with no false positives from a sample of mainly chronic & severe 
psychiatric cases. However, a higher cutting score for these samples, 
discriminated the groups with greater accuracy (90% at 100%). This 
suggested cutting score requires revalidation, and the test needs validating 
using neurological patients, as recommended by Rogers et al (1993). In any 
case Pritchard, as the author of the TNM, recommends clinicians collect local 
norms and make their own cut-off score. Furthermore, the TNM includes a 
response time facility, which the authors do not appear to have made use of.
Because Pritchard himself has not evaluated the additional contribution 
of response latency data to the clinical utility of the test, because of the 
TNM’s unique additional dimensions of other sensory modalities, 
because this potentially useful test needs validating, and because of the 
authors recommendation to collect local, and neurological, norms, this 
test was selected to form the basis of the present study.
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THE PRESENT STUDY
The present study was primarily designed to determine the validity of 
response latency on the TNM in discriminating simulator-malingerers from 
participants with two levels of head injury: mild, and moderate-and-severe. If 
response latency on the TNM can be shown to discriminate between 
simulators, and mildly-head-injured, and cognitively impaired, participants, 
then it might effectively be used in the detection of malingering.
No single test of malingering should be used alone. Specialised procedures 
detect extreme test behaviour and are by their nature conservative: they 
typically have low sensitivity. Further, malingerers cannot be relied upon to 
under-perform consistently, and one can reasonably expect malingerers to 
differ in their response styles (Rogers 1988a; Beetar & Williams 1995).
Indeed, Boone eta l (1995) demonstrated far from complete overlap in 
exaggeration, by suspected ‘fakers’, on measures of cognitive and psychiatric 
functioning. Therefore the cautious neuropsychologist would be advised to 
use a battery of specialised tests in any medico-legal assessment (Franzen et 
al 1990; Binder, 1993; Slick eta l 1999; Sweet, 1999; Iverson & Binder, 2000).
Furthermore, there are several specialised procedures which are 
recommended for use by authoritative sources (e.g. Lezak, 1995, Iverson & 
Binder, 2000) but whose value remains uncertain, and for whom normative 
data and decision-making criteria are lacking (Sweet, 1999).
Other tests of malingering were included in the study, therefore, partly for the 
reasons of validation and comparison of the TNM variables, and partly for the 
further evaluation of these additional tests.
This is an analogue study: malingering behaviour was elicited from 
unimpaired volunteers who were given information about post concussional 
symptoms (PCS), and were instructed to simulate malingering.
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HYPOTHESES
1 a). Participants simulating the malingering of the effects of a head injury 
(Simulators) will show slower response latency on the TNM, than not only 
patients experiencing post-concussional symptoms (PCS), but also patients 
with documented impairment from more severe brain injuries (‘Disabled’), thus 
distinguishing their performance as exaggerated.
1 b). Since processing speed is sensitive to cognitive impairment, the 
‘Disabled’ will show slower responding than the PCS, who, if they show any 
difference, will respond more slowly than uninjured participants (‘Normals’)
2 a). The same exaggeration as in 1 a) will be seen with regard to response 
latency variability on the TNM, with Simulators showing greater variability.
2 b). Because greater response latency variability might be expected to be 
associated with cognitive impairment (Strauss et al 1994), the same 
differentials as in 1 b) can be expected with regard to this measure.
3 a). The same exaggeration as in 1 a) will be seen with regard to the 
established scoring procedures of the TNM. That is. Total scores on Auditory, 
Visual and Memory Tests will be lower for the Simulators.
3 b). As the established TNM scores are intended to have a ‘high floor’, the 
differentials of 1 b) will not be seen. That is. Simulators are expected to score 
lower than all other groups, who are not expected to differ.
4 a). The same exaggeration as in 1 a) will be seen with regard to the scores 
derived from the Paired Associates sub-test of the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(AL Easy; AL Hard; AL Total; and Easy-Hard).
4 b). As memory is sensitive to cognitive impairment, the same differentials 
as in 1 b) can be expected with regard to the standard measures of Easy 
score. Hard score, and Total score, but...
4 c). ... The Easy-Hard score has been derived exclusively to identify under­
performance (see Method), so with this score, the differentials of 1 b) will not
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be seen. That is, Simulators are expected to score lower than all other 
groups, who are not expected to differ.
5 a). The same exaggeration as in 1 a) will be seen with regard to the 
measures obtained using the Word Recognition List (WRL): Recall; 
Recognition; Recognition-minus-RecalI.
5 b). As memory is sensitive to cognitive impairment, the same differentials 
as in 1 b) can be expected with regard to the Recall and Recognition scores, 
but...
5 c) ... The Recognition-minus-Recall score has been derived exclusively to 
identify under-performance (see Method), so with this score, the differentials 
of 1 b) will not be seen. That is. Simulators are expected to score lower than 
all other groups, who are not expected to differ.
6 a). The same exaggeration as in 1 a) will be seen with regard to measures 
obtained using the Rey 15 Items Test: (Total score; Order score).
6 b). As this test is intended to have a ‘high floor’ (Rogers et al 1993), the 
differentials of 1 b) will not be seen. That is. Simulators are expected to score 
lower than all other groups, who are not expected to differ.
7 a). The same exaggeration as in 1 a) will be seen with regard to measures 
obtained using the Dot Counting Test (DCT): Grouped Dots Total; Grouped 
Dots Rate; Ungrouped Dots Total; Ungrouped Dots Rate; Dots Rate Ratio.
7 b). Rates of counting all dots, and the correct counting of ungrouped dots 
can be seen, according to the results of Rose et al (1998), as at least 
potentially sensitive to cognitive impairment, so the same differentials as in 
1b) can be expected with regard to the measures: Ungrouped Dots Total, 
Grouped Dots Rate, and Ungrouped Dots Rate, but...
7 c). ... Grouped Dots Total can be considered to have a high floor (see Rose 
et al 1998), and Dots Ratio has been derived exclusively to identify under­
performance (see Method), so for these two measures, the differentials of 1 b) 
will not be seen. That is. Simulators are expected to score lower than all other 
groups, who are not expected to differ.
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METHOD
Research Ethical Committee Approval
Ethical approval for the research proposal was granted on its first submission 
by the Mid-Sussex Trust Local Research Ethics Committee (Princess Royal 
Hospital, Haywards Heath) on Z"" July, 1999. (See Appendix.)
Recruitment
‘PCS’ participants were recruited via posters in GP surgeries and the local 
hospital A&E department, by having information sent to patients who had 
attended A&E with a head injury, by local GP referral, and by other publicity 
from newspaper and radio announcements. ‘Disabled’ participants were 
recruited from patients of the neuropsychology department, and from a local 
charitable head-injury rehabilitation centre. Headway House at Newick, 
Sussex. Members of the ‘Normal’ and ‘Simulator’ groups were recruited from 
local hospital staff, and through the publicity mentioned above. Potential 
participants were told that the procedure would take about an hour of their 
time, and for taking part they would be offered the choice of receiving a taped 
course of relaxation training, or taking part in a lottery among other members 
of their group, for a CD voucher.
Participants
177 participants were recruited, from whom 152 met the criteria for the four 
experimental groups.
‘Normals’ (n = 41) were selected if they were aged between 16 and 64 years, 
and had no history of significant head injury (including loss of consciousness) 
or other neuropsychological impairment, nor current psychiatric or other
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illness, nor substance use, which might impair cognitive function or 
psychomotor speed.
PCS participants (n = 28) were selected with similar criteria, except that they 
had received a minor head injury in the last three years in which they had lost 
consciousness for less than one hour, and they complained of current post- 
concussional symptoms, which must include impairment of concentration or 
memory. Patients involved in compensation claims were excluded. This 
inclusion of a separate group of participants who complain of persistent PCS, 
following a minor head injury, but who are not involved in compensation 
claims, is rare in the literature of malingering, or the evaluation of tests of 
malingering. Youngjohn et al (1995) recommend the inclusion of such a 
group, and complain that they were unable to do so in their own study as such 
participants were not referred to their clinic and are “exceedingly rare”.
‘Disabled’ (n = 35) participants were selected from the same age group, who 
had suffered a brain injury with such residual neuropsychological impairment 
as to cause them to be unable to continue their job. Those with head injuries 
(25) were selected only if their loss of consciousness exceeded one hour.
The cause of injury in the remainder was: cerebro-vascular event (7), brain 
tumour and surgery (2) and anoxia (1). All participants had records, or were 
tested, to demonstrate significant impairment of cognitive functioning. Time 
since injury ranged from 3 months to 20 years. Those in current 
compensation claims were excluded.
Simulators (n = 48) were recruited as per ‘Normals’, but who accepted the 
invitation to proceed in the role of a person exaggerating in a claim for 
compensation for a head injury. Those who declined the invitation (about ten) 
proceeded as ‘Normal’ participants.
Unused participants: A small number of participants did not meet inclusion 
criteria and were not invited to participate, but another small number 
participated whose results were not used. This included some participants
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who complained of PCS but who had not lost consciousness (or who had not 
had a head injury), and those who had suffered a moderate or severe injury 
whose recent records did not show marked impairment of cognitive 
functioning. Data was collected on these participants as they might form 
interesting groups of their own, but samples are not as yet large enough to 
make useful comparisons. Finally, the data was excluded of five Simulators 
who admitted after testing that they could not in fact perform the simulation 
role.
Materials
(See Literature Review above for reviews of each test)
1. National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson & Willison, 1991). This test 
has been demonstrated as a valid measure of general intelligence in the 
normal population (Crawford eta l 1989) and, being relatively unaffected by 
many forms of cognitive impairment, as a valid indicator of premorbid IQ after 
head injury (Crawford et a /1988). It also has the advantage of being quickly 
administered. It would not have been practicable to administer, for example, 
an assessment of IQ based on Wechsler tests. The NART was given to all 
participants so that groups could be balanced for this measure of IQ.
2. Associate Learning (AL) test from the Wechsler Memory Scale (Wechsler, 
1945). This test requires the learning of 6 familiar paired associates, together 
with 4 unfamiliar pairs, over three trials. Four scores are obtained:
a. “Easy” (max 18),
b. “Hard” (max 12)
c. Total (max 30) and,
d. “Easy-Hard” (max 18): This score was devised exclusively for the 
research. In accordance with the recommendation of Gronwall (1991), 
a relative difference in performance on the two parts of the test can be 
assessed by this fourth score, obtained by subtracting the Hard score 
from the Easy score. It is Gronwall's view that a relatively poorer
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performance on easy associates, than hard ones, would suggest 
under-performance, so one would expect the “Easy-Hard” difference to 
be lower in Simulators than other groups in this study.
3. Word Recognition List (WRL) (Lezak, 1983). A list of fifteen words which 
are recalled by the participant after one presentation, after which the 
participant is required to select them from a visual presentation among 15 
other, foil words. This test yields three scores:
a. Recall (max 15),
b. Recognition (max 15) and
c. (Recognition-Recall, max 15). This score was devised exclusively
for this research. In accordance with the theory that malingerers will 
underestimate the facilitation of recall by recognition (see Brandt et al 
1985; and Bernard, 1990) this third score is the difference between the 
first two scores. It is expected that this score would be lower for 
Simulators than for others.
4. Rey 15 Item Memory Test (Rey, 1964). This test involves the immediate 
recall of 15 items, which are grouped into largely similar, and mostly highly 
familiar, sequences, presented on a card for ten seconds. Two scores were 
used:
a. Total score (max 15). This is scored according to how many figures 
were recalled, but this neglects an assessment of the overall integrity of 
the pattern.
b. Order Score (max 6). This score was devised exclusively for this 
research, to determine whether simulators are discernible by the 
pattern of their response. It is calculated by awarding one point for 
each sequentially correct line (irrespective of individual errors within a 
line) and an additional point for correctly reproducing the order of five 
lines of figures (irrespective of errors within lines).
5. Dot Counting Test {Rey 1941). Six cards are presented to the participant, 
each showing a different number, grouped in familiar dice-like arrays to
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facilitate counting (‘Grouped Dots’). The participant is asked to say as quickly 
as they can how many dots are on the card, and the response, and its latency, 
are recorded. The procedure for ‘Ungrouped Dots’ is identical, but slightly 
different numbers are presented, and in random array on the cards.
Five scores are obtained:
a. Grouped Dots Total: cards correctly counted (max 6).
b. Grouped Dots Rate: arrived at by dividing the “total number of dots 
correctly counted” by the total counting time. The “total number of dots 
correctly counted” was a score developed for this experiment, by 
subtracting the modulus error from the total, so that all errors resulted 
in a lowering of the total number correctly counted.
c. Ungrouped Dots Total: cards correctly counted (max 6).
d. Ungrouped Dots Rate.
e. Dots Rate Ratio. This score was developed for this experiment in 
accordance with Lezak’s (1983) comment about the gradual increase in 
time with increased number of dots, and my experience of patterns 
obtained from co-operative participants. Graphically represented, dot 
number and response time should form two linear progressions for 
grouped and ungrouped counting times. The grouped line should be 
relatively flat, while the ungrouped is steeper. As Lezak observes, 
deviations from this pattern “raise the likelihood that the patient is not 
acting in good faith” (p. 619). The Dots Rate Ratio score is an attempt 
to register a comparison of the slopes of the two lines formed 
graphically. So, the Grouped Dots Rate is divided by the Ungrouped 
Dots Rate for the Dots Ratio score. It is expected that this score would 
be lower for Simulators than for others.
6. Tests of Neuropsychological Malingering (TNM) (Pritchard, 1998). These 
are computerised forced-choice tests, in Auditory, Visual and Memory 
modalities. In the Auditory test, a beep generated by the computer is sounded 
or not, followed by a written question asking the participant to respond, via the 
keyboard, whether or not they heard the sound. The Visual test presents the 
participant with a simple asymmetric shape for two seconds, followed by a
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question as to which side was longer. The Memory test presents a five-digit 
number for two seconds and the participant is then invited to choose the 
number from two five-digit numbers presented subsequently.
Each test comprises 24 trials, followed by a notice saying the participant had 
done well, and the next set would be made more difficult (by means of 
shortening the tone, reducing the exposure time, or increasing the delay 
between exposure and response choice), followed by another set of 24 items, 
a similar notice, and a further 24 items, making 72 items for each test. In fact, 
the changes made after each test make little difference to subsequent item 
difficulty, and the tests remain easy throughout. Normal participants can be 
expected to score the maximum of 72 correct or very near to it, on each test.
The participant is guided through the instructions, and some practice items, 
and told to respond as quickly as possible to the questions.
Four scores are obtained from each (Auditory-, Visual-, Memory-) test.
a. In Pritchard's commercial edition, the Total score is the only score 
utilised for each test. However, in this research, three additional scores 
are derived.
b. Response Latency (RL) is the response time averaged over the 72 
trials.
c. Response Latency Variability was devised for the present study, and 
obtained from the standard deviation of the response times of the 
middle 24 items of each test.
d. Extremes. Occasionally a participant would score extreme response 
latencies, which threatened to distort the above two scores.
Sometimes such an extreme was artifactual, caused by some 
malfunctioning of the computer, or a non-relevant reaction of the 
participant. When this was observed, the score was eliminated from 
the participant's record. Unexplained extremes were not recorded by 
‘Normal’ or PCS participants (with one exception), and seemed to be a 
phenomenon of simulated malingering, but were also observed in some
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‘Disabled’ patients who, for example, might have become distracted, 
but it is possible that some artifacts went unnoticed. In order to 
minimise the distorting effects of these extreme scores, a limit was 
placed on their value. This limit was chosen at 10 seconds, this being 
the highest extreme observed among almost all the ‘Disabled’ patients 
(and was therefore about the highest ‘natural’ occurrence). Values in 
excess of this limit were “Winsorised” (see Winer, 1962). That is, they 
were accorded the value of the next highest response latency obtained 
by the participant below \he limit of 10 seconds. Thus the participant 
with many extreme scores would be likely to be given a Winsorised 
score close to the limit, while the participant with just one aberrant 
score over the limit might have the score altered to a much lower level. 
It was considered that these changes were reasonable to make, since 
they acted against the direction of the hypotheses of the research.
That is, they made the Simulators less different from the ‘Disabled’ 
group. The ‘Extremes’ score, then, was the number of times within a 
test that RL had been measured to exceed 10 seconds, without 
artifactual explanation.
Procedure
Members of all groups were given an explanatory letter, and completed a 
consent form, and a questionnaire about post-concussional symptoms 
(derived from The Rivermead Post Concussion Symptoms Questionnaire 
(POSQ) (King et al 1995) prior to the assessment session (see Appendix). In 
the assessment, participants were interviewed to obtain demographic 
information and assess inclusion/exclusion criteria, followed by administration 
of the NART. Then, ‘Normals’, PCS and ‘Disabled’ participants were given the 
paper-and-pencil tests, in the order: Grouped Dots; Associate Learning; Word 
Recognition List; Rey 15 Item Test; Ungrouped Dots. Then the computerised 
TNM were administered, in the order Auditory, Visual, Memory.
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Simulators, after administration of the NART, were invited to perform the tests 
in the role of a person who had had a head injury, and was making as much 
as they could of a claim for compensation. If the participant expressed a 
willingness to proceed in this role, they were given a written scenario, 
depicting a situation of a head injury, and its effects, and subsequent claim 
(see Appendix). The depiction asked subjects to exaggerate their assumed 
symptoms, but it was emphasised that "you must be careful not to let the 
psychologist believe that you are faking”.
The decision to invite uninjured participants to become Simulators was made 
prior to their attendance. At a later stage, it was necessary to recruit ‘Normal’ 
and Simulator participants with lower NART scores in order to balance these 
two groups with the ‘Disabled’ group on this measure.
After studying the scenario, the participants made their choice of continuing as 
a Simulator or proceeding as a member of the control group. It was 
necessary to offer subjects this choice, firstly because the ‘malingering’ aspect 
of the research was withheld from the initial recruiting publicity (for obvious 
reasons), and this was the first time subjects had encountered it. Secondly, it 
was necessary to ensure that the Simulator participants were actually 
motivated to simulate exaggeration of symptoms. A few participants 
expressed a reluctance to play this role, because of moral objections, or 
through lack of confidence in their acting abilities, or perhaps other reasons. 
Such self-selection is in-keeping with the methodology of the literature (see,
e.g., Rogers, 1997), in which many authors also use a post-experiment 
manipulation check to ensure the compliance of their simulators, as indeed 
was also the case in this research (see below).
Strictly speaking, those who declined should have taken no further part in the 
experiment. Including them in the ‘Normal’ group introduced a potentially 
artifactual difference between the ‘Normals’ and other groups, in that the 
‘Normal’ group included such decliners, whereas the Simulator group did not. 
However, decliners were included, because:
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- the limitations of recruiting suitable subjects for this piece of research were 
such that it was considered a luxury to discard valuable subjects;
- any difference so introduced was considered negligible;
- the group contrasts of main interest did not include the ‘Normal’ group, being 
firstly the comparison of Simulator and ‘Disabled’ groups, then between 
Simulator and PCS groups.
Simulator Coaching
Those accepting the Simulator role were then given a little time to prepare 
their role, as recommended by Rogers (1997). An explanatory list of post- 
concussional symptoms was provided, and Simulators were asked to 
complete a second administration of the PCSQ, this time according to the role. 
Simulators were told they must endorse both cognitive symptoms (poor 
concentration and memory), and any of the other symptoms. Then they were 
asked to describe at least four ways in which these assumed symptoms would 
interfere with their job, and/or their life outside work, for both the cognitive 
symptoms, and any two others. Simulators were then reminded that they 
should perform the test administration in role.
Thus the Simulators were coached with regard to symptoms of head injury, in 
rather greater detail than is mentioned in the literature (e.g. Demakis, 1999; 
Inman et al 1998), on the grounds that malingerers of specific cognitive 
deficits may be more difficult to identify than those who feign global 
impairment (Rogers et al 1993). However, their coaching on malingering 
skills (“to be careful not to let the psychologist believe that you are faking”) 
was rather less than is employed in other studies using coached simulators 
(e.g. Frederick et al 1994, Rose et al 1998).
Manipulation Check
Following the tests. Simulators were de-briefed, and completed a final 
questionnaire designed to assess their understanding and compliance in the 
role. This is in-keeping with simulator methodology recommended by Rogers, 
1997, and utilised by such as Goebel, 1983; Bernard, 1990; Arnett et al 1995;
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Bernard ef a /1993; Iverson, 1995; Rose et al 1995; Inman et al 1998; and 
Demakis, 1999. Five participants admitted to being unable to perform in the 
role, and their data was withdrawn.
Blind Participants:
28 Simulators, 21 ‘Normals’, and a small number from the other groups were 
tested by trained assistants, who did not know the group membership of their 
participants. Blind status was determined independently of participant 
recruitment, according to the availability of the trained research assistants.
This was designed to determine whether unintentional experimenter influence 
would affect the measured performance of participants. This was particularly 
important in the performance of the Simulators, all of whom had been coached 
by the experimenter. Ideally, all subjects would have been tested ‘blind’, but 
this was not feasible given the logistic limitations of the study. Nonetheless, 
this method provided a means of ensuring that the results were at least as 
conservative as if they had all been obtained by blind methods.
Blind methodology seems to be surprisingly rare in the malingering simulation 
literature, but one example of its adoption is provided by Rose et al (1998).
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STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Correlations and Group Comparisons
Many of the measures used were found to be non-normally distributed, and/or 
with heterogeneous variances between groups. Spearman correlations have 
been used throughout. Where non-normality has occurred in group 
comparisons, non-parametric analyses have been applied. Kruskal-Wallis 
one-way analysis of variance has been utilised, followed when significant by 
Mann-Whitney U multiple comparisons, with a Bonferroni correction against 
experiment-wise Type 1 error.
Otherwise, to maximise power, where distributional assumptions have been 
met, parametric analyses of variance have been used, with subsequent 
Bonferroni multiple comparisons, except in cases of heterogeneity of variance, 
when Tamhane multiple comparisons were made (SPSS, 2000).
All these analyses are summarised in Tables 1 to 12. Omnibus test results 
are given in the tables of group comparisons, together with an indication by 
superscript of which groups were found to differ significantly in subsequent 
comparisons. All comparisons were two-tailed.
Discriminant analyses
For those measures on which a difference was found between ‘Disabled’ and 
Simulator groups, a cross-tabulation was performed, and cut-off scores were 
obtained, with their classification rates. The results of this procedure are 
summarised in Table 13.
Correlations between these measures were also obtained, and are 
summarised in Table 14, and these two sets of data were used as the basis of 
a subsequent logistic regression, in order to estimate the discriminating value 
of a small battery derived from these measures (Tables 15 & 16).
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Abbreviations used throughout
Norm = ‘Normal’ group.
PCS = PCS group.
Dis = ‘Disabled’ group.
Sim = Simulator group.
M-W U Z = Mann-Whitney U test, Z score.
KWx^ = Kruskal-Wallis test, chi-squared result, 
t = t-test of independent samples, (Bonferroni corrected significance)
T = t-test of independent samples, (Tamhane corrected significance)
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01 ; *** = p < .001. ns = not significant.
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RESULTS
1. Preliminary Findings
1.1. Age and Estimated IQ
IQ was estimated by use of the National Adult Reading Test (NART). WAIS-R 
IQ is predicted by the NART Error score, which ranges from 0 (highest IQ) to 
50 (lowest). An Error score of 25 is equivalent to a WAIS-R IQ of 100. The 
results show that the mean of the sample as a whole is a little above average, 
but based on a wide range (from 3 to 48, equivalent to a WAIS-R IQ range 
from 71 to 127). Conversion to IQ scores is unnecessary beyond this point.
Efforts were made to ensure that the groups were balanced in terms of 
distribution of age and NART score within groups. This was achieved 
statistically for all groups. Although the PCS group's NART scores were 
slightly rhore narrowly distributed around a slightly lower mean, this group was 
not significantly different from the others, which shared very similar 
distributions for age and estimated IQ, as can be seen from Table 1.
Table 1. Groups and Total sample by Age and NART Error scores
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Total Omnibus test
N 41 28 35 48 152
Age Mean 41.32 41.18 42.60 39.04 40.87 K W x -  1-69, ns
SD 13.9 12.0 13.4 12.8 13.0
NART Mean 20.51 18.04 21.46 21.38 20.55 F(3,148) =  0.70, 
ns
SD 11.0 7.8 8.9 12.9 10.7
KW%^  = Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi\ F (*,*) = F test (degrees of freedom).
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Age and NART Error scores were found to correlate, within the ‘Normal’ 
group, with some of the measures used, as can be seen from Table 2.
Table 2. Correlations of Age and NART with test measures in 'Normal' group (N=41)
Spearman 
Correlation with
Spearman 
Correlation with
Paper-and-pencll
Test Age NART
Computer Test
Age NART
AL Easy -.064 - . 337* TNM Aud Total -.199 -.085
AL Hard - . 522* * * - . 444* *
TNM Aud 
Resp. Latency .276 .307
AL Total - .485* * * - .481* * *
TNM Aud 
RL Variation .215 .344*
AL Easy-Hard .502* * * .368*
TNM Aud 
Extremes —— - -
WRL
Recall - 427* * - . 413* * TNM Vis Total -.133 -.222
WRL
Recognition - . 353* -.191
TNM Vis 
Resp. Latency .280 .189
Recognition 
minus Recall .138 .230
TNM Vis 
RL Variation .241 .145
15 Items Total -.163 - . 418* *
TNM Vis 
Extremes _ _ —
15 Items Order - . 378* -.305 TNM Mem Total .187 - . 511* * *
Grouped Dots 
Total .103 -.188
TNM Mem 
Resp. Latency -.062 319* *
Grouped Dots 
Rate -.012 -.283
TNM Mem RL 
Variation -.089 .242
Ungrouped Dots 
Total .153 -.098
TNM Mem 
Extremes « —
Ung rouped Dots 
Rate -.205 .055
Dots Rate Ratio .104 -.234
Significant correlations in bold. * = p< .05; ** = p < .01 ; *** = p < .001.
It might be expected that IQ and age correlate with some of the more memory- 
test-like measures, such as the Associate Learning measures, WRL Recall 
and the 15 Item Test. These figures are in-keeping with those obtained, for 
example, with a standard memory test, the AMIPB (Goughian & Hollows, 
1985).
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Correlations with the NART of three TNM measures, two of them Memory 
subtests, suggest that the TNM is in parts indirectly a test of working memory 
(see Wechsler, 1998). Whatever underlies these correlations, balancing 
groups for age and NART score seems to be justified, at least for the more 
memory-like measures.
1.2. Evaluation of Blind Testing
As a check against experimenter influence, 28 of the 48 Simulators were 
tested by a ‘blind’ assistant along with 21 ‘Normals’, and a small number of 
participants from the PCS and ‘Disabled’ groups.
‘Blind’ and ‘Seen’ members of both ‘Normal’ and Simulator groups were 
similarly distributed for Age and NART, as Table 3 shows: no significant 
differences were observed between ‘Blind’ and ‘Seen’ members of each group 
on these variables.
Table 3. Means of Age and NART Error score 
for ‘Blind’ and ‘Seen’ sub-groups within ‘Normal’ and Simulator groups.
Variable
Group
‘Seen’
Norm
‘Blind’
Norm
Analysis ‘Seen’
Sim
‘Blind’
Sim
Analysis
N 20 21 20 28
Age Mean 38.10 44.38 M -W UZ = 
1.49, ns
36.20 41.07 M -W UZ = 
1.16, ns
SD 14.2 13.3 13.0 12.5
NART Mean 23.10 18.05 t =  1.50, ns 23.85 19.61 t=  1.12, ns
SD 10.1 11.4 12.6 13.1
M-WU Z = Mann-Whitney U test, Z-score. t = t test.
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The scores of the ‘Blind’ and ‘Seen’ Simulators were compared on all tests, 
and no significant differences were found between them on any of the paper- 
and-pencil tests, i.e. those administered directly by the experimenter or 
assistant. However, some differences emerged on the computerised (TNM) 
tests (see Table 4).
Table 4. Measures on which ‘Seen’ and ‘Blind’ Simulators were found to differ
Variable
Group
‘Seen’
Sim
‘Blind’
Sim M-W U  
Z score
N 20 28
TNM Auditory 
Response 
Latency 
(milliseconds)
Mean 2024 3057 2.7**
SD 1026 1399
TNM Auditory 
RL Variation 
(milliseconds)
Mean 948 1406 2.2*
SD 705 833
TNM Auditory 
Extremes
Mean 0.55 1.71 2.3*
SD 2.5 3.6
TNM Visual 
Score
Mean 57.90 49.04 2.1*
SD 14.1 6.0
TNM Memory 
Score
Mean 57.85 50.54 2.1*
SD 9.7 11.9
M-W U = Mann-Whitney U test. * p < .05; ** p < .01
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On five of the twelve measures derived from the TNM tests, the ‘Blind’ 
Simulators scored significantly differently from the ‘Seen’ Simulators. In every 
case, the ‘Blind’ sub-group scored ‘worse’ than the ‘Seen’ subgroup. That is 
to say, the ‘Blind’ participants scored more in the direction of the hypotheses 
than did the ‘Seen’ cases. This may have been because ‘Seen’ participants 
were somehow slightly inhibited, or ‘Blind’ participants disinhibited, by their 
conditions, and this showed itself in their computer performance.
(Interestingly, Martin et al (1993) note that “it is possible that a computerised 
format reduces subjects’ concern of being detected.) The disinhibition, 
however, may not have been restricted to the computer, as in 21 of all 26 
measures the ‘Blind’ participants scored further in the hypothesised direction 
than the Seen’ participants (although not significantly in the case of the paper- 
and-pencil tests).
In any case, the salient feature of these differences is that the ‘Blind’ 
participants scored further from the other groups than the Seen’ sub-group, 
so it can be concluded that non-blind experimenter influence has not acted in 
accordance with directions of the hypotheses. If anything, it has been found 
slightly to act against them. Therefore it was concluded that ‘Blind’ and ‘Seen’ 
sub-groups could be combined for the rest of the analyses.
This procedure left a substantial number of the ‘Normal’ group who had also 
been through the blind testing. ‘Blind ‘Normals” were compared with ‘Seen 
Normals’, on all dependent variables, and no significant differences were 
found. ‘Blind’ and ‘Seen’ Normals’ were thus combined in the Normal’ group.
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2. Group Differences on Measures Used
2.1. Group Differences on Associate Learning Measures
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
4 a). Simulators will score lower than all groups on all measures.
4 b). ‘Disabled’ will score lower than PCS, who, if they show any difference, will score lower than 
‘Normals’ on the standard measures of Easy, Hard, and Total scores.
4 c). On the Easy-Hard score Simulators are expected to score lower than all other groups, who are not 
expected to differ.
As can be seen from Table 5, both Simulators and ‘Disabled’ scored lower 
than ‘Normals’ and PCS (who were not differentiated on all measures) on AL 
Easy, AL Hard and AL Total measures. Simulators scored lower than 
‘Disabled’ on AL Easy and AL Total, but not on AL Hard. The groups were not 
differentiated on AL Easy-Hard.
Table 5. Associate Learning Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 33 48
AL Easy 
(max 18)
Mean
a
17.05
a
16.71
b
15.42
c
13.65 KWx ^47.7***
SD 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.9
AL Hard
(max 12)
Mean
a
7.20
a
6.43
b
4.39
b
2.81 F(3,146) = 22.2***
SD 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.4
AL Total 
(Max 30)
Mean
a
24.24
a
23.14
0
19.82
c
16.46 F(3,146) = 29.7***
SD 3.9 3.7 4.3 4.6
AL 
Easy-Hard 
(max 18)
Mean
a
9.85
a
10.29
a
11.03
a
10.83 F(3,146) =  1.69 
ns.
SD 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5
KWx^= Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi .^ F (*,*) = F test (degrees of freedom). ***p<.001. 
a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05
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Thus, hypothesis 4 a) was supported by the results obtained from the AL Easy 
and AL Total measures, but not by the other two. Hypothesis 4 b) was 
supported by the results, but Hypothesis 4 c) was not supported. These 
results are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Associate Learning Scores by Group
30
25
20
15
10
AL Easy AL Hard AL Total Easy-Hard
□  Norm
□  PCS
□  Dis
□  Sims
The Associate Learning measures derive from a clinical test, the Wechsler 
Memory Scale, so it is not surprising that the ‘Disabled’ group scored lower 
than PCS and ‘Normals’ on the direct scores (AL Easy, Hard and Total) from 
the test. Notably, PCS participants did not appear to be impaired on these 
tests, as their scores did not differ from those of the controls.
The Simulators’ performance on the direct scores give some support to 
Gronwall’s (1991) view that under-performers do relatively less well on AL 
Easy, rather than Hard, items.
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However, on the derived score (AL Easy-Hard) which was designed to detect 
such differential performance, no differences were found between groups.
This does not support Gronwall’s view, or at least, if there is a differential 
performance on these two sub-tests by Simulators, the “Easy-Hard” method of 
scoring is not detecting it.
Because no group differences were found using ‘AL Easy-Hard’, and because 
Simulators and ‘Disabled’ groups were not differentiated by ‘AL Hard’, these 
measures will not be used in further analyses.
2.2. Group Differences on Word Recognition List Measures
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
5 a). Simulators will score lower than all groups on all measures.
5 b). ‘Disabled’ will score lower than PCS, who, if they show any difference, will score lower than 
‘Normals’ on the standard measures of Recall and Recognition.
5 c) On Recognition-minus-Recall, Simulators are expected to score lower than all other groups, who 
are not expected to differ.
As can be seen from Table 6, Simulators scored lower than ‘Normals’ and 
PCS (who are not differentiated) on all measures. On the directly obtained 
measures. Simulators scored lower than ‘Disabled’ on Recognition, but not 
Recall, while the ‘Disabled’ scored lower than ‘Normals’, but were not 
differentiated from PCS, on both.
On the specially derived measure, Recognition-minus-Recall, the pattern is 
simpler, according to prediction: Simulators scored lower than all others, who 
did not differ on this measure. These results are illustrated in Figure 2.
Thus Hypothesis 5 a) was supported by two WRL measures: Recognition, 
and Recognition-minus-Recall, but not by Recall. Hypothesis 5 b) was 
partially supported: ‘Disabled’ were not differentiated from PCS on any 
measure (but were lower than ‘Normals’ on Recall and Recognition). 
Hypothesis 5 c) was supported by the relevant measure, Recognition-minus- 
Recall.
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Table 6. Word Recognition List Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 35 48
Words Recalled
(max 15) Mean
a
6.34
a,D
5.68
b,c
4.40
c
4.40 KWz^ = 23.5***
SD 2.5 2.2 1.5 1.8
Words 
Recognised 
(max 15)
Mean
a
11.32
a.D
10.46
D
8.86
c
6.08 F (3,148) = 
33.1***
SD 2.6 2.4 2.3 3.0
Recognition-
minus-Recall
(max 15)
Mean
a
4.98
a
4.79
a
4.46
D
1.69 F (3,148) = 
15.9***
SD 2.2 2.1 2.5 3.0
KW%^= Kruskal-Wallis test, ChF. F (*,*) = F test (degrees of freedom) 
p < .001. a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05.
Again, on a standard memory procedure, it is not surprising that ‘Disabled’ 
participants fared worse than ‘Normals’, although notably, again, PCS 
participants were not differentiated from ‘Normals’ on any of the measures.
Simulators were clearly suppressing their response, but this did not 
differentiate them from ‘Disabled’ in Recall, suggesting that their performance 
on this measure was realistic with respect to more severely disabled, but 
exaggerated with respect to PCS sufferers.
However, the ’violation of learning principles’ effect seems to have been 
captured here, by the other two measures. Simulators exaggerated their 
deficit beyond that of ‘Disabled’ in Recognition, and on this test ‘Disabled’ 
scored lower than ‘Normals’. But the difference between recognition and 
recall seems to be a constant among groups, at 4 or 5 words on average, with 
the exception of Simulators, whose over-suppression of recognition reduced 
this difference to less than two words, on average. This is in agreement with
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the similar findings in principle, of Brandt et al (1985), and Recognition-minus- 
Recall seems to be a useful means of identifying under-performance.
12
10
Figure 2. Word Recognition List Scores by Group
□  Norm
□  PCS
□  Dis
□  Sims
Recall Recognition Recognition-Recall
Because the measure Recall failed to distinguish between Simulators and 
‘Disabled’, it will not be considered in the subsequent section on discriminant 
validity.
2.3. Group Differences on Rey 15 Item Memory Test
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
6 a). Simulators will score lower than all groups on both measures.
6 b). On both measures, non-Simulator groups are not expected to differ.
As Table 7 reveals, on both measures, Simulators scored lower than 
‘Normals’ and PCS, but were not differentiated from ‘Disabled’, who scored 
lower than PCS, but not Normals’. Notably, once again, the PCS group were 
not found to perform any worse on this test than ‘Normals’. These results are 
illustrated in Figure 3.
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Table 7. 15 Item Memory Test Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 35 48
Number Correct
(max 15)
Mean
a,D
13.44
a
14.64
D.C
12.43
c
11.31 KW%  ^= 30.9***
SD 2.5 0.8 2.4 3.2
Order Score
(max 6 )
Mean
a.D
4.66
a
5.29
D.C
3.94
C
3.13 KW%  ^= 42.0***
SD 1.6 0.8 1.5 1.5
KWx  ^= Kruskal-Wallis test, ChF. *** = p < .001. 
a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05.
Figure 3. 15 Item Memory Test Scores by Group
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□  Norm
□  PCS
□  Sims
Order Score
Neither Hypothesis 6 a) nor 6 b) were fully supported by either measure 
derived from the 15 Item test.
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There seems, at this stage of analysis, to be no additional benefit to be gained 
from utilising the specially developed ‘Order’ score of this test.
Due to the lack of differentiation between Simulator and ‘Disabled’ groups, 
these tests will not be included in the subsequent section examining 
discriminant validity.
2.4. Group Differences on Dot Counting Measures
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
7 a). Simulators will score lower than all groups on all measures.
7 1)). ‘Disabled’ will score lower than PCS, who, if they show any difference, will score lower than 
‘Normals’ on the measures of Ungrouped Dots Total, Grouped Dots Rate, and Ungrouped Dots Rate.
7 c). For Grouped Dots Total and Dots Ratio, Simulators are expected to score lower than all other 
groups, who are not expected to differ.
On all Dot Counting measures. Simulators were differentiated from all other 
groups (see Table 8 and Figure 4). ‘Normals’ and PCS did not differ from 
each other on any measure, nor from ‘Disabled’ on Grouped Dots Total, 
Ungrouped Dots Total and Dots Rate Ratio. Disabled’ counted grouped dots 
more slowly than ‘Normals’, but not PCS, and ungrouped dots more slowly 
than PCS, but not ‘Normals’.
Hypothesis 7a) was supported by all Dot Counting measures: Simulators are 
seen to have exaggerated their ‘deficit’ beyond even the performance of the 
‘Disabled’ group.
Hypothesis 7b) was not clearly supported with respect to the rate of counting 
of either grouped or ungrouped dots, which measures seem to be only slightly 
sensitive to cognitive impairment. And this hypothesis was not supported at 
all by the other measure: Ungrouped Dots Total. All non-Simulator groups 
were, surprisingly, not differentiated on the score for counting ungrouped dots.
Hypothesis 7c) was supported by the results, indicating that Grouped Dots 
Total is indeed a ‘high floor’ test, and Dots Ratio appears to be insensitive to 
genuine impairment, while being sensitive to under-performance.
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Table 8. Dot Counting Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 35 48
Grouped Dots 
Total (max 6)
Mean
a
5.68
a
5.96
a
5.78
D
4.42 KWz^=28.7***
SD 0.8 0.2 0.4 1.9
Grouped Dots 
Rate (/sec)
Mean
a
8.20
a,D
7.64
0
6.54
c
3.31 F (3,148) = 
31.8***
SD 3.3 2.2 1.9 2.4
Ungrouped Dots 
Total (max 6)
Mean
a
4.76
a
4.96
a
4.54
0
3.02 F (3,148) = 
22.0***
SD 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.4
Ung rouped Dots 
Rate (/sec)
Mean
a.D
2.64
a
2.79
D
2.24
c
1.67 F (3,148) = 
17.5***
SD 0.7 0.5 0.6 1.0
Dots Rate Ratio Mean
a
3.23
a
2.78
a
3.03
D
2.06 K\Nx = 33.2***
SD 1.7 0.8 0.9 1.3
KW%^= Kruskal-Wallis test, ChP. F (*,*) = F test (degrees of freedom). *** = p < .001. 
a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05.
The design of the ‘Grouped Dots Rate’ measure reflects the assumption that 
even cognitively impaired subjects would be able to take the short-cut of 
counting the die-like patterns as a whole, but in practice, it was clear that 
several ‘disabled’ participants failed to do so, which could explain their lower- 
than-’Normal’ performance on this measure, and which agrees with Rose et 
a/’s (1998) observation of sensitivity to brain injury. However, among the Dot 
Counting measures, the greatest effect size between these two groups was 
shown in ‘Grouped Dots Rate’, so, notwithstanding the deficit shown by the 
‘Disabled’, this measure is the best discriminator of Simulators discussed so
139
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Research Dossier. The Present Study.
far. It also has the advantage of being partly a ‘hidden’ measure, the 
ostensible focus of the test being on correct counting, rather than on speed.
Figure 4. Dot Counting Scores by Group
Grouped
Total
Grouped
Rate
Ungrouped
Total
Ungrouped
Rate
Dots Rate 
Ratio
□  Norm
□  PCS
□  Dis
□  Sims
Dots Rate Ratio is a measure devised for this research, which attempts to 
gauge the degree of variation between the slopes of progression of counting 
larger numbers of grouped, versus ungrouped, dots. Normally, there should 
be a distinction between the slopes, and Lezak (1983) proposes that a 
deviation from this pattern is suggestive of faking. So, one would expect a 
lesser distinction, or a smaller ratio, between these slopes in simulating, and 
indeed, this was found to be the case. The slope of counting progressively 
more ungrouped dots was about 3 times steeper than that of grouped dots, in 
all groups except Simulators, for whom the ratio was closer to 2. This 
measure therefore has the double advantage of a) identifying simulation while 
not differentiating cognitively impaired from uninjured respondents, and b) 
being relatively well hidden from the subject, so not having the transparency 
which usually attends advantage a).
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2.5. Group Differences on TNM Standard Procedure: Total Scores
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
3 a). Simulators will score lower than all groups on all measures.
3 b). Non-Simulator groups are not expected to differ.
From Table 9 it can be seen that Simulators scored lower than all other 
groups on the Total score in all modalities. Non-Simulator groups did not 
differ from each other on the Auditory and Visual Tests, but ‘Disabled’ scored 
lower than Normals’ and PCS (who did not differ) on the Memory test. These 
results are illustrated by Figure 5.
Table 9. TNM Total Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 35 48
TNM Auditory 
Total
Mean
a
71.17
a
71.11
1.1
a
70.66
1.9
D
59.02
12.1
KWx  =  63.9***
SD 1.0
TNM Visual 
Total
Mean
a
71.44
a
71.50
a
71.43
D
52.73 KW x^=88.2***
SD 1.1 0.9 0.9 15.7
TNM Memory 
Total
Mean
a
71.15
a
70.82
b
70.05
c
53.58 KWx^ = 96.3***
SD 1.3 2.0 1.5 11.5
KW% = Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi .
= p < .001. a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05.
Thus both hypotheses 3a) and 3b) were supported by the data, with one 
exception, in the Memory Total score, which appears somewhat sensitive to 
cognitive impairment. This is surprising, according to the pattern of the means 
in Table 9, and Figure 5. On inspection of the data, this result appears to be
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due to a handful of ‘Disabled’ participants scoring slightly lower than the 
maximum, while almost all of the ‘Normals’ score at maximum, or very close to 
it. Notwithstanding this result, the data suggest that this test measure does 
have an effectively high floor, as further analyses will show.
The TNM Memory Total Score showed the greatest effect size of all measures 
in this study, when Simulators were compared with ‘Disabled’, and, as will be 
confirmed later, appears to be the test which best discriminates between 
these groups.
Figure 5. TNM Total Scores by Group
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2.6. Group Differences on TNM Response Latency
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
1 a). Simulators will score higher than all groups on all measures.
1 b). ‘Disabled’ will show slower responding than PCS, who, if they show any difference, will respond 
more slowly than ‘Normals’.
The pattern of scores obtained on the Response Latency was identical to that 
obtained with Total scores (see Table 10): Simulators were differentiated from 
all other groups, with slower responses, in all modalities, and the other groups 
were undifferentiated on all measures except memory, in which ‘Disabled’ 
responded more slowly than ‘Normals’ and PCS. The results are expressed 
graphically in Figure 6.
Table 10. TNM Response Latency Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 35 48
TNM Auditory
Response
Latency
Mean
a
930
a
889
a
1142
D
2626 KWx =  69. 7* * *
(milliseconds)
SD 365 368 517 1347
TNM Visual
Response
Latency
Mean
a
674
a
730
a
869
b
2132 KWx =  72. 8 * * *
(milliseconds)
SD 258 370 416 1175
TNM Memory
Response
Latency
Mean
a
1274
a
1274
b
1692
c
3331 KWx =  84. 9* * *
(milliseconds)
SD 450 524 651 1280
KW%^= Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi''.
= p < .001. a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05.
Thus Hypothesis la ) was supported by all three response latency tests. 
Simulators exaggerated their ‘deficit’ on these beyond the scores of the 
‘Disabled’ group. However, Hypotheses 1b) was not supported by the data for 
the Auditory and Visual tests, which suggested that Response Latency on 
these two tests is not very sensitive to cognitive impairment.
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In each case, the ‘Disabled’ mean was higher than that of the ‘Normals’, but 
not significantly so. However, this hypothesis was supported on the Memory 
test with regard to the ‘Disabled’ group, who responded significantly more 
slowly on this test than either PCS or ‘Normals’.
Figure 6. TNM Response Latency Scores by Group
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Response Latency, a measure not utilised by the commercial version of the 
TNM, but included for the primary investigation of this study, therefore 
appears to be a valid test of underperformance, with Simulators being clearly 
differentiated, while the scores of the ‘Disabled’ group were on the whole 
much closer to those of the ‘Normals’ than they were to the Simulators.
Among the measures newly-devised for this study. Response Latency showed 
the largest effect size, and floor-effect differentiation. Whether it is a useful 
addition to the existing measure of Total Score, with which it is sometimes 
correlated, will be considered later.
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2.7. Group Differences on TNM Response Latency Variability
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
2a). Simulators will score lower than all groups on all measures.
2b). ‘Disabled’ will show greater variability than PCS, who, if they show any difference, will score higher 
than ‘Normals’ on this measure.
Table 11 shows that Simulators were more variable in response latency than 
all others, in all modalities. The variability of the ‘Disabled’ appears higher on 
average than that of the remaining groups, but significantly so only on the 
Visual test, in which it was higher than ‘Normals’ but not PCS.
Table 11. TNM Response Latency Variability Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 35 48
TNM Auditory 
RL Variability 
(milliseconds)
Mean
a
364
a
352
a
501
b
1215 KWx  =  61.9***
SD 185 178 297 807
TNM Visual RL
Variability
(milliseconds)
Mean
a
256
a, D
259
b
507
c
1115 KWx^ =  70.2***
SD 177 212 360 1002
TNM Memory 
RL Variability 
(milliseconds)
Mean
a
522
a
530
a
852
b
1454 KWx =  64.5***
SD 445 377 636 629
KW%^= Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi''.
= p < .001. a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05.
Hypothesis 2a) was supported by all three Response Latency Variability tests. 
Simulators exaggerated their ‘deficit’ on these beyond the scores of the 
‘Disabled’ group.
Hypotheses 2b) was not supported by the data for the Auditory and Memory 
tests, which suggested that Response Latency Variability is not very sensitive 
to cognitive impairment.
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However, Hypothesis 2b) was supported on the Visual test with regard to the 
‘Disabled’ group, who showed significantly more variability on this test than 
‘Normals’ (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. TNM Response Latency Variability Scores by Group
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Response Latency Variability was devised for the present study, and appears 
to be a valid test of underperformance, with Simulators being clearly 
differentiated, while the scores of the ‘Disabled’ group were on the whole 
much closer to those of the ‘Normals’ than they were to the Simulators. 
However, its pattern among groups seems to follow closely that of Response 
Latency, with which it is very highly correlated across groups in this study. 
Whether it contributes any more than Response Latency will be examined 
later.
146
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Research Dossier. The Present Study.
2.8. Group Differences on TNM Response Latency Extreme Scores
Summary of relevant hypotheses:
2 a). Simulators will score higher than all groups on all measures.
2 b). ‘Disabled’ will show more extremes than PCS, who, if they show any difference, will show more 
extremes than ‘Normals’.
Extreme scores, as defined in this experiment (as exceeding ten seconds), 
were not specifically foreseen by the hypotheses, and were devised post hoc 
primarily to minimise the distorting influence of outliers. However, it was 
observed that extreme scores were characteristic of Simulators, appeared 
occasionally in the ‘Disabled’ group, but were almost completely absent in the 
others.
Table 12. TNM Number of Response Latency Extreme Scores by Group
Variable
Group
Norm PCS Dis Sims Omnibus Test
N 41 28 35 48
TNM Auditory 
RL Extremes
Mean
a
0.00
a
0.00
a.D
0.06
D
1.23 K\Nx =  19.7***
SD 0 0 0.2 3.2
TNM Visual 
RL Extremes
Mean
a
0.00
a,D
0.00
a.D
0.09
D
0.54 m ix  =  16.8***
SD 0 0 0.3 1.4
TNM Memory 
RL Extremes
Mean
a
0.00
a,D
0.04
D.C
0.31
0
1.78 KWx^ =  31.8***
SD 0 0.2 0.8 4.5
RL Extremes 
total incidence
No. 0 1 16 170 n/a
n = 0 1 10 23
KWx = Kruskal-Wallis test, Chi .
= p < .001. a,b,c,d = means within a row sharing the same superscript do not differ at (corrected) p<0.05.
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Table 12 shows that, as with all other measures of the study on which group 
differences were found, Simulators were differentiated from ‘Normals’ and 
PCS - with one exception, on the Visual test, in which Simulators did not score 
significantly higher than PCS. On no test modality were Simulators 
significantly differentiated from ‘Disabled’, which is surprising, when 
considering the data.
There were no examples of extreme scores in the ‘Normals’, on any TNM test. 
There was a single extreme score in PCS. There was a total of 16 incidents, 
across all three TNM tests, in the ‘Disabled’ group, scored by ten participants, 
and by large contrast, there were 170 incidents in the Simulators, scored by 
23 participants - almost half the group.
Even the difference between the Simulators and PCS group failed to reach 
significance on the Visual test, despite the fact that Simulators registered 26 
extremes, and PCS had none.
Hypotheses la  and 1b were therefore supported qualitatively, but not 
quantitatively, by the data on TNM RL Extremes. Because of the paradoxical 
nature of these results, TNM RL Extremes will be considered briefly in the 
following section on discriminant validity.
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3. Discriminant Validity
3.1. Specificity, Sensitivity, and Cut-off points for the Tests
For those measures on which the mean scores of Simulators were found to be 
significantly different from those of the ‘Disabled’, data cross-tabulating scores 
of ‘Disabled’ and Simulator participants were examined for various levels of 
sensitivity, specificity, and correct classification rate, of each measure (see 
Literature Review for definitions and discussion).
In accordance with the principle laid out in the literature review above, we are 
interested in the discriminating ability of the tests at about 90% specificity.
That is, how many Simulators the test will correctly identify, while incorrectly 
classifying no more than about 10% of the ‘Disabled’ participants. This is 
usually a reasonable risk of mis-classification, as the disabled subjects used in 
such research often have such handicaps that for many reasons other than 
the test score (such as medical indicators of severity of injury, disabilities and 
consistent neuropsychological impairment) the mis-classified patients would 
not in fact ultimately be wrongly labelled as malingerers. In the case of the 
present study, this is undoubtedly true: many of the lowest-scoring ‘Disabled’ 
group were self-evidently handicapped, with corroboratory records, and the 
selection of 90% specificity is in this case very conservative.
Table 13 provides discriminating data for the measures on which ‘Disabled’ 
and Simulator groups were found to differ. Sensitivity and specificity levels do 
not always fall into neat round numbers and it is not always possible to adjust 
the cut-off to produce a specificity of exactly 90%. For this reason, in the 
tables below, more than one level of sensitivity is offered for some tests, for 
values of specificity around 90%. Maximum discriminating values have not 
been listed, as this maximum is often achieved at rather meaningless levels of 
sensitivity and specificity. For example, Recognition-minus-Recall scores can 
discriminate 72% of the two groups correctly. However, this is only achieved
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at a cut-off which, while correctly classifying 83% of the Simulators, actually 
mis-classifies almost half of the ‘Disabled’ group.
It can be seen from Table 13 that the most discriminating test is the TNM 
Memory Total score, correctly classifying over 90% of both the Simulators 
and ‘Disabled’. The TNM Visual Total score shows a similar, but slightly 
lower profile.
These are followed by two more TNM scores, the Auditory Total and 
Auditory Response Latency scores, correctly classifying about three- 
quarters of the Simulators at 90% specificity.
A third order of correct classification is indicated by the two other TNM 
Response Latency scores, for Visual and Memory tests, and the Grouped 
Dots Rate of counting, all of which classify ^ bout two-thirds of the Simulators 
at 90% specificity.
These are followed by TNM Auditory RL Variability, and Dots Rate Ratio,
both of which show a sensitivity over 60% at 89% specificity, while 
Recognition-minus-Recall and Ungrouped Dots Rate show about 50% 
sensitivity.
The remaining measures: Word Recognition, Grouped and Ungrouped Dots 
Totals, the TNM Visual and Memory RL Variabilities, and the remaining 
Associate Learning measures. Easy and Hard, indicate varying sensitivities 
below 50% at the required 90% specificity.
Despite the fact that TNM Response Latency Extremes did not statistically 
differentiate the ‘Disabled’ and Simulator groups, it is worth noting that a cut­
off of more than one extreme on any of the TNM tests identifies a third of the 
Simulators, while correctly classifying 89% of the ‘Disabled’, therefore making 
this aspect a potentially useful clinical sign.
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Table 13. Specificity, Sensitivity and Classification Rate of Significant Measures
Measure Cut-Score Spec. Sens.
Correct 
Classfn. %
TNM Memory Total 67/68 91 94 93
TNM Visual Total 68/69 97 88 92
70/71 86 90 88
TNM Auditory Total 68/69 89 77 82
TNM Aud Resp. Latency 1.72s 89 75 81
1.75s 91 73 81
TNM Mem Resp. Latency 2.6s 91 67 77
Grouped Dots Rate 3.5/sec 91 63 75
4.5/sec 89 69 77
TNM Vis Resp. Latency >1.5 s 89 65 76
1.58s 91 60 74
Dots Rate Ratio 2 91 52 69
2.2 89 63 74
TNM Aud RL Variability >800 89 63 74
900 91 52 69
Unarouped Dots Rate___ 1.65/s _ 89 52 68
WRL Recog-Recall 112 91 50 68
WRL Recognition 5/6 91 48 67
Grouped Dots Total 4/5 100 40 65
5/6 77 52 63
TNM Mem RL Variability 1790 91 35 59
TNM Vis RL Variability 1100 89 38 59
1175 91 33 58
Assoc. Lnq. Easy 12/13 91 31 56
Assoc. Lng Total 14/15 88 41 56
Ungrouped Dots Total 2/3 89 40 48
(TNM Extremes Total) 1/2 89 33 57
3.2. Correlated and Uncorrelated Measures
From Table 14 it can be seen that the two most discriminating measures, TNM 
Memory Total and TNM Visual Total are highly correlated among the 
Simulators (rho = 0.76, p<0.001), and therefore seem to be measuring a 
common factor.
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Table 14. Inter-Correlations of Discriminating Measures (Simulators only)
AL
Easy
AL
Total
Recog­
nition
Recog-
Recall
Gp
Dots
Gp Dot 
Rate
Ug
Dots
Ug Dot 
Rate
Dots
Ratio
AL
Easy 1 .881 .567 .263 .427 .554 .421 .509 .240
AL
Total 1 .649 .315 .448 .621 .501 .549 .325
Recog­
nition 1 .782 .119 .353 .334 .386 .072
Recog-
Recall 1 -141 .155 .222 .296 -113
Gp
Dots 1 .514 .550 .204 .501
Gp Dot 
Rate 1 .461 .733 .610
Ug
Dots 1 .231 .423
Ug Dot 
Rate 1 -010
Aud
Total .462 .531 .481 .204 .416 .449 .418 .415 .208
Aud RL -.471 -.459 -.348 -.141 -.229 -.545 -.241 -.627 -.089
Aud
RLV -.558 -.535 -.461 -.260 -303 -.511 -.417 -.581 -.101
Vis
Total .500 .613 .596 .271 .343 .499 .378 .444 .185
Vis
RL -.280 -.299 -.165 -.024 -.090 -.488 -.192 -.416 -.262
Vis
RLV -.348 -.343 -.190 .020 -.148 -.492 -.240 -.494 -.223
Mem
Total .416 .505 .531 .190 .337 .371 .288 .352 .166
Mem
RL -.206 -.215 -.057 -.003 -.141 -.462 -.108 -.512 -.108
Mem
RLV -.394 -.392 -.230 -.085 -.180 -.595 -.212 -.571 -.255
Aud
Total
Aud
RL
Aud
RLV
Vis
Total
Vis
RL
Vis
RLV
Mem
Total
Mem
RL
Mem
RLV
Aud
Total 1 -599 -.590 .706 -.216 -.310 .772 -.202 -.280
Aud RL
1 .859 -.567 .603 .586 -.482 .508 .552
Aud
RLV 1 -.545 .413 .555 -.374 .348 .598
Vis
Total 1 -.356 -.335 .764 -.309 -.357
Vis
RL 1 .787 -.305 .769 .580
Vis
RLV 1 -.225 .609 .724
Mem
Total 1 -.184 -.191
Mem
RL 1 .612
Significant results in bold. * p <.05; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .001.
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Given the observation of different styles of malingering (Rogers 1988a; Beetar 
& Williams, 1995; Boone et al 1995) it may well be the case that other 
measures, albeit of apparently lower sensitivity, but which are not correlated to 
the principal test (in this case TNM Memory Total score) are of higher 
adjunctive value than related tests of higher sensitivity.
Examining Table 14, it can be seen that the measures which have non­
significant correlations with TNM Memory Total are: TNM Memory Response 
Latency; TNM Memory RL Variation, TNM Visual RL Variation, Recognition- 
minus-Recall, and Dots Rate Ratio, some of which are also not correlated with 
each other. The selected TNM measures are themselves highly correlated, 
but Memory Response Latency correlates least with Memory Total, and, as 
Table 14 shows, has a much higher sensitivity than the other two.
Thus, if one discards the other two TNM candidates, one arrives at a final set 
of four measures with no significant inter-correlations, and with sensitivities 
ranging from 50 to over 90 per cent: TNM Memory Total; TNM Memory 
Response Latency; Recognition-minus-Recall; and Dots Rate Ratio.
3.3. Logistic Regression Analysis
The discriminant validity of the combination of the four selected, almost 
orthogonal, tests can be assessed by regression analysis of group 
membership (‘Disabled’ or Simulator) as a function of the significant 
measures.
When the data for these measures, from the 35 ‘Disabled’ participants and 48 
Simulators, was entered into a logistic regression using SPSS, the procedure 
achieved 97.6% discrimination, with one misclassification from each group.
The results of the regression are summarised in Table 15.
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Table 15. Logistic Regression: 4 unreiated variables suggested by high sensitivity and low
inter-correlation.
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig Exp (B)
TNM Memory Total -1.49 .58 6.56 .01 .22
TNM Memory RL .001 .001 .34 1 .56 1.00
Recognition - Recall -.99 .48 4.25 1 .04 .37
Dots Rate Ratio -1.82 1.09 2.81 1 .09 .161
Constant 107.20 41.94 6.53 1 .01 —
Although the model is reliable (ChP = 99.77, p<.001), from these figures it 
would appear that, despite its sensitivity as a test of simulation in the present 
study, and its low correlations with the other measures in this set, the TNM 
Memory Response Latency variable contributes little in addition to the 
combined discriminating value of the other three variables.
Indeed, one can exclude TNM Memory Response Latency from the regression 
analysis, without loss of discrimination. Table 16 summarises the result of the 
regression analysis using the remaining three measures, again reliable (ChF = 
99.77, p<.001), again resulting in 97.6% discrimination. In this case, all three 
variables make a significant additional contribution to the regression.
Table 16. Logistic Regression using 3 unrelated variables suggested by high sensitivity and
low inter-correlation.
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig Exp (B)
TNM Memory Total -1.52 .55 7.77 1 .005 .22
Dots Rate Ratio -2.19 .1.02 4.62 1 .03 .11
Recognition - Recall -1.07 .47 5.09 1 .02 .34
Constant 111.49 39.69 7.89 1 .005 —
Removal of any of the remaining variables results in lower discrimination, and 
inclusion of either of the two variables which also did not correlate with TNM 
Memory Total (TNM Memory RL Variation, TNM Visual RL Variation) does not 
improve the result.
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This selection of tests is corroborated by a logistic regression analysis of a 
wider range of measures. Consider the eleven most discriminating measures 
(listed in bold in section 3.1 above). If these measures are entered into a 
stepwise logistic regression, the process is terminated at three steps, with the 
same result as in Table 16. The remaining measures appear not to make a 
significant additional contribution to the equation.
The inter-correlations, and the results of the Logistic Regression suggest that 
there is some redundancy between many of the measures deriving from the 
same test. Thus among the TNM tests are several measures that discriminate 
Simulators from ‘Disabled’, but it would seem that participants responded 
similarly on many of them, so most are excluded by stepwise logistical 
regression. Conversely, tests which showed a smaller effect size, and 
individual sensitivity, than some TNM measures, were nonetheless found to 
make a more valuable additional contribution, once the most discriminating 
TNM measure was utilised.
The regression analysis therefore gives support to the idea that, 
notwithstanding the powerful discriminant validity of the TNM Memory Total 
score, the best discrimination is achieved using a variety of tests.
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DISCUSSION
1. The Aims of the Present Study
The principal, and unique, aim of the study was to determine the validity of 
response latency on the TNM in discriminating malingerers from people with 
minor, and with significant, brain injuries.
The study found response latency to be a good discriminator of such groups, 
at least insofar as our simulators were representative of malingerers. 
Furthermore, the findings reversed those of the only other fully published 
study which has looked at this question. Rose et al (1995) used a 
computerised version of the Portland Digital Recognition Test (PDRT) and 
recorded the response latency of brain injured patients, and two groups of 
simulators: one ‘uncoached’, the other ‘coached’ (i.e. they were advised not 
to exaggerate, and told that people with a head injury had poor memory and 
“think a little slower”).
There are some interesting comparisons to be made with the study of Rose et 
al, so it is worth summarising their findings . With respect to the total score on 
the PDRT (which, like the TNM is scored out of 72), uncoached simulators 
scored lower than coached simulators, who scored lower than a sample of 
head injured patients, who in turn scored lower than ‘normal controls’. On 
response latency however, there was no difference between the two groups of 
simulators, whose response latency was longer than the controls, but shorter 
than the head-injured group, which was also longer than controls. Thus the 
PDRT scores went according to prediction, but the response latencies did not, 
with simulators registering less of a deficit than actual patients. Rose et al 
concluded that response latency was not an effective discriminator between 
these last two groups, but was useful in a complicated way, by virtue of 
analogue malingerers responding more quickly than actual patients.
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Why are the Rose et a/’s simulators, with clear evidence of exaggerating, 
found not to be exaggerating their response latency beyond ‘disabled’ levels in 
their study, when they were found to do so in the present study? Rose’s 
patients had suffered documented head injuries “of at least moderate 
severity”, which seems to be an understatement. Their average length of 
unconsciousness was 42 days (mode = 14 days). 42 days of coma 
represents a very severe injury (as does even 14 days) (Jennett & Teasdale, 
1981). Some of the patients in the present study had brain injuries other than 
head injury, but for the majority who were head-injured, duration of loss of 
consciousness was recorded in terms of whether it was under a day, days, or 
over a week. However, in all likelihood the average duration of coma would 
have been considerably less than 42 days (and modally was less than a 
week). Therefore, the ‘Disabled’ group of the present study do not appear to 
be as severely injured as Rose’s head-injured group.
If so, the ‘Disabled’ group of the present study would appear to be a better 
reference group than Rose et a/’s. The level of injury at which malingering is 
most commonly disputed is mild. The overwhelming majority of 
neuropsychological studies investigating the phenomenon are concerned with 
claims following mild head injury. The clinician, or lawyer, or researcher, 
interested in demonstrating exaggeration, needs to find a comparison group of 
undoubtedly injured and disabled individuals who can nonetheless perform 
better on certain indices than the malingerer. In order to maximise the 
sensitivity of the selection instrument, it is therefore necessary to find the most 
able group of genuinely and clearly disabled for comparison. In many 
respects members of the present study’s ‘Disabled’ group were more disabled 
than was required for a comparison group, but it appears they were not as 
disabled, as a group, as Rose’s.
This could explain why the response latencies of Rose’s patients were not 
exceeded by the simulators, but there are other possible reasons for the 
discrepancy between the two studies. The Total score means obtained by 
Rose’ s samples on the PDRT are all lower than those obtained in the current
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study on the TNM. This suggests that the PDRT is a harder test, at least 
where significant brain injury is involved, which makes sense when one 
considers that the PDRT involves long interference delays requiring counting 
backwards.
So Rose's patients may well be more severely disabled, the test may be 
harder for them, and the simulators? Perhaps they are less prone to 
exaggeration than those of the present study? The data do not suggest so. 
The mean total score on the PDRT of Rose's uncoached simulators is below 
chance, and the figures suggest that almost two thirds of them scored at this 
level. Even the mean of the coached simulators is only a third of its standard 
deviation from chance, two standard deviations below the ‘normals’, and their 
distribution suggests that one third of the group scored below chance. In 
contrast, only 6% of the simulators of the present study scored below chance 
on the analogous test, and their mean was one and a half standard deviations 
above chance, and one and a half standard deviations below the ‘normal’ 
controls. It seems, therefore, that the simulators of the present study behaved 
more cautiously than those of the Rose study.
The results of the present study therefore stand in contrast to the conclusions 
of the main existing similar study, by Rose ef a/ (1995), that response latency 
is not by itself useful in the detection of malingering. Furthermore, it appears 
that the present study has made use of a more appropriate criterion group of 
disabled participants, has used a possibly easier, and more discriminating, 
test, and a more conservatively responding sample of analogue malingerers.
The results of the present study are in agreement with the findings of the only 
three other studies which tackle this issue of response latency on a forced 
choice test. The studies of Allen et al (1998), Green & Iverson (2002) and 
Slick et al (1996) seem to have had similar findings on similar tests, but Allen’s 
study is reported as an abstract, with unspecified injuries. Green’s study has 
not yet been published, while Slick et a/did not subject their interesting 
observations to further analysis, statistical or otherwise.
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A secondary, almost unique aim of the present study was to validate the work 
of Pritchard & Moses (1992) on the TNM, using neurological, rather than 
psychiatric patients, as recommended by Rogers et al (1993), and Pritchard 
(1998). Pritchard & Moses used chronic psychiatric patients as their 
cognitively impaired group and a group of uncoached staff members as 
simulators. They only made use of Total scores, not response latency. 
Decision rules are not made clear in the paper, but in the TNM manual, 
Pritchard (1998) seems to state that an astonishing 66% of his simulators 
scored lower than 29 out of 72 on at least one of the three modalities of the 
TNM, while all his patients scored higher than 50 on all tests. The results of 
the present study suggest that its ‘Disabled’ group comprises a more 
homogeneous and more appropriate sample of cognitively impaired 
participants, (who did not score below 67), and that the coaching of the 
current study’s simulators, in the symptoms of PCS, resulted in simulator 
behaviour which was more conservative than Pritchard’s (uncoached) 
simulators. The current study was also able to suggest a much higher and 
therefore more effective malingering cutting score, at around 68, rather than 
50.
The only other study to have used the TNM with neurologically impaired 
subjects was reported by poster at an APA convention (Cole et al, 1995). The 
authors, (who only used Total scores, not response latency) found that 34 
consecutive neuropsychology patients seeking compensation scored 
significantly lower than patients not seeking compensation, (who did not differ 
from uninjured controls) with four (11.8%) scoring below chance. No other 
data are provided, but from this limited account it would appear that the 
Simulators in the present study behaved as a group similarly to the real 
compensation-seekers of Cole et a/’s study.
A rather unusual feature of the present study is the inclusion of a PCS group. 
That is, a group characterised by minor head injury and complaints of PCS, 
without involvement in a compensation claim. Youngjohn et al (1995) 
recommend their inclusion, but say they are “exceedingly rare”.
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The PCS group in the present study was not differentiated from ‘Normals’ on 
any measure utilised in this study. This is to be expected in the tests which 
clearly have a high floor, but it is also the case where tests have a genuine 
memory or speed component. A tentative inference, although not a specific 
line of enquiry of this research, is that people with persistent PCS symptoms 
following a minor head injury, who are not claiming compensation, are not 
impaired on standard cognitive tests, which is in-keeping with the conclusion 
of Binder (1997). A clearer inference is that deviations from normality, shown 
on any test used in this study, by those with a history of a minor head injury 
and PCS, can be considered not to be attributable to the head injury, and the 
possibility of malingering can be considered.
2. Evaluation of the methods of detection.
Paper & Pencil Tests
In this study, the tests with their origins in standard neuropsychological 
procedures in some respects fared less well (than specialised procedures) as 
instruments for the detection of underperformance. For example, although 
Simulators undoubtedly under-performed on Associate Learning, the impaired 
performance of the ‘Disabled’ group on this test meant that these two groups 
were not discriminated on one measure (AL Hard), and were less well 
separated (than by specialised tests) on two others (AL Easy and AL Total). 
Nonetheless, Gronwall’s (1991) suggestion that the examiner’s suspicions 
should be raised by below average scores on the easy paired associates, 
accompanied by relatively less impaired performance on the harder ones, is 
borne out by the data on Associate Learning. (Note: clinicians can compare 
their scores obtained on this test with those of the present study, and with 
norms usefully provided by des Rosiers & Iverson (1986).
None of the groups was differentiated by the AL Easy-Hard measure (see 
below).
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The same weakness can be ascribed to the Word Recognition List. Simulator 
and ‘Disabled’ means were identical on the Recall measure, so although 
Simulators were exaggerating, they did not completely differentiate 
themselves. On this test they were better separated by the recognition 
measures. Recognition, and Recognition-minus-Recall. The ‘Disabled’ group 
scored higher in Recognition (than Recall), but were still impaired in 
comparison to the ‘Normals’, but the Simulators overestimated this deficit, in 
agreement with the work of Brandt (1985), Bernard (1990) and Greiffenstein et 
al (1994 &1996a). The clearest definition emerges with this test when recall 
and recognition are taken into account, as in the Recognition-minus-Recall 
measure (see below).
But these special procedures derived from standard tests are not alone in 
being less well supported by the data. The most disappointing figures are 
returned by the ‘stand alone’ specialised procedure, the Rey 15 Items Test. 
The data support the contentions made in the Literature Review, that a) this 
test is not an effective ‘floor effect’ test, as the ‘Disabled’ group tended to 
score lower on it, and b) it may, on the other hand, be too easy, or too 
transparent, to elicit sufficiently low scores from Simulators to differentiate 
them from the ‘Disabled’.
In its defence, it should be borne in mind that some Simulators were identified 
by this procedure. Using a cut-off at 8/9, 17% of Simulators are identified, at 
94% specificity, and the sensitivity is 36% at 86% if the cut-off is 9/10.
Although these figures are not high, and tend to support the more negative 
findings of Guilmette et al (1994), and Schretlen et al (1991), the test is very 
quick and easy to administer, and it might be worth giving. Nonetheless these 
results clearly support the recommendation of Iverson & Binder (2000) that the 
test should not be used alone. Furthermore, as with all these tests, a negative 
finding should not be taken to mean the absence of malingering. The higher 
cut-off, incidentally, is the same as that suggested originally by Rey (1964). 
However, authors since have recommended lower cut-scores, and Spreen & 
Strauss (1998) in their compendium, recommend a cut-score of 7/8.
161
M.J.Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. Research Dossier. The Present Study.
Of the specialised paper-and-pencil procedures, the Dot Counting measures 
appear from the data to be the most effective detectors. Much of this success, 
it seems, is owed to a tendency of Simulators to ignore the benefit to counting, 
of the dots being grouped, and count grouped dots one at a time. If this 
occurs in true malingering, it could be a clinical sign to look out for, as it can 
be observed by the examiner. In the study, this kind of counting was seen 
with a few disabled patients, but they may well have been the more severely 
injured, and it was not seen with PCS patients. It is worth noting that no 
‘disabled’ participant got the total wrong in more than two of the grouped dots 
cards (whereas 40% of Simulators did).
These results are much more discriminating than those of Greiffenstein et al 
(1996a) and Rose ef a /(1998), although these authors used somewhat 
different scoring methods and/or decision rules, both from each other, and 
from this study. The results are more in-keeping with the general indications 
of Binks et al (1997), whose suggestion, similar to the findings of this study, 
was that number of errors, and “deviations from linearity”, were good 
discriminating measures.
Specially devised adaptations of the paper and pencil tests.
Several additional measures were formed in this study in an attempt to 
measure a potential characteristic of malingering that did not seem to be 
captured by the existing measures. In the paper and pencil tests, there was 
one such development in each test. In Associate learning, the Easy-minus- 
Hard score was devised in accordance with Gronwall’s (1991) observation 
that the Easy score might be more suppressed relative to the Hard score, in 
malingering responses. Although, as stated above, this observation was 
borne out by the data of the Easy and Hard scores themselves, the Easy-Hard 
score did not reflect that, and therefore does not seem to have utility as a 
discriminating variable.
On the Word Recognition List, the Recognition-minus-Recall measure was 
devised in accordance with the observations that, in cognitive impairment.
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recognition is less affected than recall, and that this differential may be 
overlooked by the malingerer (Brandt etal, 1985; Bernard, 1990). This choice 
appears justified: the data show that Simulators did suppress their recognition, 
but the Recognition scores of the ‘Disabled’ group were also lowered, with 
respect to controls. The Recognition-minus-Recall score was designed to 
reduce that effect, and this appears to have been achieved. ‘Disabled’ score 
no differently from ‘Normals’ in this measure, while the mean of the Simulators 
is significantly lower than all others. In terms of classification rates, the 
difference is less marked: 48% of the Simulators are identified by the 
Recognition score alone, at 91% specificity, while Recognition-Recall 
identifies 50%. Nonetheless, this easily-derived score has promise, and with 
it a potentially useful provisional rule: the data suggest that if the difference 
between recognition and recall on this test is less than two words (from an 
original fifteen), under-performance can be suspected. This rule identifies half 
the Simulators of the present study.
The Dots Ratio calculation has a similar profile: the ‘Disabled’ group score no 
differently from the ‘Normals’ on this measure, and the Simulators are 
relatively well separated, giving rise to a rule of thumb: if the counting of 
grouped dots is less than twice as fast as that of ungrouped dots (using this 
study’s method of scoring correct counting) simulating is indicated, and would 
correctly identify half the Simulators at over 90% specificity. The 
classification rate is second only in the Dots measures to the rate of counting 
grouped dots. The inclusion of Dots Ratio therefore seems justified, with the 
reservation that all the other four measures in this test identified Simulators 
almost equally well.
The remaining specially devised measure among the paper-and pencil tests 
was the spatial scoring system for the 15 Items Test - the ‘Order’ score. This 
was highly correlated with the staple, number correct score, and neither was 
found to be an effective detector in this study. The Order score does not 
appear to have added anything to the discriminatory power of the Total score, 
and therefore does not seem to be justified by this study.
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The Computerised “Tests of Neuropsychological Malingering” (TNM).
Standard Scoring
The original scoring of the TNM is simply a total correct score, out of 72, for 
each of the Auditory, Visual and Memory presentations. These tests showed 
themselves in the study to be true ‘high-floor’ tests with good detection of 
Simulators. To illustrate, among the 35 ‘Disabled’ participants, the lowest 
score in any test was 64, (in Auditory) but this was an exception. There was 
one score of 66 (Auditory), three at 67 (Memory) and a few at 68, but the 
overwhelming majority were higher than this.
In contrast, the average total scores among the Simulators were in the 50s for 
each of the three modalities, with scores as low as 7, 11 and 17 in each. 
Consequently, scores for the three non-simulating groups were very similar, 
while the Simulator groups showed a highly significant difference.
High cut-offs enabled these tests to identify more of the Simulators than any of 
the paper-and-pencil tests. It is surprising that Simulators were induced to 
under-perform on the Auditory test, which involved responding to a perfectly 
audible beep, and on the Visual test, which also appeared to be 
straightfonvard, although there was an element of memory in this test. The 
Memory test itself, perhaps not surprisingly, showed the best discriminatory 
properties of all, identifying 94 % of the Simulators at 91% specificity.
Notably, very few of the Simulators scored at below chance levels: only 8 out 
of 48 would have been identified across all three tests. The implication is 
clear that, in the words of Guilmette et ai (1993) a cut-off at the level of chance 
“is far too conservative”, and should be raised to the lower levels of the 
performance of criterion groups (Binder, 1992b & 1993; Nies & Sweet 1994; 
Binder & Kelly, 1996).
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Specially devised adaptations of the TNM.
This was a primary focus of the research, and the main attempt to add an 
original contribution to the body of work on the detection of malingering. 
Response Latency showed itself in this study to be a good discriminator. 
Among ‘Disabled’ participants, only two averaged a response time of more 
than 2 seconds in the Auditory test, three averaged over 1.5 seconds in the 
Visual task, and only one took longer than 3 seconds on average to respond 
to the Memory cues. In contrast, the Simulator group as a whole averaged in 
excess of these figures, and clearly separated themselves from the other 
groups.
The discriminant classification rates were higher for Response Latency than 
for almost all the paper and pencil tests: about 60% (Visual) to about 75% 
(Auditory) of Simulators were identified, at about 90% specificity.
These positive results are rather overshadowed by the superior findings of the 
original Total scores of the tests, and this contrast might suggest at first sight 
that the response latency measures are superfluous. There are two reasons 
why this judgement might be premature.
Firstly, the correlation (among Simulators) found between Total Score and 
Response Latency, while high for the Auditory test (-.60) and moderate for the 
Visual test (-.36) is very low for the Memory Test, at a non-significant -.18.
This suggests that, at least for the Memory test, the Response Latency is 
measuring a different attribute of simulating response style.
Secondly, the weakness of the TNM lies in its potential transparency: the tests 
are in fact very easy, and they could be identified as such by some potential 
malingerers, who are not thereby drawn to under-perform on them (Millis & 
Volinsky, 2001). Reports of the low sensitivity of forced-choice tests in 
general (Iverson & Binder, 2000) suggest that this indeed might commonly be 
the case. It is possible, therefore, that a malingerer wishing to demonstrate 
cognitive deterioration, but not drawn by the TNM into making too-obvious
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errors, might nonetheless slow his/her responses, to the degree shown in this 
study. This possibility is borne out by the findings of Goebel (1983), who 
reported on the strategies of those faking brain injury: 36% slowed their 
responses while only 2% tried to simulate memory impairment. Iverson & 
Binder (2000) are also of this view, suggesting that “‘valid’ [= apparently 
genuine] FCT scores accompanied by extremely long response times could 
be interpreted as malingering ”. Certainly, I have seen this very pattern in two 
claimants suspected of malingering.
Therefore, to the extent that multiple measures of under-performance are 
recommended (Franzen etal, 1990; Binder, 1993; Slick eta l 1999; Sweet, 
1999; Iverson & Binder, 2000; Millis & Volinsky, 2001), TNM Response 
Latency seems to be well worth including in the battery. It takes no additional 
time, being automatically calculated in the test; and, in the test with the 
highest ‘face validity’, TNM Memory, Response Latency appears usefully not 
to be related to the Total score, and may therefore be sensitive to a separate 
aspect of malingering.
By contrast, the other a priori adapted TNM measure, ‘Response Latency 
Variability’ (RLV), showed less promise. It is highly correlated with Response 
Latency in all three tests, but its classification rate is less each time (although 
high in comparison to other tests in the case of Auditory RLV). RLV is time- 
consuming to calculate (until a programme is developed to calculate it 
automatically) and appears to add little to the contribution of Response 
Latency.
The remaining adaptation, made post-hoc, is the measure of Extreme scores 
on the TNM (i.e. response latency exceeding 10 seconds). This phenomenon 
was clearly more characteristic of the Simulators, but insufficiently common to 
make a statistical difference with the analysis used. Nonetheless, the 
presence of one, or two (depending on the test) extreme scores identifies over 
20% of the Simulators at 90% specificity, and very few ‘Disabled’ participants 
scored more extremes than this. Therefore, the presence of several such
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extremes in a subject’s TNM profile, in a case of minor head injury, or in any 
case where information processing speed is not profoundly impaired, would 
be diagnostic of under-performance. This measure, then, while not of use as 
a screening test for under-performance, is worth considering as a 
supplementary measure for the subject who may be over-emphasising poor 
concentration, fatigue, or slowness of thinking.
3. Limitations of the Present Study, and 
Recommendations for Further Research
The Use of Simulators
The present study was an analogue study. It used participants who were 
instructed to play the part of malingerers, not malingerers themselves. The 
simulators in this study, as in all such studies, were given some guidance in 
how to perform their role. The aim here was to reproduce the circumstances 
of the exaggerating claimant. This ‘model client’ would have suffered a minor 
head injury, and would be experienced in post-concussional symptoms, but 
not in undergoing psychological tests. The participants were therefore 
educated’ in the subject of PCS symptoms and given an exercise in which 
they applied the symptoms, in extremis, to their own lives. This makes the 
simulator sophisticated in symptoms but still naïve in terms of performing 
convincingly on the tests.
There is an assumption sometimes made in simulation studies that simulators 
will be more easily detected than true malingerers, although this is very 
difficult to prove, as true malingerers are hard to identify, let alone involve in 
research. Martin et al (1993) provide support for this idea, quoting the Binder 
& Willis (1991) study in which naïve simulators performed worse than a group 
of mild head injury compensation claimants, who were themselves as a group 
shown to be under-performing, but this is not quite the same thing, as not all 
the claimants will have been malingering .
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Rose et al (1995) argue that malingerers can become sophisticated, not just to 
their alleged symptoms, but to the tests for detecting under-performance, as 
they are in the public domain, and so the spiral of demand for ever-more 
sensitive tests is climbed, and more sophisticated simulators are therefore 
required.
Some authors therefore coach their simulators in the tactics of responding to 
the tests, such as instructing them to perform above chance, and miss more 
hard items than easy ones (Martin et a /1992,1993; Frederick et al 1994). 
However, several authors have found no difference between naïve and 
sophisticated simulators (Rose etal, 1995; Binks etal, 1997). (Also, Inman et 
al, 1998 - although Inman’s guidance was more to do with symptoms than 
tactics on the tests.)
Some studies have educated their simulators only in the symptoms (Kerr et al, 
1990; Schwartz et al, 1998) resulting in profiles similar to those of brain- 
injured. Schwartz et al found that the closeness to genuine profiles was a 
function of the level of education of the simulator.
In any event, the simulators in the present study were educated in a wide 
range of post-concussional symptoms, with the emphasis on poor 
concentration and memory, and were thereby encouraged to exhibit them 
during testing. But they were not given any instructions on how to perform 
the tests convincingly, apart from the general caution that “you must be careful 
not to let the psychologist believe that you are faking”.
It is therefore possible that our sample of simulators was more willing to 
under-perform than actual malingerers. From observation, it was true that 
some participants threw themselves well into the role, but three features of the 
results suggest that under-performance in general was not highly 
exaggerated.
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Firstly, only a small fraction, about 10%, scored below-chance on any one test 
of the TNM, (and only 6% TNM Memory) which is comparable to the 
proportions, reported in the literature, of MHI litigants who score below-chance 
on a forced-choice test: 30% (Millis, 1992); 22% (Binder & Willis, 1991); 17% 
(Binder, 1992b) and 15% (Youngjohn etal, 1995), and in particular with the 
12% of Cole et al (1995), who used the TNM.
Secondly, gross exaggeration was not evident on the 15 Item test, a test 
found to be of variable sensitivity in the literature, in which the instructions are 
designed to make the test appear difficult, and on which one might expect 
naïve over-exaggeration to be registered. Although Simulators under­
performed on this test, they did not suppress their responses beyond those of 
the ‘Disabled’ group. Furthermore, their scores were not as low as in other 
studies using this test with simulators (e.g. Arnett et al, 1995), nor with 
‘probable malingerers’ (Greiffenstein etal, 1994; Schretlen etal, 1991) nor 
even with neurological out-patient litigants (Lee etal, 1992). They were, in 
fact, similar to the scores of simulators in a study showing the highest scores 
on this test (Guilmette et a /1994).
Thirdly, in the only analogous study which looks at response latency on a 
computerised FCT (Rose et al 1995), the figures suggest that both coached 
and uncoached simulators of that study scored considerably worse on the 
Total score than did the simulators of the present study.
Nonetheless, it would be interesting to repeat the present study, using 
simulators who have had head injuries and experienced post-concussional 
symptoms. A sample of these should remain naïve with regard to testing, 
while another sample could be given some limited coaching. The results 
might in that way be more generalisable to naïve and sophisticated 
malingerers respectively.
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Further, a long-term study is feasible in which real-life suspected malingerers, 
perhaps who meet the useful criteria of Greiffenstein et al (1994) are tested 
with this battery and the results accumulated over time.
Further Recommendations
As has been stated, although the ‘Disabled’ group of the present study seems 
to be a more appropriate comparison group than that used in the analogous 
Rose et al (1995) study, the degree of cognitive impairment of this group as a 
whole may have acted to blunt the sensitivity of the detection instruments.
One requires a comparison group of people who have been unable to 
continue with their employment by virtue of an undisputedly disabling head 
injury, but are othen/vise capable of independent living. The first requirement 
here was met by the current ‘Disabled’ group, but not all were head-injured, 
and not all were capable of living independently. A more homogeneous group 
of high-functioning, cognitively impaired controls would enable cut-offs to be 
raised, increasing the sensitivity of test without compromising specificity. (On 
the other hand, having a severely disabled comparison group is a useful 
counterbalance to the possibility that simulators may be exaggerating ‘true’ 
malingering under-performance. Both of these sources of error lie in the same 
direction and would therefore act to nullify each other.)
One source of statistical error in response latency was the varying style of 
responding to the TNM by participants in all groups. Some would have their 
fingers ready, hovering over the keys, others would sit back after every 
response. All participants were encouraged to position themselves 
comfortably in order to respond quickly, and to respond as quickly as possible 
to the questions, but it would perhaps have been better to instruct participants 
to hold their fingers above the keys. This instruction was not given, principally 
because it is not part of the standard instructions of the test, but also because 
not doing so allowed Simulators a strategy of delaying their response. (In fact.
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it appeared that not holding the fingers in readiness was not a characteristic 
exclusive to Simulators).
It would also improve the test if the same response keys were used in all three 
TNM procedures, and if all keys adjacent to the response key also registered 
the response (or a special key-pad were used), or responses were made via 
the mouse, reducing errors made, particularly by disabled participants.
A related research question is how malingerers would respond to being 
explicitly informed that the computer was timing their responses. A future 
design in which participants were, and were not, told, would have instructive 
results for the most propitious way of eliciting exaggeration.
Other opportunities available to future research would include the much- 
needed evaluation of the promising Wiggins and Brandt's (1988) 
Autobiographical Interview, Rey’s (1964) original (30 second) version of the 15 
Items Test, and Rey’s (1941) recommendation of repeating the DOT (see 
Literature Review above).
Conclusion
This research was inspired by a possible malingerer who was not identified by 
existing specialised tests, but whose response latencies on the TNM were 
extraordinary. The primary aim of the research was to gather representative 
data on response latency, and to determine its discriminative validity in 
identifying intentional under-performance.
A secondary aim was to obtain representative neurological data for the TNM 
and further investigate its discriminative validity.
A tertiary aim was to gather data on a range of other existing specialised 
procedures for the detection of under-performance.
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A simulation design was used, typical of research in this area, including 
uninjured controls, a group with unambiguous cognitive impairment, a group 
simulating intentional under-performance, and unusually, a group of people 
with minor head injuries who complained of persistent PCS but who were not 
involved in compensation claims.
The results provided useful data on response latency on the TNM, and 
indicated that this measure was a valid detector of under-performance.
(These results would have converted the original and inspirational “possible 
malingerer" into a “probable” one, as his response latency scores were highly 
similar to the means of the simulator group!).
The TNM test itself was validated on a neurological sample, and its Total 
scores were found to have very high sensitivity in detecting under­
performance, with the Memory score having the highest sensitivity of all tests 
used.
Useful representative data was obtained for the other specialised procedures 
used, and comparative evaluations made which indicated that the Dot- 
counting Test and the Word Recognition List were the most useful 
discriminators among these additional tests for these groups, and the Fifteen 
Items Test was of the most limited utility. Further analysis showed that 
combinations of tests could identify disabled and simulating participants with 
98% accuracy, and so supported the view of Iverson & Binder (2000) that the 
highest discrimination is achieved when multiple specialised procedures are 
employed.
MJT, March, 2002
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APPENDIXES TO RESEARCH DOSSIER
APPENDIX 1 : Tables of multiple group comparisons
APPENDIX 2: Examples of Research Documents
a. Letter of approval from Local Research Ethics Committee
b. Example of recruiting letter
c. Example of consent form
d. Example of post-concussional symptoms questionnaire
e. Simulator role-play briefing document
f. PCS symptoms guidelines
g. Simulator post-experimental de-briefing questionnaire
(Many of the documents were tailored to different groups, with slightly altered, but substantively identical, wording.)
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APPENDIX 1
Tables of Multiple Group Comparisons 
1. Associate Learning measures
AL Easy AL Hard AL Total
AL Easy- 
minus-Hard
Sim-Dis -2.80* t = -2.71 t = -3.31**
omnibus test 
not significant
Sim-PCS -4.80*** t = -7.95*** t = -7.31***
Sim-Norm -6 .01*** t = -7.66*** t = -8.51***
Dis-PCS -2 .68* t = -2.85* t = -3.21*
Dis-Norm -3.76*** t = .^07*** t = -4.66***
PCS-Norm -0.92 t — -1.08 t=  -1.18
2. Word Recognition List measures
Recall Recognition
Recognition-
minus-Recall
Sim-Dis -0.21 t = -4.56*** t = _4.41***
Sim-PCS -2 .68* t = -6.60*** t = -4.77***
Sim-Norm -4.04*** t = -8.76*** t = -5.75***
Dis-PCS -2.49 t = -2.68 t = -0.56
Dis-Norm -3.75*** t = -4.33*** t = -0.95
PCS-Norm -1.10 t = -1.39 t = -0.35
3. 15 Items Test measures
15 Items 
Total Score
15 Items 
Order Score
Sim-Dis -1.46 -2.51
Sim-PCS -4.90*** -5.86***
Sim-Norm -3.29*** ■4.48***
Dis-PCS -4.26*** -3.86***
Dis-Norm -2.12 -2.32
PCS-Norm 2.29 1.28
4. Dot Counting Test measures
Grouped
Total
Grouped
Rate
Ungrouped
Total
Ungrouped
Rate
Dots Rate 
Ratio
Sim-Dis -3.37*** T = -6.75*** T = -4.99*** T = -3.22* -4.71***
Sim-PCS -4.28*** T = -7.95*** T = -7.31*** T = -6.53*** -3.74***
Sim-Norm -3.42*** T = -7.83*** T = -6.59*** T = -5.44*** -4.70***
Dis-PCS -2.16 T — -2.08 T = -1.46 T = -3.71** 1.00
Dis-Norm 0.02 T = -2.71* T= -0.75 T = -2.57 -0.31
PCS-Norm 2.13 T — -0.84 T=0.85 T = 0.99 -1.23
Figures are Mann-Whitney U Z-scores with Bonferroni correction of significance, except where t = t-test 
with Bonferroni correction, T = t-test with Tamhane correction.
Significant results in bold. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 (corrected).
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APPENDIX 1 (continued). Tables of Multiple Group Comparisons.
5. TNM measures
Total
Score
Response
Latency
RL
Variation
RL
Extremes
Auditory -5.88*** 5.77*** 5.03*** 2.21
Sim-Dis Visual -6.98*** 5.99*** 4.88*** 1.59
Memory -7.21*** 6.34*** 4.00*** 2.43
Auditory -5.82*** 6.33*** 6.03*** 2.71**
Sim-PCS Visual -6.59*** 6.17*** 6.53*** 2.57***
Memory -6.83*** 6.61*** 5.78*** 3.58***
Auditory -6.58*** 6.95*** 6.68*** 3.24***
Sim-Norm Visual -7.39*** 7.29*** 7.18*** 3.08*
Memory -7.82*** 7.63*** 6.42*** 4.62*
Auditory -0.65 1.94 1.99 1.28
Dis-PCS Visual -0.56 1.40 2.03 1.58
Memory -2.65* 2.95* 1.90 1.72
Auditory -0.83 1.69 1.93 1.54
Dis-Norm Visual -0.50 2.05 2.67* 1.90
Memory -3.58 2.90 2.90* 2.74*
Auditory -1.23 -0.14 -0.25 0.00
PCS-Norm Visual 0.18 0.26 0.96 0.00
Memory -0.85 0.31 0.59 1.21
Figures are Mann-Whitney U Z-scores with Bonferroni correction of significance. 
Significant results in bold. * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 (corrected).
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The Princess Royal Hospital Haywards Heath West Sussex R H 1 6  4 E X  T e l u i'UO N e : (01444) 44)881
Clinical Effectiveness Department
Ex. 4343
8* July 1999
Mr. M. Tossell
Chartered Clinical Psychologist 
Psychology Department 
Princess Royal Hospital
Dear Mr. Tossell
Re: Neuropsychological Malingering Project
I am pleased to be able to report that the committee of the LREC convened on the 7* 
July has approved the recent application for the above study.
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours sincerely
Dr. Gemma Tildsley
Chair
LRÈC
Hft-ESTORK PEOPLE
ID Su s s e x
N .V I lOiN M I >LAL 1 ' KSIJW R 1 J R l  'S I
T h e  Princess Royal Hospital Haywards Heath West Sussex R H I6  4 E X  TELEPHONE: (0 1 4 4 4 ) 441881
Psychologj' Department, Ext 4994
Dear Patient /  Volunteer
Research into Head Iniuries
Thank you veiy much for your interest in this research. I am conducting research to investigate some 
characteristics of head injuries (from minor to severe). The research is intended to help psychologists better 
understand the consequences of head injuiy, and give better help to those who need it.
Psychologists are interested in how head injury affects performance on some simple tests. I would like to 
invite you to help us to find out. The people taking-part will be adults, aged 18-64. Some will not have had a 
head injury. Some may or may not have been knocked out at some time. Some will have recovered, others 
will still be experiencing the effects. All may be suitable for the research, but particularly those who have 
experienced poor memory or concentration, at any time, as a result of a head injuiy.
What will I have to do if  I take part?
You win be asked to attend the Princess Royal Hospital, Haywards Heath, for about an hour, at your 
convenience. (Or you could be seen at home if you have a compatible computer). During that time you will 
be asked to read some words, count some items and remember some shapes. Also, you will be asked to 
make some Yes/No keyboard responses on a computer. That’s it. Most people enjoy it!
Your involvement is confidential, and the data will be anonymous.
What are the possible risks of taking part? None whatsoever.
Are there any possible benefits?
No. If you are suffering from any symptoms following a head injuiy, this is not a treatment, and none is 
offered. Your GP will tell you of any available treatment. However, brief, informal advice, is offered to 
patients, and all participants have the choice of a taped relaxation course or chance to win a CD voucher.
Do I have to take part?
No, taking part is voluntary. If you would prefer not to take part you do not have to give a reason. Your 
doctor would not be upset and your treatment would not be affected. If you take part but later change your 
mind you can withdraw at any time. If you have been recruited through your GP, I would want to inform 
your GP that you are taking part, with your permission.
WThat do I do now?
If you have not already done so, give your name and telephone number, and tiiwps when von nan
l i e  e O T ltA efeH  t n  thA  P c v r h n ln o v  T ^ on arfm on t Tn q -fow T %An11
you need glasses for reading, you may need them for the tests.
In the meantime, please complete any forms enclosed, and bring them with you to your appointment.
Thank you veiy much for your consideration.
Mike Tossell, Chartered Clinical Psychologist
NB: This research project has been approved by the local Research Ethics Committee. The Committee will contact some 
subjects to check that the research is being done in the right way. By agreeing to take part in tliis research you also agree 
that I can tell the Research Etliics Committee your name and address, so that they can contact you, but you need not 
answer their questions if you don’t want to.
ID 5USSEX
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The Princess Royal Hnspical Haywards Hearh West Sussex R H R , 4E X  TELEi'HONE: (01444) 44)881
Psychology' Department Ext 4994
HEAD INJURY RESEARCH 
INFORMED CONSENT TO RESEARCH PROCEDURES
PARTONE: PARTICIPATION:
I hereby agree to participate in the research project undertaken by Michael Tossell, Clinical 
Psychologist.
I understand that the purpose of the research is to record the performance of people on some 
simple tests. Some people taking the test will have had a head injury, and others will not. The 
results will help psychologists better understand the effects of a range of head injuries.
I understand that my involvement will take about an hour, during which I will be asked to carry out 
some simple paper and pencil tasks, and make some simple yes/no decisions on a computer.
I understand that there are no benefits, or risks, of the procedures, and that no treatment is offered 
for any symptoms I may have.
I understand that the data obtained will be confidential, and collated anonymously.
I also understand that participation is voluntary, and I can withdraw my consent at any time.
Signed.................................................. Date
PART IWO: RELEASE OF MEDICAL INFORMATION (Patients only):
I hereby give my consent for my GP, Neuropsycholopst, or the A&E department(s) involved, to 
release information to Michael Tossell about my accident and recovery (e.g. loss of consciousness, 
length of stay, etc.) ONLY pertaining to my classification as a subject in this research.
I understand that I can withhold my consent for the release of this information and still participate 
in the research.
Signed...............   Date
Date and place of head injury:
Name Date
C O N FID E N TIA L  
PCS S ym ptom s Q u estio n n a ire ; H e a lth y  V o lu n te e rs
After a  head injury people can experience any of the symptoms listed below, bu t some of 
these symptoms might occur normally from time to time. In order to ensure that our 
'healthy volunteers' are different from our head injured patients, we would like to know if 
you are currently suffering any of the symptoms given below.
For each symptom please circle the num ber closest to your answer, according to the 
following scale:.
0 = not experiencing, or no worse than usual
1 = mild problem
2 = moderate problem
3  = severe problem
Are you experiencing ... Notes (Office use)
Poor concentration 0 1 2 3
Forgetfulness, poor memory 0 1 2 3
Fatigue, tiring more easily 0 1 2 3
Headaches 0 1 2 3
Feelings of dizziness 0 1 2 3
Nausea and /o r vomiting 0 1 2 3
Easily upset by loud noise 0 1 2 3
Sleep disturbance 0 1 2 3
Being irritable, easily angered 0 1 2 3
Feeling depressed or tearful 0 1 2 3
Feeling frustrated or impatient 0 1 2 3
Taking longer to think 0 1 2 3
Blurred vision 0 1 2 3
Easily upset by bright light 0 1 2 3
Double vision 0 1 2 3
Restlessness 0 1 2 3
Anxiety, loss of confidence 0 1 2 3
Other (state):! 0 1 2 3
Other (state) :2 0 1 2 3
Please note: like all data in this research, this questionnaire is confidential and will 
become anonymous. Once all the data has been collected, your scores will be separated 
from your name and this form will be destroyed.
PLEASE BRING WITH YOU TO YOUR APPOINTMENT
CONFIDENTIAL: SIMULATOR BRIEFING -  COMPENSATION CLAIM
Head injuries can have veiy debilitating effects. The effects can interfere with a person’s functioning 
so much that they are unable to work. Sometimes the injuries can be long-lasting, with a dramatic 
effect on one’s life. Occasionally, people are able to make claims of compensation for such losses. 
Where loss of employment for years is involved, the sum claimed can run into hundreds o f 
thousand o f pounds.
Please imagine that you have suffered a head injury, in a road accident that was not your fault. You 
were knocked out for a while. Since then you have suffered firom poor memoiy and concentration, 
as well as other symptoms which make you, and others, think you are ‘not right’.
The sym ptom s have prevented you from  doing your job, and from  living a norm al life.
- And you are claiming compensation through an insurance company.
Although some days are better than others, you do not know how long these problems are going to 
last. You are worried about losing your job, and you are really angry with the person who has 
brought all this trouble into your life. You are very worried that your injuries can’t be seen, and you 
are frightened that the Court will underestimate your suffering.
Your solicitor advises you that you stand to w in at least £ 5 0 ,0 0 0 , perhaps many times 
more than this if your symptoms are bad, and they persist. A large award offers you security -  
perhaps it would pay off your mortgage -  and freedom from worrying about your job.
The insurance company has arranged for you to be tested by a psychologist.
Your task is to exaggerate your problem s in the questionnaire and the tests, so that 
the court w ill award you the maximum damages for your injuries, but you m ust be 
careful not to let the psychologist believe that you are faking.
PLEASE NOTE; THIS IS NOT A TEST OF YOUR HONESTY OR MORAL JUDGEMENT. 
IT WOULD BE UNETHICAL FOR US TO DO SO. EVEN THOUGH YOU MIGHT NEVER 
DO THIS IN REAL LIFE, YOU ARE GENUINELY BEING ASKED TO ‘EXAGGERATE’.
The more convincing you are, the better we will be able to make tests which differentiate between 
c) real people who exaggerate, 
c) people whose symptoms are worsened by stress, and 
c) people with symptoms of actual brain injury.
Please read this briefing through twice, and then let the researcher know whether
a) you understand your instructions, and the role you are asked to play, and
b) you are willing to proceed with the tests as a ‘simulator’ subject
I f  fo r any reason you do not wish to perform the simulation, you may i f  y ou wish proceed to the
tests as yourself, and simply do your best at them.
The person w ith the m ost convincing perform ance as unable to work now, and for the  
foreseeable future, due to the effects o f a head injury, w ill w in a CD voucher.
THE NEXT EXAMINER DOES NOT KNOW YOU ARE SIMULATING,
AND WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HELP YOU
EXPLANATION & EXAMPLES OF POST CONCESSIONAL SYMPTOMS
POOR
CONCENTRATION
difficulty reading: reading the same paragraph in the newspaper over 
and over without taking it in; no longer reading books; losing the 
thread of TV programs; not taking in what is said in conversations; not 
being able to do more than one thing at a time; making silly mistakes.
POOR MEMORY forgetting what has been said; frequently losing items such as keys; 
‘double booking’; missing appointments; going into a room and 
forgetting why you are there; coming home from shopping without 
having bought many of the items you intended to.
FATIGUE tiring much more easily; often needing an afternoon nap
HEADACHES self explanatory.
DIZZINESS self explanatory.
NAUSEA/VOMITING feeling sick; being sick.
NOISE
HYPERSENSITIVITY
always complaining that the TV and radio are too loud. You cannot 
have a conversation with someone while someone else is talking, or 
there is a competing noise in the background; being startled or 
overwhelmed by sudden, or loud noises
SLEEP
DISTURBANCE
unable to get to sleep; wakening during night and early in the morning; 
daytime tiredness; body clock shift to late nights, early mornings
IRRITABILITY the bustle of every day life has become intolerable; you have found 
yourself shouting at others for the slightest reasons.
DEPRESSION low self esteem, can’t be bothered to do things; tearful, sometimes for 
no apparent reason
FRUSTRATION angered by your own shortcomings, especially those caused by the 
accident.
SLOWER THINKING taking longer to think, losing concentration; making more mistakes
BLURRED/ 
DOUBLE VISION
self explanatory
PHOTOPHOBIA being sensitive to bright light, having to wear sunglasses more often, 
even on dull days.
RESTLESSNESS feeling tense, can’t sit still
ANXIETY loss of confidence, worry about the effects of the injury, your job, 
money, family, etc; worry what others will think of you; worry about 
every ache and pain; wondering if these bodily symptoms are a result of 
your injuries, or signs of something else; worry over the court case.
FIRST Name ................................. Date
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
The assessment is now over. Please take a few more minutes to complete this questionnaire. Please 
circle the number on the following scales the extent to which you believe that you:
1. were not being tested for your honesty, but were genuinely being asked to exaggerate
(Not at all = i)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (7 = Fully)
2. understood the instructions you were given
(Not at all = 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  (7 = Fully)
3. were able to relate to the road accident /  injuries /  compensation scenario described
(Not at all = 1) 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 (7 = Fully)
4. were w illin g  to simulate the role of the injured person ‘making the most’ of their symptoms
(Not at all = 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (7 = Fully)
5. were able to perform as unable to work now, and for the foreseeable future, due to head injury
(Not at all = 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (7 = Fully)
6. were successful in deceiving the examiner
(Not at all = 1) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 (7 = Fully)
7. In your own words, please briefly explain what the instructions you were given asked you to do.
8. Please describe the strategies you used during the assessment to demonstrate that you were 
experiencing the symptoms of head injury.
9. If you found it difficult to perform as if you had symptoms resulting fi-om a head injuiy, what 
were the reasons for this?
PLEASE GIVE YOUR COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE FIRST EXAMINER 
Thank you very much for the tim e and energy you have given to participate in  this study.
' I
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“O wad some Power the giftie gie us 
To see oursels as ithers see us!
It wad frae monie a blunder free us 
An’ foolish notion 
What airs in dress and gaid wad lea’e us 
An’ ev’n devotion!....”
Robert Burns 
(from “To a Louse”)
ABSTRACT
The proposition is made on theoretical empirical and clinical grounds that 
there are instances in which measures of self-ideal concept discrepancies, 
self-ideal correlations, or self image per se provide data which can be 
considered neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the interpretation of 
psychological (mal-) adjustment. The argument is considered that a more 
appropriate measure of adjustment might be “self concept accuracy”, this 
dimension more comfortably including as “maladjusted” not just patients with 
low self-esteem, but those whose self image is in some respects unrealistically 
high.
The usefulness of video feedback as a means of improving self concept 
accuracy and thus assisting in therapeutic change, has been discussed on 
theoretical empirical and clinical grounds, and note made of its negative as 
well as positive potential.
A research investigation is described, which was designed to examine:
1) the measurement of self concept accuracy and its relevance to 
psychological adjustment, and
2) the immediate effects on self concepts of video feedback and of combined 
verbal and video feedback
The results of the investigation suggest that the distorted rating of self and of 
others is related to ‘neurotic’ symptoms, particularly anxiety and depression, 
and there is some evidence in support of the hypotheses predicting 
improvement in self concept accuracy as a result of video feedback 
treatments.
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. M.Sc. Dissertation.
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INTRODUCTION 
The Distorted Self Concept And Psychological Maladjustment
Two basic tenets of Rogers’ (1951) “Client-Centred Therapy” are: 
that a major characteristic of psychological maladjustment is a discrepancy 
between concepts of the “self and of the “ideal self; and: that successful 
psychotherapy is marked by a reduction in this discrepancy. In Rogers’ 
words: “The client tends to enter therapy regarding himself quite largely in 
terms of standards set by others. He has an ideal for himself, but sees this 
ideal as very different from his present se lf... [and in therapy]... He slowly 
discovers that what he wishes is a more achievable goal, and that actually he 
is himself changed to a degree which brings him much more in accord with his 
ideal”.
Testing these hypotheses, Butler and Haigh (1954) conclude: “low 
correlations between self and ideal are based on a low level of self-esteem 
[rather than high ideals] related to a relatively low adjustment level” and that a 
“consequence of [therapy] was, on average, a rise in the level of self-esteem 
[rather than lowering of ideals] and adjustment.”
In evaluating the effects of various psychotherapies several researchers have 
looked for changes in self/ideal self concepts as indices of successful 
treatment (e.g. Rogers and Dymond 1954; Barron and Leary 1955; Cartwright 
1956). Berg in (1966, 1971) reviewed a number of such studies and 
concluded that: “Psychotherapy may cause people to become better or worse 
adjusted than comparable people who do not receive such treatment.”
This conclusion is based on data concerning the “self-ideal correlation”, i.e. 
the degree to which an individual’s scores on measures of “self concept co- 
vary with his scores on measure of his “ideal self concept. The validity of 
self-ideal correlation as a measure of psychological adjustment is based on 
the observations that:
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a) as a group, psychoneurotic patients before therapy have lower self-ideal 
correlations than equivalent non-patients (Butler and Haigh, 1954)
b) patients who "benefit from therapy" tend to show increased self-ideal 
correlations (Butler and Haigh, 1954).
Now it has also been observed that:
c) the “ideal” scores of such patients remain relatively stable over therapy as 
compared with the “self scores (Rudikoff 1954), and, from a), b), and c), it 
has been inferred that:
i) the main contributor to low self-ideal correlation is a tendency for self 
scores to deviate from more or less common ideal scores, i.e. low self­
esteem.
ii) the main contributor to a raised self-ideal correlation -  of the “better 
adjusted” -  is a tendency for self scores to approach the ideal scores, i.e. 
higher self-esteem.
Thus Bergin’s assertion that “psychotherapy can and does make people 
worse than their control counterparts!” is based on data of lowered self-ideal 
correlations, which are associated with loss in self-esteem. However, the 
interpretation of loss of self-esteem as deterioration in adjustment has been 
held open to serious question.
Chodorkoff (1954) found a curvilinear relationship between “adjustment” (as 
measured by ratings based on biographical and projective data) and self-ideal 
correlations, and concluded that “caution must be taken in interpreting 
correspondence between perceived and ideal self as reflecting adequacy of 
adjustment. Although the most adequately adjusted subjects showed the 
highest correspondence between perceived and ideal self, the least 
adequately adjusted subjects did not show the least correspondence”. 
Presumably, then, for these least adequately adjusted subjects, improvement 
in adjustment may have been accompanied, initially at least, by a decrease in 
self-ideal correlation.
M. J. Tossell. Psych. D. Portfolio. M.Sc. Dissertation.
Block and Thomas (1955) also argue that “self-ideal correlation, or “degree of 
self satisfaction” is curvilinearly related to the social dimension of adjustment 
(as measured by M M PI)... [and]... is ordinally related to the conceptual 
dimension of ego control”, by which it is meant that low self-esteem is 
associated with “under controllers” in whom “anxiety and despair are 
manifest”, while too high self-esteem is associated with “over controllers”, in 
whom anxiety and despair are denied -  “individuals describing themselves as 
very close to their ego ideals [“over controllers”] tend to deny and suppress 
threatening features of themselves and cannot be considered mature and 
healthy”.
Another example of defence mechanisms interfering with self-ideal 
perceptions is provided by Hillson and Worchel (1957) who found that 
maladjusted subjects characterised by anxiety showed significantly greater 
self-ideal discrepancies than normals, but that “maladjusted subjects with 
defensive patterns” showed no greater discrepancies than normals. However, 
the “defensive” subjects' ideals tended to be lower than normals, and both 
anxious and “defensive” subjects’ ratings of “self-as-compared-to-others” were 
significantly lower than normals.
Laxer (1964) found low self-esteem to be related, in-patients and non-patients, 
to a tendency to blame oneself, and to depressed mood. In psychiatric 
patients these factors interacted: thus depressed patients, characteristically 
self-blamers, showed distinctly low self rating, but patients who tended to 
blame others, or external situations, showed relatively high self rating, even 
when in depressed mood.
Braucht (1970a; 1970b) criticised Bergin’s conclusions on grounds, among 
others, of the criterion validity of rise in self-esteem as adjustment. Braucht 
asserted that a fundamental shortcoming of change in self-esteem as an index 
of change in adjustment is that the self-esteem criterion requires that all 
patients change in the same direction in order to show improvement in 
adjustment as a group, whereas in fact some patients who lose in self-esteem
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may actually improve in adjustment, in that they become less defensive and 
thus more accurate or realistic in their self descriptions.
Thus, Braucht argues, and others imply, a more useful measure of 
psychological adjustment would be to what extent the individual's self concept 
is realistic. This framework of psychological adjustment includes, then, the 
possibility of therapeutic change involving a change in self-esteem which 
appears in direct opposition to the criteria which have been used in 
frameworks apparently developed from Rogerian theory. However, 
examination of Rogers' “Theory of Personality and Behaviour” (Rogers 1951) 
reveals Braucht's proposition to be no less in line with it. Indeed, this 
framework appears better to fit Rogers' definition of maladjustment than the 
unidirectional dimension of self-esteem perse.
Rogers (1951) postulates that: “Psychological maladjustment exists when the 
organism denies to awareness significant sensory and visceral experiences, 
which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the 
self structure. When this situation exists, there is a basic or psychological 
tension”.
In other words, the individual's internal concept of self is not congruent with 
his “external self. That is, he sees himself differently from the way others see 
him, and if his view of himself were compared with the view others have of 
him, this would show a self concept inaccuracy. In a study entitled “ Changes 
in the maturity of behavior as related to therapy ", Rogers (1954) reports that, 
following therapy, “successful " clients' self ratings of behaviour was consistent 
with others' ratings, whereas “unsuccessful” clients rated their own behaviour 
as “much more mature” than it was rated by friends and counsellor. This is an 
important example, from Rogers work, of positive self concept discrepancy, or 
self-esteem which is unrealistically high in some respects, and from which it 
becomes conceivable that successful therapy may involve some degree of 
loss of self-esteem.
8
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Braucht’s hypothesis is supported by Argyle (1967) who notes that many 
types of psychiatric patients have difficulty in perceiving themselves 
realistically or in telling whether others approve of them: “a number of studies 
have found that neurotics have greater self/ego-ideal conflict than normals 
and that the discrepancy gets smaller during psychotherapy -. . . .  mainly 
because of changes in self ratings. However, there are some groups of 
people, by no means well adjusted, who show very little conflict because they 
perceive themselves so inaccurately.” (my emphasis). Argyle argues that a 
person's self image is kept in check by reality in the form of others' reactions 
to him. Most people's self ratings closely correspond with ratings by others, 
though self ratings tend to be more favourable. However, both extremes of 
self-esteem "usually reflect failure to perceive accurately the responses of 
others and can be regarded as failures of adjustment.”
In addition to self-esteem scores, Braucht (1970b) used a measure of self 
concept accuracy based on differences between self ratings and a consensual 
“reality “ of judges' descriptions of the patient. Braucht hypothesised that:
i) on the measure of self-esteem there would be no difference in the 
arithmetic mean change between those who received “self 
confrontation treatment “ and the control subjects, but the distribution of 
experimental subjects' changes would show greater variability than that 
of the control subjects, (i.e. that the so-called “deterioration effect” 
would be observed to nullify the mean differences between 
experimental and control subjects in terms of change in self-esteem).
ii) experimental subjects would show greater change towards more 
accurate self descriptions than would the control subjects.
Both of these hypotheses were supported by the results. In addition, Braucht 
found that in-patients, chronic patients and psychotics showed greater self 
concept inaccuracy than out-patients, new patients and neurotics respectively 
and improved their accuracy more after the experimental treatment.
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Since Braucht’s work, other authors have demonstrated the validity of self 
concept accuracy as a measure of adjustment. Kennard (1974) examined 
differences in perception between the newly admitted psychiatric patient and 
his “closest other person” (C.O.P.). There was close agreement in 
perceptions of the “ideal” and the “mentally ill” person but perceptions of the 
patient himself differed, particularly in the areas of disturbed behaviour, ease 
of communication and degree of illness. Kennard and Clemmey (1976) 
showed that a treatment approach of “ reality confrontation” in a therapeutic 
community - giving verbal feedback to patients concerning their behaviour as 
it appears to others - leads to a reduction in the discrepancy between the 
perceptions of the patient and his C.O.P.
Self concept accuracy has also been shown to be related to marital 
adjustment. In a study by Sporakowski and Hughston (1978) couples married 
for 50 years or more were interviewed about what they felt were the most 
important factors in happy marriage. Marital satisfaction was assessed over 
the stages of the family life cycle. Indices of their marital adjustment and 
personality were examined using a self- and perceived-by-other comparison 
technique. Positive marital adjustment was found to be related to congruence 
of self-other perceptions.
The Role Of Videotape Recorded Feedback
If self concept inaccuracy can be considered an indicator of maladjustment, 
and greater self concept accuracy a measure of therapeutic success, how is 
positive change in self concept accuracy to be brought about? Is it merely to 
be hoped that it will inevitably arise as a product of “successful 
psychotherapy” or is there a means of directly attacking the self concept within 
therapy? Feedback from others about ones own behaviour is frequently 
indirect, non-verbal and subtle, rarely as explicit expression. Indeed, there is 
often a taboo in our culture on giving such personal information, especially of 
a non-complementary kind. It would appear that some people either fail to
10
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receive such feedback or distort it in some way (Argyle 1972, Trower 1979).
So perhaps what is needed is some more explicit form of feedback from the 
therapist. However, this information may be biased, or at least inaccurate, 
depending upon the personality of the therapist himself, who may selectively 
distort what he perceives and remembers. In addition, accuracy will be lost in 
the verbal translation of essential non-verbal information and the therapist will 
only use a fraction of the available information and may miss important 
features in the patient's behaviour. And even then his message is subject to 
the possible distortion, denial and sheer disbelief of the patient himself. The 
answer would appear to lie in videotape recorded feedback (which was the 
essence of Braucht’s experimental self confrontation treatment): a complete, 
faithful, immediate and, if necessary, permanent record of an individual’s 
behaviour that can be replayed repeatedly, in short or long segments, at 
normal or slow speeds, or frame by frame, with a choice of wide-angled or 
close-up perspectives.
Not only is the content of video feedback more accurate and comprehensive, 
its style can be more persuasive. Attribution theory (Jones and Nisbett, 1972) 
holds that an individual tends to attribute the causes of his own behaviour to 
the situation, while those of others’ behaviour he tends to attribute more to the 
enduring dispositions of the performer. It is arguable, then, that if he were to 
see himself as others see him he may assume more responsibility for his 
actions (and this in turn may lead to changes in self-attitude and, perhaps 
behaviour). Indeed, Storms (1973) has demonstrated that if the perspectives 
of performer and observer are exchanged by the video feedback of what the 
other sees, this differential attribution phenomenon is reversed completely.
Thus, theoretically it is possible to provide an individual with a perception of 
himself more realistic than his own, and encourage him to accept 
responsibility for this new image, and this attitude change could be a 
therapeutic catalyst. The observation that improved self concept accuracy 
accompanies therapeutic change may in some cases make it a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition of adjustment. However, there is reason to believe
11
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that this re-direction of attention to ignored habitual behaviour, or “de- 
automization”, as Gill and Brennan put it, may “prime” the individual for 
subsequent behaviour change.
According to Duval and Wicklund (1972), the self viewer is in a state of 
“objective self-awareness”, and in this state the individual evaluates himself 
according to some internal standards (such as ideal self, peer group 
standards), and the almost inevitable discrepancy observed is associated with 
a corresponding feeling of discomfort which leads either to change in 
behaviour/adjustment in standards in order to reduce the discrepancy, or to 
avoidance of the state of objective self-awareness.
Now for those individuals whose self concept is unrealistically low, if their 
perception of the evidence is undistorted, the actual discrepancy would be 
seen to be not as great as the previously perceived discrepancy, and the rise 
in self-esteem may provide him with an adjustment in self appraisal which is in 
itself therapeutic, and the confidence for future positive behaviour change.
This may have been a process underlying the production of significant positive 
change in students' interpersonal interactions by Cavior and Marabotto 
(1976).
On the other hand, for the individual whose self concept is unrealistically high, 
the observed discrepancy between “true” self and his standards would be 
greater than he had hitherto believed. This would be especially aversive, and, 
according to Duval and Wicklund, if he did not escape it, would lead to 
behaviour change in order to reduce this discrepancy. This rationale may be 
applied to the use of video feedback in the treatment of attempted suicides 
(Resnik et al 1977) anorexics (Biggs et al 1980) and alcoholics (Paredes et al 
1969).
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Utilisation Of Video Feedback As A Means Of Self Confrontation With
Psychiatrie Patients
Video feedback has been found to be a powerful therapeutic tool, with both 
positive and negative reported effects. Alger and Hogan (1967) enthused:
“.... it may be no exaggeration to say the videotape recording represents a 
technological breakthrough with the kind of significance for psychology the 
microscope has had for biology”. Others have been less eulogistic. Studies 
may be divided into five categories, according to the orientation of treatment 
involved:
A. Marital therapy
B. Treatment of alcoholism
0. In-patient programmes
D. Treatment of anorexia nervosa
E. Social skills training
A. Marital Therapy
After four years of treatment with over seventy-five families and couples, Alger 
and Hogan (1967) listed advantages of the use of video feedback, which are 
relevant to therapy with other patient types, and which are typical of 
advantages reported elsewhere:
1. Videotape makes immediately available more objective data concerning 
the therapeutic process.
2. Therapy becomes more equal and co-operative as patients and therapists 
have equal access to the objective record of what transpired.
3. Video feedback encourages more emotional involvement in therapy.
4. Video feedback clarifies complex behaviour patterns and sequences in the 
actual context of their occurrence and is especially useful in relating verbal 
and non-verbal levels and channels of communication within these 
contexts
13
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5. “Videotape confrontation can help produce insight of meaningful and 
lasting nature (months and even years). It can also be helpful to a person 
in contacting and taking responsibility for his own behaviour, in expressing 
those feelings more directly when desired, and in maintaining his own 
direction in life.”
Wright and Fichten (1976) similarly conclude that: “the change in visual 
perspective may allow a spouse to view himself or herself, both literally and 
figuratively, as does the other partner, leading to a decrease in perceptual 
biases, allowing the spouse to perceive his own behavioural contribution to 
the conflict. Also the spouse may attribute causation for his own behaviour 
dispositionally, thus making him more likely to accept his share of the blame
for conflict with the consequence of perceiving the other in a more
favourable light.”
However these conclusions are based on the subjective clinical experience of 
the authors. Indeed, the majority of reports of the usefulness of video 
feedback in family and marital therapy are based on uncontrolled studies, and 
findings of weak or un-established reliability and validity.
Video feedback was used in a treatment package to help couples improve 
their communication and problem solving skills, and to teach them 
contingency contracting, by Jacobson (1977). A comparison of pre-and post 
treatment behaviour ratings by independent judges revealed significant 
improvement by all couples. Here video feedback was used with other 
treatments, and although the results are favourable, whether it enhanced the 
effect of the other treatments cannot be ascertained. Video feedback's 
contributory effect was assessed by Edelson and Sindman (1975), who 
compared:
a) focused verbal feedback, where the therapist provided constructive 
comments on the partners' interaction pattern during interview,
b) focused feedback plus video feedback, and
c) no feedback.
14
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The combined video and focused feedback produced more (favourable) 
change in inter personal perceptions than both other treatments, which did not 
differ. This priming or catalytic effect of video feedback in addition to other 
treatment was also shown by Eisler et al (1973) where again video and 
focused feedback produced improved non-verbal marital interaction to a 
greater extent than either treatment alone.
Amidst the many uncontrolled but positive findings of the use of video 
feedback in marital therapy there is an uncontrolled but dramatically negative 
report. Alkire and Brunse (1974) report two suicides, one the morning after 
feedback, the other two weeks later following a deepening depression, 
together with four divorces or separations within two months of feedback, a 
higher rate of "casualties ' than had been observed before the authors 
introduced video feedback. The suicides raise concern over the power of this 
technique and the suitability of it for certain patients (these were in-patients in 
remission of major psychotic symptoms) although a causal link between the 
treatment and this outcome is equivocal on this evidence alone. At least the 
separations might not be regarded as indicating casualty. On the contrary, it 
may be argued that using video feedback, solutions to troubled marriages 
were found more efficiently and effectively than previously.
B. Treatment of Alcoholism
Self confrontation of the sober patient with a recording of his behaviour when 
intoxicated has been used in a number of studies. Video feedback alone has 
been reported to bring about a lowering of self-esteem, a more involved 
therapeutic relationship and eventual enhanced self acceptance. However 
these changes were not accompanied by corresponding changes in 
psychometric and behavioural data (Paredes et al, 1969; Feinstein and 
Tamerin, 1972). Schaefer et al (1971) found no difference in improvement of 
video feedback alcoholics as opposed to no-treatment controls.
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Video feedback has been included in comparisons of treatment packages of 
various constitutions in three studies (Baker et al 1973; Sobell and Sobell 
1973;Vogler et al 1975), in each of which video feedback was always included 
in the most successful package. Its contribution was seen as providing the 
motivation for behaviour change, which was brought about by the other 
successful treatment components, such as training in self control and anxiety 
management.
C. In-Patient Programmes
Changes in self concepts and concepts of interpersonal behaviour of patients 
on a psychiatric ward were measured by Boyd and Sisney (1967) following 
video feedback and compared with a control group not given the self 
confrontation. Interpersonal concepts of the self, the ideal self and “public 
self became less discrepant and normatively less pathological following 
feedback, and differences between experimental and control groups remained 
significant two weeks later, with one exception. Changes in self perception 
were also found by Reivich and Geertsma (1968), who measured the disparity 
between patients’ self ratings on clinical scales and the ratings given them by 
psychiatric nurses. After video feedback the ratings of the patients came to 
agree more with those of the nurses.
Geertsma and Reivich (1965) report a case history of an “emotionally 
disturbed” patient who, after a series of feedback sessions “demonstrated 
substantial changes in self regard. She came to rate herself as less 
intelligent, less cheerful, less conscientious, less bold and venturesome, and 
more tender minded. All of these shifts were directed toward the levels of 
ratings given by the student nurses, thus suggesting that the patient came to 
assess herself more realistically.”
Moore et al (1965) compared 40 patients of varying diagnostic categories, 
who were shown video recordings of their structured psychotherapy
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interviews, with 40 similar patients who were not given feedback. The 
feedback groups showed significantly greater improvements (as gauged by 
“blind”, independent observers) than the no-feedback group.
Resnik et al (1973) cite two case studies to illustrate the reported success of 
using, with psychotherapy, video tape recordings of the sequelae of attempted 
suicides (intensive care, reaction of family etc.) in order to “challenge the 
patients denial of despair, suicidal intent, and the consequences of his suicidal 
behaviour.” “In each case” (as in others) state the authors, “relevant material 
was stimulated that helped to engage the patient in the therapeutic alliance.”
As in other areas of use, evidence of video feedback alone producing 
therapeutic behavioural change is lacking, although again there are several 
examples of its beneficial use in conjunction with other treatment strategies 
(Bailey 1970; Robinson and Jacobs 1970; Muzekari and Kamis 1973;
Edelstein and Eisler 1976; Hall et al 1978).
D. Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa
The usefulness of video feedback is indicated in a single case study by 
Gottheil et al (1969), who wrote: “If self image confrontation is a useful 
therapeutic tool in combating denial, it should be maximally effective in 
conditions such as anorexia, where, in addition to disturbances in body 
concept the visible changes in body structure are so clearly evident.” The 
patient in the case study was given 54 feedback sessions in 16 months of 
treatment, during which: “her weight increased.... she recognised some of her 
problems, her plans for the future became more realistic .... changes occurred 
in her attitudes toward her image .... Eventually she became able to take a 
more objective view of herself; to see both positive and negative features in 
the [feedback]; and to respond to aspects of her performance other than that 
of her physical appearance alone. Toward the end of her hospitalisation she 
was doubly shocked to see how terribly thin she had been earlier and how
17
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. M.Sc. Dissertation.
indifferent she had been to her condition. Her body image had changed, so 
that thinness became ugly rather than comforting to her.... The changes in 
self image which took place slowly against a great deal of resistance 
appeared to be associated with the continued and repeated self image 
confrontations."
Comparing the effects of video feedback on the self-esteem of anorexics (who 
may be considered to have an unrealistically favourable self-image), 
depressives (low self-image) and normals, Biggs et al (1980) predicted that 
video feedback would result in more realistic self-appraisal. This was found to 
be the case with the anorexics, who responded with a reduction in self-esteem 
(which was seen as potentially therapeutic). Normals displayed an increase in 
self-esteem (and this was seen as in keeping with the prediction). However, 
depressed patients perceived themselves negatively both before and after 
video feedback.
E. Social Skills Training
The recent growing interest in social skills training has been accompanied by 
the use of video feedback in some research on teaching assertive, social, 
dating and problem solving skills, often to students, but in the clinical 
population at least, to people who frequently exhibit an unrealistically low self­
esteem (Trower et al 1978). Many systematic studies have involved students, 
the content of the feedback typically being the role playing of specific target 
behaviours they wanted to improve, be it asserting oneself (Aiduk and Karoly 
1975; Galassi et al 1974), “poise in dating" (Melmick 1973), personal problem 
solving (Arnkoff and Stewart 1975) interpersonal interactions (Cavior and 
Marabotto 1976) or giving a speech (Blount and Pedersen 1970; Curran and 
Gilbert 1975; Fino 1974).
Two of these studies found video feedback had no effect, either when used 
alone (Fino 1974) or in addition to behaviour rehearsal (Aiduk and Karoly,
18
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1975). Blount and Pedersen found a significant tendency for feedback S’s to 
perceive themselves more favourably than no feedback S’s although the 
actual differences were small. Cavior and Marabotto (1976) produced 
significant improvement after instructing students to monitor the negative 
aspects of the video feedback of a previous interaction. Curran and Gilbert 
(1975) and Galassi et al (1974) had positive results with video feedback as 
part of a comprehensive package.
With a clinical population, a comparison of modelling and video feedback in 
personal problem solving showed limited improvement in both treatment 
groups, but in different ways (Arnkoff and Steward, 1975). Modelling 
effectively taught patients to gather more information, but video feedback led 
to better discrimination of important information for problem solving. The 
complementary effect of video feedback with modelling was replicated in 
another study which showed that modelling increased appropriate emotions, 
while a combination of modelling, instructions and video feedback produced 
improvements in all aspects of assertiveness (Edelstein and Eisler 1976). 
Similarly, two other studies comparing modelling alone and a combination of 
modelling and video feedback found the latter clearly the more effective in 
inducing behaviour change (Melnick, 1973; Walter, 1975).
Possible Antitherapeutic Effects
Video feedback has been shown to be a powerful therapeutic tool, which 
when used alone can bring about therapeutic change in attitudes regarding 
the self and others, and, especially when used in conjunction with other 
treatment strategies can produce therapeutic behaviour change. However, 
some evidence exists of possible anti therapeutic effects. In addition to the 
dramatic negative findings of Alkire and Brunse (1974) already mentioned, 
other authors have expressed concern over the stressful nature of video 
feedback, particularly where it may be expected to produce a lowering of self­
esteem (albeit in producing a more realistic self concept).
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Carrere (1954) used film to show alcoholics how they behaved when 
intoxicated, but found it necessary to edit “ the more shocking scenes." The 
full presentation of their behaviour when drunk was too stressful for many of 
his patients.
Geertsma and Reivich (1965) observed that some self-viewing depressive 
patients became more depressed, some schizophrenic patients engaged in 
more bizarre behaviour, and some neurotics showed an increase in symptoms 
characteristic of their disorder.
Danet (1969) anticipated that for some people playback may be perceived as 
a hostile gesture on the part of the therapist (although Resnik (1973) reported 
this as a temporary, defensive reaction).
Like the above mentioned authors, Wright and Fichten (1976) found video 
feedback useful in many instances, in this case in marital therapy, but were 
concerned that “in couples who do not possess problem solving skills, [video 
feedback] may lead to deterioration since greater acceptance of responsibility 
for conflict would generate increased arousal and guilt."
Muzekari et al (1973) concluded that “for the chronic patient, stark 
confrontation with the realities of his appearance and evident defects in his 
functioning as highlighted by videotape replay constitutes a negative 
experience."
These authors and others argue that video feedback is a powerful tool which 
can have both injurious as well as therapeutic effects, depending upon its 
skilled use. As Berger (1970) advised: “the therapist should not force [the 
patient] to face what he is not ready to face. This is an individual and delicate 
matter which depends so much on the skill and art of the therapist to bring it to 
successful fruition.”
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It is an established principle of learning in general and behaviour modification 
in particular, that positive reinforcement is more successful at establishing and 
maintaining a behaviour than is punishment at eliminating one, and, in 
connection with this, feedback concerning successful behaviour promotes that 
behaviour better than does feedback of inappropriate behaviour. For 
example, Leitenberg et al (1968) gave (non-video) feedback to phobic patients 
undergoing behaviour modification, and found feedback about progress 
speeds improvement, but information of temporary setbacks interferes with 
therapy.
Not only must the therapist exercise skill and judgement in selecting the 
material to be used in feedback, but there is evidence to suggest that what the 
therapist sees is not necessarily what the patient perceives and interprets. 
Recent research confirms that some people, who are “good self monitors" 
attune their behaviour to the situation, while others, “poor self monitors", do 
not respond to feedback, either because they fail to perceive the cues or 
because they interpret them incorrectly (Trower 1979).
Trower asserts that the more negatively self-evaluating patients may:
a) attend to the more negative aspects of their performance, or
b) attend with negative set, even to the positive aspects.
Indeed, Duval and Wicklund state that the individual in objective self- 
awareness selectively attends to those features of himself which are most 
salient to him at the time, so that the low self-esteem self viewer may allow his 
attention to one aspect of his performance with which he is not happy to 
negatively influence his global self-rating. Therefore, Trower argues, the self 
viewer sees himself from a particular “private perspective" and expects this to 
be the perspective of others, including the therapist, who sees him and the 
feedback from the more objective “public perspective" and believes the patient 
is sharing the same view.
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Furthermore, Carrer (1977) found that negative stimuli are more depressing to 
the person in a self conscious state, and Ickes and Layden (1978) conclude 
that the high self-esteem subject tends to claim credit for successes, and 
blames fate or others for failures while low self-esteem subjects tend to 
attribute successes to others or to luck, and blame themselves for failures.
In addition to an understanding of what to feed back and how to use it, it 
would appear that the therapist needs to ensure that the patient receives what 
the therapist is intending to transmit. According to Duval and Wicklund, the 
two alternative reactions to the aversive state of objective self-awareness are:
i) to reduce the self-ideal discrepancy (i.e. by favourably changing 
attitudes and/or behaviour), or
ii) to avoid this state of awareness (e.g. by discontinuing treatment).
It is incumbent upon the therapist to present and interpret feedback material in 
such a way as to maximise the likelihood of the former alternative and 
minimise that of the latter.
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THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION 
Rationale And Development Of Hypotheses
It has been proposed, on theoretical, empirical and clinical grounds that there 
are instances in which measures of self-ideal discrepancies, self-ideal 
correlations, or self-image per se provide data which can be considered 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the interpretation of 
psychological (mal)adjustment. The argument has been considered that a 
more appropriate measure of adjustment might be “self concept accuracy”, 
this dimension more comfortably including as “maladjusted” not just patients 
with low self-esteem, but those whose self image is in some respects 
unrealistically high.
The usefulness of video feedback as a means of improving self concept 
accuracy and thus assisting in therapeutic change, has been discussed on 
theoretical empirical and clinical grounds, and note taken of its negative as 
well as positive potential. However, little research appears to exist concerning 
either, the relative usefulness of the concept of positive or negative self 
concept accuracy as opposed to the unidirectional self-esteem, or. the effect 
on self concept accuracy of video feedback, with the type of patient most 
typically referred to in Rogers’ “Theory of Personality and Behaviour”, namely, 
the “anxious neurotic”.
The present research was designed to bring together these two areas of 
investigation. The study was intended to examine:
i) the measurement of self concept accuracy and its relevance to 
psychological adjustment, and
ii) the immediate effects on self concept of video feedback and of 
combined verbal and video feedback.
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The hypotheses concerned with the investigation may be stated as follows: -
1. Self concept accuracy is inversely related to “neuroticism” (as defined 
operationally using a psychometric instrument) -  and to the component 
measures of psychopathology upon which the dimension of "neuroticism" is 
based.
2a. Psychiatric patients showing high anxiety will also exhibit a less accurate 
self concept than low-anxious non-patients. While it was considered unlikely 
that, in the selection of subjects, there would be any among the anxious out­
patients who did not exhibit “high anxiety", it was envisaged that among the 
non-patients there would exist those who did indicate high anxiety. Should a 
sufficient number of these be found, a sub-hypothesis was generated:
2b. Non-patients exhibiting high anxiety would differ, in terms of self concept 
accuracy, from low-anxious non-patients, in proportion to the extent of their 
“level" of anxiety. Should this be tested, a more generalised compilation of 
1a) and b) would be that self concept accuracy varies among individuals 
(whether patient or non-patient) in inverse relation to the variation of anxiety 
among them. Since the concept of self inevitably involves the “non-self, it is 
arguable that the maintenance of a discrepant perception of self involves a 
distorted view of others. Thus a third hypothesis is that:
2c. High-anxious individuals exhibit an inaccurate concept of others.
3a. The immediate effect of videotape feedback on all individuals will be to 
increase self -concept accuracy.
3b. The combination of video and verbal feedback will be to increase self 
concept accuracy to a greater extent than video feedback alone.
4a. Video feedback alone will influence the self ratings of low-anxious 
individuals more positively than high-anxious individuals.
4b. This differential effect will be reduced by video and verbal feedback 
combined.
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Experimental Design
The methodological procedure undergone by all subjects is summarised in 
fig. 1.
After completing the preliminary questionnaires (CCEI, STAI, BDI, MSGO), 
thirteen high-anxious out-patients (Group PS = patient subjects) were 
individually paired with thirteen low-anxious controls (group HC = hospital 
controls) matched for sex, age and social class. Later, seven low-anxious 
controls were paired with seven matched low-anxious controls (group UC = 
university controls). In addition to these were found six high-anxious non­
patients (group NS = non-patient subjects) who were paired with six further 
low-anxious controls.
Each pair conducted the experimental conversation which was video-taped. 
Following the conversation each participant rated certain behavioural and 
general aspects of the conversational performance of him/her self and of the 
other person. From combinations of these SELF and OTHER scores of the 
different groups, the following different measures of SELF CONCEPT 
ACCURACY can be measured, each with different implications for the 
hypotheses of the investigation:
Patient's (Group PS) self concept accuracy:
is calculated from the differences between the patient’s ratings of SELF, and 
(HC) controls ratings of the patient (OTHER).
HC control’s self concept accuracy:
is calculated from the differences between the HC control’s ratings of SELF 
and the patient’s ratings of the HC control (OTHER).
UC control’s self concept accuracy:
is calculated from the differences between the control’s ratings of SELF and 
his paired UC control’s ratings of OTHER.
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High-anxious non-patients’ (Group NS) self concept accuracy: 
is calculated from the differences between the high-anxious non-patient’s 
rating of SELF and the low-anxious non-patient’s ratings of OTHER. Thus the 
only measure not involving ratings of high-anxious subjects is UC controls self 
concept accuracy. Now, assuming all controls to be of the same population,
a) differences between patients self concept accuracy (SCA) and UC controls 
SCA will be attributable to the se/f-rating ability of the patients
b) differences between HC controls SCA and UC controls SCA will be 
attributable to the other rating ability of the patients.
But the patients differ from controls in two ways: 1) they exhibit higher anxiety, 
and 2) they are psychiatric hospital out-patients, so differences observed in a) 
and b) above can be attributed to the variables either of 1) anxiety or 2) 
patient/non-patient status.
Therefore comparisons of the SCAs of the high-anxious non-patients (Groups 
NS) can be made with those of patients and with those of non-patient controls 
to resolve the two conflicting hypotheses in the following manner:
If the SCA of high-anxious non-patients is more like that of UC controls than 
that of patients, then differences at a) and b) above may be attributable to the 
patient’s “out-patient status.” However, if the SCA of high-anxious non­
patients is more like that of patients than that of controls then the differences 
at a) and b) can be attributed to anxiety.
Following the first ratings, the videotape recording was played back and the 
second ratings similarly made. Then, each subject was given verbal feedback 
concerning how the other rated him and the recording was again played back 
and the participants rated for the third and final time. Thus comparisons can 
now be made to investigate the effects of video feedback alone and verbal 
and video feedback combined on SELF ratings, OTHER ratings, and SCA 
scores. Note that at any given treatment stage, self concept accuracy is
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defined as the difference between the subject’s rating of himself at that stage
and the first rating of the subject by another person, i.e. the other person’s
impression before any feedback.
Statistical analyses to be applied to the data thus generated will involve:
1. Correlational analysis (N = all groups -  PS, HC, UC, NS, NS controls) for 
confirmation of construct validity of established psychometric instruments 
used.
2. Correlational analysis (N= groups PS, UC) for analysis of variation of self 
concept accuracy with neuroticism and its psychopathological components 
(hypothesis 1). Groups HC and NS controls are omitted as their SCA 
scores are contaminated by OTHER scores of high-anxious subjects, 
which may themselves be distorted. Group NS is omitted to ensure 
symmetrical distribution and avoid effects of disproportionate concentration 
of scores from a truncated range.
3. Analysis of variance for comparison of groups PS, HC, UC, NS to 
investigate relationship between anxiety and ability to rate a) self, b) 
others, realistically (hypotheses 2a, b and c).
4. Repeat of (3) at subsequent feedback stages, and, within groups, repeated 
measures analyses of variance to investigate effects of video feedback 
and combined verbal and video feedback on ratings of self, others and on 
self concept accuracy (hypotheses 3a, b and 4a, b).
Subjects
There were primarily three groups of subjects: 13 high-anxious patients, 13 
matched, partnered, low-anxious (Hospital) controls, and 14 independent 
(University) matched low-anxious controls. A further group of high-anxious 
non-patients developed from the University sample, and these were partnered 
with 6 more matched low-anxious non-patient controls.
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Choice Of Cut Off As Selection Criterion
In order operationally to define high and low anxiety it was necessary to 
choose an arbitrary cut off point between the two. For the purpose of 
measuring anxiety the STAI (Trait) questionnaire was used, and the cut off 
point established using the tests normative data by estimating the point of 
intersection of the normal curves of two samples: those of anxious neurotic 
patients and undergraduates (the oldest group for whom normative data was 
provided). The cut off point thus obtained was a score of 42.6. Patients 
scoring 42 and below, and non-patients scoring 43 and above were to be held 
in reserve to form further groups.
1  High-anxious Patients (groups PS)
These were non-psychotic patients, in whose complaint anxiety was a major 
component, and who had been referred to the Department of Psychiatry, West 
Park Hospital within one month. Of the sixteen patients approached, thirteen 
agreed to participate and all of these scored in excess of the cut off point on 
the STAI.
2. Hospital Staff Controls (Group HC)
These were recruited from the staff of West Park Hospital according to the 
above mentioned characteristics of the patients. Recruitment was made on 
an informal "grapevine referral” basis, so exact figures are not available, but 
most of the staff members approached agreed to participate, and none of 
these scored above the cut off point.
3. University Staff Controls (Group UC)
These were recruited from the staff of the University of Surrey according to the 
characteristics of the hospital groups. Most of the staff members approached 
agreed to participate, and of these, twenty out of twenty six scored below the 
cut off point. Fourteen of these were paired as Group UC (the other six 
partnered those six scoring above the cut off -  see below)
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4. High-anxious Non-patients (Group NS)
These were the six University staff members who agreed to participate and 
scored above the cut off point.
5. Low-anxious Non-patient Controls
These were the six University staff members who scored below the cut off and 
partnered the high-anxious non-patients.
The relevant characteristics of the above groups are summarised in Fig. 2.
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Instruments Used
1. The Crown-Crisp Experiential Index (CCEI)
The CCEI is a means of rapid quantification of common symptoms and traits 
relevant to the conventional categories of psychoneurotic illness. It consists of 
48 questions, each with a choice of two or three answers for the respondent to 
check (e.g. 38. Are you scared of heights? Very.... (2 points); Fairly.... (1pt); 
Notât all.... (0 points).
The semantic direction of the questions and responses is varied in order to 
minimise “response set” effects.
The CCEI is designed so that a total score can be obtained to provide a 
measure of general emotionality or “neuroticism”, together with a profile of six 
sub-scale scores (Crown and Crisp, 1979). The six sub-scales are intended 
to measure free floating anxiety (FFA), phobic anxiety (PHO), obsessionality 
(OBS), somatic concomitants of anxiety (SOM), depression (DEP), and 
“hysterical personality” (HYS). Each of these sub -scale dimensions is 
measured by eight questions. Questions for each sub-scale are rotated to 
disguise from the testee the aims of the questions.
Features of the sub-scales and “neuroticism” score:
FFA Scale: This sub-scale has, over a variety of different types of 
investigation, shown itself to be reliable and valid, the correlation of the FFA 
sub-scale with the N-scale of the EPI is 0.59 (Young et al, 1971). One year 
retest reliability = 0.77 (Crown et al, 1970).
PHO Scale: Crisp et al (1978), in their validity study, show that anxiety phobic 
states are particularly well identified by the PHO sub-scale. Olley and 
McAllister (1974) showed that discrimination between phobic patients and two 
non-psychiatric groups was heavily dependent upon the symptom ratings
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emerging from the CCEI. One year retest reliability = 0.68 (Crown et al,
1970).
OBS Scale: Crisp et al (1978) showed that this scale was an effective 
measure for identifying subjects with obsessional neuroses. The OBS scale 
contains questions relating to traits (15, 33, 39 and 45) and others related 
more to symptoms (3, 9, 21 and 27). One year retest reliability = 0.73 (Crown 
et al, 1970).
SOM Scale: This has previously been found to be an accurate measure of 
somatic complaints in the psychiatric clinic (Crown and Crisp, 1966). One 
year retest reliability = 0.68 (Crown et al, 1970).
DEP Scale: This scale clearly differentiated patients diagnosed by consultant 
psychiatrists as “psychoneurotically ill” from those designated “not 
[depressively] ill” and also from the general population. (Crisp et al, 1978).
One year retest reliability = 0.72 (Crown et al, 1970).
Subjects diagnosed as suffering from anxiety states cannot easily be 
distinguished from those suffering from depressive illness on this, or indeed 
on the anxiety-related scales. This is interpreted (by Crown and Crisp, 1979) 
as reflecting a major symptomatic overlap in these two populations, this 
interpretation being supported by the normative data of the two more specific 
questionnaires used in this investigation, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory and 
the Beck Depression Inventory.
HYS Scale: The HYS scale has been shown to be reliable (one year retest 
reliability = 0.72 (Crown et al, 1970)), but its validity has strongly been 
questioned. Gadd and Merskey (1975) found the HYS scale to be 
unsuccessful in differentiating patients with a diagnosis of conversion hysteria 
from other, neurological patients. HYS correlations with the other scales and 
with total scores have been found to be exceptionally low (Crown and Crisp, 
1979), and Dasberg et al (1978) found correlations of HYS with a total score
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compiled without the HYS component to be “even negative and significant”. In 
Dasberg’s view, HYS measures a degree of sociability. Indeed, Crown and 
Crisp (1979) admit HYS to be more a measure of extraversion than of 
hysteria.
Total “Neuroticism” Score: While the total score of the CCEI is frequently 
recommended by the Index's authors as a measure of neuroticism or 
emotionality (Crown and Crisp, 1979), normative data for adults concerning 
the overall scale has been provided by only one major study. Dasberg et al 
(1978), noting the questionable validity of the HYS sub-scale, used a total 
score minus the HYS score, and showed that this strongly differentiated 
between psychiatric out-patients and “normals” -  general practice patients 
(acute infections diseases) (p<0.001).
2. The State-Trait Anxiety (STAI)
The STAI (Trait) scale comprises twenty self-report statements designed to 
measure how an individual considers he generally feels along the relaxation- 
anxiety dimension. Alongside each of the statements is a four-item scale on 
which the subject indicates his agreement with the statement.
According to Spielberger, Gorsuch and Lushene, who developed the STAI, 
Trait anxiety describes “relatively stable individual differences in anxiety- 
proneness; that is, differences between people in the tendency to respond to 
situations perceived as threatening with deviations in State anxiety intensity”.
The range of possible scores on the STAI form is from 20 (indicating minimum 
anxiety) to 80 (maximum anxiety). Each agreement-rating to a statement 
made by the subject is weighted by a score of 1 to 4 according to the degree 
of agreement and direction of the statement, e.g. 21. “ I feel pleasant”.... 
Almost never (4 pts).... Sometimes (3 pts).... Often ( 2pts).... Almost always
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(1 pt). Seven of the twenty statements are reversed in semantic direction in 
order to minimise “response set”.
STAI (Trait) Reliability and Validity
Spielberger et al (1970) report retest reliabilities from 0.86 (N = 38, 20 day 
retest) to 0.73 (N = 25,104 day retest), and inter-item reliability of 0.90 (N = 
253). Construct validity of the STAI (Trait) is evidenced by high agreement 
with both the I PAT (Cattell et al, 1963) and the Taylor Manifest (Taylor 1953) 
anxiety scales. Using 126 college females, Spielberger et al (1970) report that 
the STAI (Trait) scores correlated highly with those of I PAT (r = 0.75) and 
TMAS (r = 0.80). With 112 “neuropsychiatrie" patients the correlations were
0.77 and 0.83 respectively.
The STAI (Trait) scale has been shown to discriminate between anxious 
psychoneurotic patients on the one hand and college students (p<0.001) or 
general medical patients (p>0.001) on the other. The normative data of these 
groups provide a means of determining a neurotic anxiety cut-off point for 
selection of subjects for the present investigation.
3. The Beck Depression Inventory
The BDI is a 21-category inventory designed to measure a degree of 
depression. Each category describes a specific behavioural manifestation of 
depression and consists of a graded series of four or five self-evaluative 
statements. The statements are ranked to reflect the range of severity of the 
symptom, from neutral to maximal severity. Each statement carries a score 
from 0 to 3 according to severity.
The inventory was standardised on 226 (and replicated on a further 183) in- 
and out-patients, of varying diagnostic categories, of two hospital psychiatric 
departments, and compared with psychiatrists' diagnoses of “Depth of
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Depression” (according to four categories: “none”, “mild”, “moderate”, and 
“severe”.)
BDI Reliability and Validity
Beck et al (1961) reports a split-half reliability coefficient of 0.93, and that the 
inventory significantly differentiates between adjacent categories of the clinical 
ratings of Depth of Depression. For the purposes of the present investigation. 
Beck’s (1961) data show that it clearly differentiates between clinical ratings of 
“none” and “mild” depression (and above) (t = 7.34; p< 0.001).
4. The Miskimmins Self-Goal-Other Discrepancy Scale
The MSGO is a scale for measuring various aspects of the “self concept”.
The form used for the present investigation (MSGO - 1 :  General, Social and 
Emotional sections) consists of fifteen bipolar constructs in three sets of five. 
The first five constructs comprise a “General” category, the second five a 
“Social” category and the third five make up the “Emotional” category. Each 
bipolar construct is divided into three separate nine-point scales between the 
two poles: the first scale is for a rating of how the subject sees himself (SELF); 
the second is for rating his ideal self (GOAL), and the third is for rating how 
the subject thinks others see him (OTHERS). All items are unidirectional with 
a higher score for a more negative rating.
A variety of sub-totals and discrepancies may be calculated from the scores 
on this scale, but for the purposes of the present investigation the scores of 
relevance are the total scores (of the fifteen items) of SELF, GOAL and 
OTHERS, and the differences between these totals (SELF-GOAL and SELF- 
OTHER discrepancies).
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MSGO Reliability and Validity
Miskimmins et al (1979) report 14 day test-retest reliabilities, based on the 
scores of 51 students, as follows:
Total SELF: r = 0.81; GOAL: 0.63; OTHERS: 0.73;
SELF-GOAL discrepancy: 0.74; SELF-OTHER discrepancy: 0.48 
(p < 0.001 in all cases).
All these variables, except for ideal self (“GOAL”) total correlated with the 
Taylor manifest Anxiety Scale as follows:
Total SELF: r (TMAS) = 0.63; OTHERS: 0.57;
SELF-GOAL: 0.69; SELF-OTHER: 0.51. p < 0.001 in all cases.
(GOAL r = 0.08, non-sig.)
All validity details given by Miskimmins et al (1979) relate to the test's use as 
an anxiety, or psychopathology scale, rather than an instrument to measure 
various aspects of the self-concept. However it is as a measure of self- 
concept and self-esteem that it is of interest here, as this is the purpose for 
which it was used by Braucht (1970) in the study which is a cornerstone of the 
rationale upon which this investigation is based (see Introduction).
5. The Behaviour Rating Questionnaire
This questionnaire was designed by the experimenter specifically for this 
investigation to measure the subject’s opinion of the “appropriateness ” of 
certain aspects of verbal and non-verbal behaviour of a) him/her self, and b) 
the other person involved in the experimental dyad. In addition, the 
questionnaire was designed to measure the subjects’ opinion of the 
conversational performance in terms of certain socially desirable general 
characteristics. The design of the questionnaire was derived from a Social
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Skills Assessment Chart, which was developed by Spence (1980). An attempt 
was made to maintain some of the structure of the Assessment Chart, while 
minimising the complexity in order that assessment may be made quickly from 
immediate memory, rather than as an “in-depth” analysis of social interaction.
Ratings of the Verbal and Non-verbal sections range from 1 (“totally 
inappropriate behaviour” in the aspect of behaviour concerned) to 7 (“totally 
appropriate behaviour”). For the general characteristics a rating scale of a 
similar range was used: from 1 (minimum amount of the quality) to 7 
(maximum amount of the quality).
The aspects of verbal behaviour (rated on degree of appropriateness) listed 
are:
Amount of speech / Clarity / Loudness / Fluency / Speed / Content /
Tone of voice
The non-verbal aspects of behaviour (also rated on degree of 
appropriateness) listed are:
Facial expressions /  Eye contact / Smiling /  Other listening responses /
Posture / Gestures
The general characteristics (rated on "amount shown”) listed are the following 
adjectives:
Attractive / Interesting / Intelligent /  Confident / Relaxed /  Friendly / Competent 
Scoring of the Behaviour Rating Questionnaire
The behaviour rating questionnaire provides a score of from 1 to 7 for each of 
the twenty verbal, non-verbal and general aspects to be considered, both for 
the subject rating himself and for the subject training the other person (i.e. 2 x 
20 scores) and this for each of the three times the subject rates -  before video 
feedback, after video feedback and after verbal and video feedback.
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For “self and “other” scores, ratings are summed for each of the sections 
Verbal, Non-verbal and General and in addition the sections are summed for a 
total score. For self-concept accuracy scores, the discrepancy between the 
“self rating score and the partner's “other” rating score is found for each 
aspect, and these “self-other” discrepancies are summed for each section’s 
discrepancy score and all three of these are summed for a total discrepancy 
score. For example a subject’s Verbal discrepancy score is the sum of the 
differences between his “self rating and his partner’s “other” rating for each of 
the Verbal items. The Non-verbal and General discrepancy scores are arrived 
at similarly and all three added to form the Total Discrepancy score.
Absolute and Relative Discrepancies
Now the discrepancy between a person’s SELF rating and his partner’s 
OTHER rating can be positive or negative. Summing such discrepancies can 
therefore be done either by adding the ABSOLUTE value of each discrepancy, 
(i.e. without regard to sign) or by adding the discrepancies taking sign into 
account, resulting in a RELATIVE discrepancy sum or self concept accuracy 
value, for each section or total of sections. Both of these methods have been 
utilised and each version of SCA, Absolute and Relative, entered into the 
statistical analysis separately.
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Procedure 
Part One:
The first part of the investigation was conducted at West Park Hospital, 
Psychology Department.
Selection of Subjects:
Out-patients recently referred to the department were approached, and asked 
if they would take part in a research exercise. Each patient was asked to 
complete four confidential questionnaires (STAI/BDI/MHQ/MSGO) and to 
undertake to participate, if required, in a short video taping session. During 
the (approximately 40 minute) session, a three-minute conversation (on a 
neutral topic) with an unfamiliar person would be video taped and played back 
to them. Each participant would be asked to complete a final confidential form 
concerning their impressions. Each patient was advised: that the session was 
not part of his/her treatment, and that while it may not be of direct benefit to 
him/her, the research may be used to develop treatments of use to similar 
such patients.
When a suitable patient had been found, a partner had to be secured who was 
local, able and willing to spare the time to take part, scored below the cut off 
on the STAI (Trait), was the same sex and of a similar age and social class to 
those of the patient. (Furthermore an appointment had to be made which was 
convenient to both participants and to the other psychologists who shared the 
use of the laboratory and video taping equipment). This was not always a 
simple task (!) but thirteen such patient-non-patient pairs were formed each of 
the same sex, scoring either side of the cut-off, and within five years of the 
other's age. Social class was estimated from occupational data, using the 
Registrar General classification (OPCS 1980). This last variable is rather 
arbitrary and imprecise, and it was considered sufficient to match subjects that 
both fell at least within two adjacent classes. With both samples coming from
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a largely homogenous population, it was not difficult to ensure that a dyad was 
not formed by two people of widely different backgrounds.
Each non-patient was approached in a similar way to that used for the 
patients, obviously without reference to psychological treatment. Thus neither 
patient nor patient-control knew whether or not the other was a patient. None 
of the patients scored below the cut-off and none of the non-patients scored 
above it.
The Video Feedback Session
At the beginning of the session, the two participants were introduced to each 
other by their forenames and asked to sign a video consent form on which 
was written:
“I hereby consent to participate in this research exercise and authorise the 
making of a video recording of me. I understand that this will only be used for 
the purposes of the research and that it will be destroyed thereafter. I 
understand that I have the right to withdraw from the exercise at any time if I 
so wish".
The participants were seated in adjacent chairs approximately twelve feet 
from the camera, and asked to “have a chat" about holidays. They were 
assured that they were not under test for their conversational ability, and told 
that once they were “into the swing” of the conversation, the recording would 
begin, and last for the next three minutes.
Somewhat surprisingly, every pair of subjects quickly became involved in a 
conversation, which was fully sustained throughout the three minutes. When 
the recording was stopped the participants were asked to complete both forms 
of the behaviour rating questionnaire. Verbal comments were discouraged, 
deferring them until later in the session. When the questionnaires had been 
completed the video recording was replayed to the participants, who were 
asked to re-complete the questionnaires after seeing the recording. After this
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second rating, verbal comments were encouraged, and each participant’s 
permission sought (and obtained in every case) for the next stage of the 
session.
In the last stage the experimenter gave to each subject a brief verbal 
summary of the behaviour ratings of that subject by the other. No scores were 
disclosed: a guide was given as to which behavioural aspects had been rated 
high or low with respect to the subject’s self-rating. Behavioural aspects were 
mentioned specifically, but in the case of the general qualities, in the third 
section of each form, an especially brief, global description was given, without 
reference to specific qualities. This was because, while the ratings of 
behavioural elements could be objectively supported or disputed by the 
recorded evidence, this was much less the case with the general personal 
qualities. It was considered that to be more specific on these qualities would 
run the risk of embarrassment or damaging loss of self-esteem which, 
although theoretically possibly even therapeutic, may not adequately be dealt 
with at the time.
Following the verbal feedback, the subjects were shown the recording again 
and asked to make a final series of ratings on the questionnaire.
Part Two:
The second part of the investigation was conducted in the Department of 
Psychology, University of Surrey. Seven pairs of subjects were recruited form 
the university staff, who as a pair individually matched each other, and as a 
group matched the West Park samples on the characteristics of sex, age and 
social class. Most of the people approached agreed to participate.
Volunteers who scored above the cut off point on the STAI took part in the 
research as an additional subgroup, each matched with a corresponding non- 
anxious volunteer. The subjects unden/vent the same procedure as the West 
Park samples.
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Results and Implications
Each hypothesis, or group of related hypotheses, developed in the 
Experimental Design section has its corresponding statistical analysis and 
results described separately in this section. Before each description of 
analysis and results, reference will be made to the hypothesis or hypotheses 
concerned by number. Following the detailed description, the hypothesis or 
hypotheses will be reiterated and the implications of the results of the 
hypotheses will be discussed.
I. Correlations of Aspects of Psychopathology and Self Concept 
Accuracy
Results of these analyses bear relevance to hypothesis 1. The scales of all 
the established questionnaires used were correlated with each other, and with 
discrepancy scores derived from the behaviour rating questionnaire, using 
Spearman rank correlations (Siegel, 1956).
/./. Inter-correlations of the Indices of Psychopathology
For these inter-correlations, N = 52: the thirteen high-anxious patients, thirteen 
low-anxious (HC) controls, fourteen low-anxious (DC) controls, six high- 
anxious non-patients and their six low-anxious control partners.
As can be seen from fig. 3, with the exception of the HYS scale, all CCEI sub­
scales correlated highly with each other, with the total score and with 
Dasberg’s (1978) “neuroticism” (total minus HYS) score. Among these, the 
only inter-correlations for whose significance the confidence was less than for 
p <0.001 were: OBS with PHO (rho = 0.315 p <0.01); SOM with PHO 
(rho = 0.407 p <0.01); DEP with PHO (rho = 0.397 p <0.01); and OBS with 
SOM (rho = 0.352 p 0.01). The HYS scale significantly correlated with only 
one other sub scale: DEP (rho = 0.306 p <0.05).
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Ail CCEI sub-scales and the “neuroticism” score correlate significantly with the 
STAI; p exceeds 0.001 only for the OBS (rho = 0.301 p <0.05) and HYS 
(rho = 0.274 p <0.05) sub-scales. Similarly, all these scales except HYS 
correlate significantly with the BDI scores. Only the p. of PHO 
(rho = 0.384 p < 0.01) and OBS (rho = 0.255 p < 0.05) exceeded 0.001.
STAI (Trait) and BDI scores themselves correlated highly with each other 
(rho = 0.729 p <0.001).
Of the MSGO sub-scales, the SELF, OTHER and SELF-GOAL discrepancy 
scales correlated with most of the other scales. The SELF scale correlated 
most highly with FFA, DEP and “neuroticism” scores of the CCEI,
(rhos = 0.541, 0.596 and 0.561 resp., ps <0.001) and correspondingly with the 
STAI (Trait) and BDI scores (rho = 0.713, 0.563 resp. ps < 0.001).
Similarly, but to a lesser extent, the OTHER scale correlated most highly with 
the CCEI sub-scales of DEP and “neuroticism” (rho = 0.445, 0.425 resp., 
ps < 0.001) and with the STAI (rho = 0.529, p<0.001). The SELF-GOAL 
discrepancy scale showed a pattern of agreement with all anxiety depression 
and neuroticism scales which was highly similar to that of the SELF scale.
The SELF-OTHER discrepancy scores related significantly only to the FFA 
and BDI scores (rho = 0.289 p<0.05; rho = 0.319, 0<0.05 resp).
'/.// Correlations of Self concept Accuracy with Indices of Psychopathology
For these correlations, N = 27; the thirteen high-anxious patients (group PS) 
and fourteen independent low-anxious (UC) controls (see Experimental 
Design).
All behaviour rating questionnaire scores used here were derived from the first 
ratings (i.e. “no feedback”) made by subjects.
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LU (a) “Absolute” Discrepancy (Self concept Accuracy) Scores
In general, correlations of the “absolute” discrepancies were higher, and 
hence more often significant, than the “relative” discrepancies (see fig.4).
The absolute rating discrepancies of all three sections (Verbal, Non-verbal, 
General) and Total discrepancies all correlated significantly with the same 
CCEI scales (and not with the others). These CCEI scales were all the 
anxiety scales (FFA, PHO and SOM) the depression (DEP) and neuroticism 
scores.
The Total discrepancy scores showed the highest correlations with these 
scales (rho = from 0.475 to 0.676; p<0.01 to p<0.001), while the Verbal 
discrepancy scores showed the lowest (rho from 0.337 to 0.470 ps <0.01). 
Similarly, all rating discrepancy scores correlated with the STAI, Total 
discrepancy showing the highest (rho = 0.516 p<0.01) and Verbal the lowest 
(rho = 0.400 p <0.05) correlations.
Similar agreement was shown with the BDI, except for that of the General 
discrepancy score whose low correlation failed to achieve significance.
Agreement with MSGO scales was a little less consistent. As for the 
established measures of anxiety, depression and neuroticism, the SELF, 
OTHER and SELF-GOAL discrepancy scores were the scales with which the 
highest correlations were achieved, this time with the discrepancy sores. 
However, none of these scales significantly correlated with all four of the 
rating discrepancy scores. The Verbal rating discrepancy scores failed 
significantly to correlate with the SELF and SELF-GOAL discrepancy scales, 
while the General rating discrepancy score failed significantly to correlate with 
the OTHER MSGO scale. The non-verbal discrepancy score tended to show 
the highest correlations with the MSGO scales and was certainly the most 
consistent, correlating significantly with all five (rho’s from .625, p<0.001 
(SELF) to .342 p<0.05 (GOAL)).
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LU (b) “Relative “Discrepancy (Self concept Accuracy) Scores:
Significant correlations made with these scores were fewer and lower than 
those with the “Absolute” discrepancy scores. For example, no significant 
correlations were made with the CCEI, ‘FFA’ scale. Although the Total 
discrepancy score showed a similar pattern of correlations to those of the 
Absolute discrepancy scores, the Verbal, Non-verbal and General discrepancy 
scores showed few significant correlations. Against this background of loss of 
agreement with the measures of psychopathology by the Relative discrepancy 
scores, there was a curiously anomalous result. All four Relative discrepancy 
scores correlated significantly with the CCEI HYS’ sub-scale 
(rhos about - 0.44 ps <0.05).
This was the only scale with which all four discrepancy scores correlated 
significantly, and, moreover, this was of note because none of the Absolute 
discrepancy scores showed a significant relationship with the HYS sub-scale.
All correlations with the Relative discrepancy scores were negative. That is, 
agreement with psychopathology measures was determined by the degree to 
which the self ratings were less than those of the other person.
47
I8üc(0
Q .
2
8
TO
C
CD
0)(/)
8
0)CL
T3
C(0
B
I
i
(D
C
C0
1 3 TO >> TO O O sz
t0
1
CL
O
(O
C0
1 
g
o
ü
TO
O
CD
CO
s i
h -
lO
cq
d S
(O CD
S
cq
CD
:  g *  1
CD 
" ?
CO 
* ?
CL
LU
ë
S
cq
CD
T f
o
00
cq
%
cq
g
CD S
u_
_ i
LU
CO
î  g
h -G)
cq
CD 
* ^
lO
o
TT
Î8
Q
m
CD 
*  ”
M.
O
00 
•  %
oo
00
cq
1
o
o
• i
h -
?
CD
*  5 )
o
TT
LU
ü
ü
g i ?
CD
* S
CO
•  i? «g
N
1
CO lO S
TT
00
CO
CL
LU
Q *  ^ % 5
O
(O
O
CO
CO
*
O) 
*  ID
O
TT
N
00
cq
CO 
" ?
CO
CD
O
O
X
CL
C3)
* S ■ %TT * i cq
CD
£
Lj_
N
CO
CO
CD
O
T f
O)CT>
cq
lO
*
CO
LU
O
z
2
LU
CL
ü
CO
Q
1 5
■e
$ 11
2
CD
C
CD
CD ï
lô
•e
g 1 1
2
CD
C
CD
CD 1
&  
c  
CD CO
i l
<  o
&
i l
CD ü
m w
CL Q
00
M. J. Tossell. Psych.D. Portfolio. M.Sc. Dissertation.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Self concept accuracy is inversely related to “neuroticism” 
and to the component measures of psychopathology upon which the 
dimension of “neuroticism” is based.
Implications: The inter-correlations of the psychopathology instruments used 
(see fig.3) attest to the construct validity of the CCEI scales (except for HYS), 
the STAI, BDI, and the SELF, OTHER, and SELF-GOAL discrepancy scales 
of the MSGO-1.
The correlations of the section and total Absolute discrepancy scores with the 
psychopathology scales (see fig. 4) (of a similar order to the inter-correlations 
of the scales themselves) indicates a strong relationship between self concept 
accuracy and “neuroticism”, and in particular the component of anxiety and 
depression. The highest correlations were most consistently achieved by the 
total discrepancy scores rather than by the scores of any one of the sections 
of the rating form (Verbal, Non-verbal and General). The distinctly lower 
correlations of the Relative discrepancies support the notion that it is self 
concept inaccuracy perse, that is, in either direction, which is related to 
psychopathology, and not just a tendency to mis-rate in one particular 
direction, (as might be expected from individuals with low self-esteem, for 
example.) In fact, the correlation of Relative discrepancies with the HYS scale 
suggests a relationship between under-rating of self and extraversion.
Therefore hypothesis 1 is supported by the data where self concept accuracy 
is described by the Absolute discrepancies in self ratings. Self concept 
inaccuracy thus appears related to “neuroticism” in general, and in particular 
to the neurotic components of free-floating, phobic and somatic anxiety, and to 
depression.
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Il Group Differences in Aspects of Psychopathology and Self concept 
Accuracy
Results of this section bear relevance to hypotheses 2a) b) and c).
Il.i Comparison of Indices of Psychopathology
The scores on the four preliminary questionnaires (CCEI, STAI (Trait), BDI, 
MSGO-1) of four groups (high-anxious patients (PS),their low-anxious control 
partners (HC), the independent low-anxious controls (UC) and the high- 
anxious non-patients (NS)) were compared using the Kruskal-Wallis analysis 
of variance (Siegel, 1956) for each psychopathological index separately.
Where a significant variance was observed, multiple comparisons were made 
using the Mann-Whitney U test (Siegel, 1956). The results of these analyses 
are summarised in fig. 5. When multiple comparisons are mentioned in the 
text, example values will be given of the lowest significant difference 
observed.
Significant variance was shown between the groups on all the CCEI anxiety 
sub-scales (FFA, PHO and SOM), the DEP sub-scale and the neuroticism 
(Total minus HYS) score. (p<0.001 for all except PHO; p<0.01). Further 
(multiple comparison) analysis showed that for FFA, SOM, DEP and 
neuroticism scales, the two high-anxious groups scored significantly higher 
than the two low-anxious groups (who did not differ on any scale). On the 
PHO scale, the patients scored significantly higher than both control groups, 
but the high-anxious non-patients did not show this effect. The high-anxious 
patients and non-patients did not differ significantly from each other on all 
CCEI sales except FFA, on which patients scored higher than the non-patients 
(U = 13p<0.05).
The high- and low-anxious groups were differentiated on the STAI (Trait) as 
this was the basis of their selection. There were no significant differences 
between the two high-anxious groups (patients and non-patients) or between
50
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the two low-anxious groups (linked and independent controls) on this scale.
On the BDI, the two high-anxious groups scored significantly higher than the 
control groups (H = 19.2 p<0.001; U = 10.5, p<0.01).
On the MSGO-1 scales, significant variance was shown on 
SELF (H = 10.2, p<0.01) OTHER (H = 8.1, p<0.05) and 
SELF-GOAL discrepancy (H = 9.39, p<0.01) scores.
Multiple comparisons showed that on the SELF and SELF-GOAL discrepancy 
scores, patients scored themselves significantly more negatively, and showed 
a significantly greater distance between self and ideal self concepts than did 
the controls (U = 21.5 p<0.001, U =27 p<0.01 respectively).
On these scales, the high-anxious non-patients showed no significant 
difference from either the controls or the patients. On the OTHER scales, 
both high-anxious patients and non-patients (who themselves did not differ) 
showed a significantly more negative perception of how others see them than 
did the controls (L) = 14.5 p<0.05).
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II. H Comparison of Initial Measures of Self Concept Accuracy
Discrepancy scores, for each section, and total of the behaviour rating 
questionnaire, of the four groups were compared using the Kruskal-Wallis 
analysis of variance for each section separately. Where a significant variance 
was observed, multiple comparisons were made using the Mann-Whitney U 
test.
//.// (a) Absolute Discrepancy Scores (Summarised in fig. 6a)
Significant variance was shown between groups on the Non-verbal 
(H = 10.5, p < 0.05) and General (H = 10.3, p < 0.05) sections and on Total 
discrepancy score (H = 12.5, p < 0.01), but not on the verbal section. Further 
analysis showed that on each of these sections the scores of the independent 
control group (UC) were significantly lower than those of all anxious subjects 
(groups PS and NS) and of the patient's partners (group HC). The scores of 
groups PS, NS and HC did not differ significantly from each other.
//.// (b) Relative Discrepancy Scores
By contrast, no significant variance was shown between groups on the relative 
discrepancy scores, in total or for each section separately.
HYPOTHESIS 2a): Psychiatric patients showing high anxiety will also exhibit 
a less accurate self concept than low-anxious non-patients.
Implications: This hypothesis is supported by the data (summarised in Fig.
6a) of Total (Absolute) discrepancy scores, and of the discrepancy scores of 
two of the three rating sections, in which the patients’ (PS) discrepancies were 
significantly higher than those of the independent controls (UC). This 
difference was not shown by the Verbal discrepancies. (The fact that linked 
controls (HC) were not significantly differentiated from the patients is of 
relevance to another hypothesis).
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Therefore hypothesis 2a) is supported by the data in the non-verbal and 
general aspects of behaviour rating, and in the overall ratings of subjects, but 
is unsupported in the verbal aspect.
HYPOTHESIS 2 b): Non-patients exhibiting high anxiety would differ, in terms 
of self concept accuracy, in proportion to the extent of their level of anxiety.
Implications: Again, from fig. 6a) it can be seen that the high anxiety non­
patients (NS) showed significantly higher discrepancies than the independent 
controls (UC) in Non-verbal, General, and Total scores.
Therefore hypothesis 2b) is supported by the data in the non-verbal and 
general aspects of behaviour rating, and in the overall ratings of subjects, but 
is unsupported in the verbal aspect.
HYPOTHESIS 2c): High-anxious individuals exhibit an inaccurate concept of 
others.
Implications: As explained in the Experimental Design section, the 
discrepancies of the linked (HC) controls, who partnered the patients, are of 
importance here. The discrepancy scores of the HC controls involve in their 
calculation the OTHER ratings of the patients. Thus differences in 
discrepancies between these controls and the UC controls imply a difference, 
in rating of others, between patients and low-anxious non-patients, and not a 
difference in the self-rating of HC and UC controls (which are assumed to be 
the same). Now the discrepancies of the HC controls, while not significantly 
different from the patients, are significantly higher than those of the UC 
controls in Non-verbal, General and Total discrepancy scores.
Therefore hypothesis 2c) is supported by the data in the non-verbal and 
general and overall aspects of behaviour rating, but is unsupported in the 
verbal aspect.
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Ill Effects of Video Feedback and Combined Verbal and Video Feedback 
on Self concept Accuracy (Absolute Discrepancies)
Results of this section bear relevance to hypothesis 3a) and b). The effects 
were investigated in two ways. Firstly the comparison of section and total 
discrepancy scores between groups  ^which has already been made for the no­
feedback phase (see Results I ii a), was made again for scores following video 
feedback and following combined verbal and video feedback treatments. 
Second, repeated measures analyses of variance were used to compare the 
SCA scores under the three different conditions within groups.
Ill i. Differences in Absolute Discrepancies following feedback conditions for 
Groups PS, HC, US and NS (summarised in fig. 6b)
After video feedback, the variance between groups in Verbal discrepancies 
remained non-significant. The variance in Non-verbal discrepancies, 
significant in the no-feedback condition, became non-significant. The variance 
in General discrepancies, significant in the no-feedback condition was still 
significant, but showed a change in group differences: the discrepancies of 
the anxious non-patients (NS) and the patient's partners (HC) were still 
significantly higher than those of the independent controls (UC)
(e.g. U = 50.5 p<0.05). However, the General discrepancies of the patients 
(PS) were no longer significantly higher than those of the independent 
controls. The variance in Total discrepancies also maintained its significance, 
but showed a change in group differences similar to that of the General 
discrepancies: again, the discrepancies of patients were no longer significantly 
higher than those of the independent controls. After combined Verbal and 
video feedback, the variances of the Verbal and Non-verbal discrepancies 
retained their non-significance and that of the Total discrepancies, significant 
in the previous two conditions, became non-significant. The variance of the 
General discrepancies remained significant and showed the same significant 
group differences as were shown after the video feedback-alone condition.
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Il LU. Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance Within Groups.
A Friedman repeated measures analysis of variance (Siegel, 1956) was 
applied to the scores of each group, for each Total and section discrepancy 
score, between conditions of no feedback, video feedback and combined 
verbal and video feedback. When the variance was found to be significant 
between conditions, multiple comparisons were made using the Wilcoxon 
matched pairs test (Siegel, 1956).
Of all the groups compared for each of the section and Total discrepancy 
scores, despite almost all differences being in the predicted direction, 
significant variance was shown only between conditions for the patients'
Verbal discrepancies (x  ^= 9.62, p <0.01). Further analysis revealed the 
discrepancies after video feedback to be significantly lower than before it 
(T = 8.5 p<0.01). This difference just failed to reach significance after the 
combined feedback. When all high-anxious subjects (groups PS and NS) 
were combined, their Total discrepancies showed a significant variance 
across conditions (x  ^ = 6, p <0.05). This was due to Total discrepancy scores 
being significantly lower after the combined feedback than before any 
feedback (T = 34, p <0.05).
As can be seen from the graph of fig. 7b): viewed from an overall perspective, 
changes in self concept accuracy across treatments can be seen consistently 
to occur in the predicted direction. This itself is significant 
(Friedmans analysis: x  ^ = 8.5 p <0.001).
The changes across treatments are large enough to render non-significant 
differences between groups which were significantly different previously as, 
for example, occurred between patient (PS) and control (UC) groups.
However, the changes are not significantly large to show significant difference 
across treatments within groups.
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Fig 6a. Differences in initial measures of self concept accuracy (Absolute self-other
discrepancies) for groups PS, HC, UC and NS.
Section
Analysis of 
Variance 
H p<
Multiple Comparisons
Verbal Non-significant
Non-verbal 10.5 0.05 NS, HC. PS > UC (U=41.5; p < 0.05)
General 10.3 0.05 NS, HC, PS > UC (U=48.5; p < 0.05)
Total 12.5 0.01 NS, HC, PS > UC (U=43.5; p < 0.05)
Fig 6b. Differences in measures of self concept accuracy (Absolute self-other discrepancies) 
following feedback, for groups PS, HC, UC and NS.
After Videofeedback
Section
Analysis of 
Variance 
H p<
Multiple Comparisons
Verbal Non-significant
Non-verbal Non-significant
General 9.5 0.05
NS, HC > UC (U = 50.5; p < 0.05); 
NS > PS (U = 15; p < 0.05 (2 tailed)); 
HC V PS, PS V UC non sig.
Total 8.5 0.05 NS, HC > UC (U = 32, p < 0.01); HC v PS, PS v UC, non sig.
After Verbal and Videofeedback
Verbal Non-significant
Non-verbal Non-significant
General 9.0 0.05
NS, HC > UC (U = 46.5, p < 0.05); 
NS > PS (U = 16, p < 0.05 (2 tailed))
Total Non-significant
For both tables, group listed in order of mean size. Value of “U” referred to is of comparison of smallest 
significant difference, the two involved groups listed immediately adjacent to inequality sign.
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Fig. 7a: Differences between groups in section discrepancies and changes after feedback
Mean Verbal Absolute Discrepancy
UC
PS
HC
NS
Mean Non-Verbal Absolute Discrepancy
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Mean General Absolute Discrepancy
20
15
10
5
0
x-axis: No
feedback
Video­
feedback
Verbal + 
Videofeedback
PS = High anxious patients 
HC = Low anxious partner controls
NS = High anxious non-patients 
UC = Low anxious independent controls
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Fig 7b; Differences between groups in Total Discrepancies and changes after feedback
Mean Total Absolute Discrepancy
x-axis: No
feedback
Video­
feedback
Verbal + 
Videofeedback
PS = High anxious patients NS = High anxious non-patients
HC = Low anxious partner controls UC = Low anxious independent controls
HYPOTHESIS 3a): The immediate effect of videotape feedback on 
individuals will be to increase self concept accuracy.
Implications: The evidence concerning this hypothesis is equivocal. From figs. 
6b and 7a & b, it can be seen that the Non-verbal discrepancies of anxious 
subjects and linked controls, significantly higher than those of independent 
(UC) controls before video feedback, are no longer significantly different after 
it, and that this change is primarily due to the lowering of the patients' 
discrepancies. Indeed the patients’ discrepancies become not significantly 
different from the independent controls in the General section and Total 
scores also.
One would not expect the discrepancy scores of the HC controls to be 
lowered; according to the argument above, the aberrant size of these
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discrepancies is due to the patient’s distorted rating of them. Since the HC 
controls have no information of how they are being mis-rated from the video 
feedback, there is no reason why their discrepancy scores should change.
The apparent improvement in self concept accuracy shown by the patients 
after video feedback is only slightly matched by the anxious non-patients.
Thus the hypothesis is supported to some extent by the data of between 
group differences. However the data of within group differences offers little 
support, the only significant change being shown by patients’ Verbal 
discrepancy scores, being lower after video feedback.
Therefore hypothesis 3a) is supported to a limited extent, in that the self 
concept accuracy of patients is significantly lowered in the verbal aspect, while 
in the non-verbal, general and overall aspects the differences between 
patients and independent controls become non-significant. However, the lack 
of improvement in self concept accuracy by high-anxious non-patients does 
not offer support for the hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 3b): The combination of video and verbal feedback will be to 
increase self concept accuracy to a greater extent than video feedback alone.
Implications: Again the evidence for this hypothesis is equivocal. From the 
data of between group differences (see fig.6b), 7a) and b)) it can be seen that 
the differences between groups on Total discrepancies, significant after video 
feedback, become no longer significant after video feedback.
It may be seen from fig. 7b) that the chief contributors to this effect are the 
reduction in Total discrepancy scores of both high-anxious groups (NS, PS), 
but that the linked controls (HC) also show a slight reduction in this respect. 
This may be expected at this stage since the linked controls will now have had 
some feedback concerning how the patients rated them (however distorted 
this may have been), and it appears that the self ratings of these controls have 
shifted towards the ratings of them by the patients, even though the evidence 
suggests these ratings to be inaccurate.
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However, within groups, significant variance between all conditions, 
attributable to the combined treatment condition, is only found if the two high- 
anxious groups (NS, PS) are combined, and this only for the Total 
discrepancy scores. Figs. 7a) and b) show that there is a tendency for self 
concept accuracy measures to decrease following the combined treatment, in 
particular the Total discrepancy scores of the high-anxious groups. However, 
these changes are not sufficiently large to achieve significance in the global 
across-all-treatments analyses used.
Therefore hypothesis 3b) is supported to a very limited extent, in that group 
differences in the overall aspect of self concept accuracy become non­
significant following the combined feedback treatment, and that high-anxious 
groups when combined show a significant increase in the total aspect of self 
concept accuracy following the combined treatment.
IV Self Ratings, Others Ratings and the Effects of Feedback
Results of this section bear relevance to hypotheses 4a and b).
Comparisons were made, using the appropriate non parametric analyses, to 
investigate differences between groups in Total ratings of self, of others, and 
by others, and differences within groups between feedback conditions on 
these variables. All groups rated themselves significantly lower than they 
rated the other person, and significantly lower than the other person rated 
them (Wilcoxon and Mann Whitney U tests). There was no significant 
variance between groups on total ratings of self, of others, or by others 
(Kruskal Wallis analyses).
All groups showed no significant variance of total self ratings within groups 
between treatment conditions (Friedman analyses).
HYPOTHESIS 4a): Video feedback will influence the self ratings of low- 
anxious individuals more positively than high-anxious individuals.
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HYPOTHESIS 4b): This differential effect will be reduced by video and verbal 
feedback combined.
Implications: Part IV of the Results section shows that no support is found for 
either of these hypotheses. The total self ratings of all groups, low- or high- 
anxious, patient or non-patient, were unaffected overall by the feedback 
treatments.
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Discussion and Conclusions
Self concept inaccuracy, defined as the discrepancy between ratings of self 
and those of another person without regard to the direction of the discrepancy, 
has been shown to be related to neurotic symptomatology in general, and to 
the neurotic dimensions of anxiety and depression in particular. In fact, the 
relationship is as high as, but no higher than, that shown by self-ideal self 
discrepancy (measured on the SELF-GOAL scale of the MSGO-1). Thus as a 
descriptive of neurotic self perceptions it may be as useful as the Rogerian 
concept of low self-esteem. However, it is considerably more difficult to 
measure, requiring as it does the reliable ‘true’ perception of the individual by 
another. But, as it allows for discrepancies in either direction, it may prove to 
be a better index of therapeutic change than “self-esteem” or self-ideal 
discrepancy, which allows for change only in one (positive) direction.
The patients clearly showed greater self concept inaccuracy than the 
independent controls, and the attribution of this effect to anxiety rather than to 
any other quality of being an out-patient is supported by the observations of 
the characteristics of the high-anxious non-patients. These also showed 
greater self- concept inaccuracy than the independent controls, and were 
similar to the patients and significantly different from the controls in almost 
every measured respect.
In addition to the self-rating of anxious individuals being inaccurate, the results 
implied that the rating of others by anxious individuals was also unrealistic. 
Over groups, no significant differences emerged in overall ratings of self and 
of others, and it is difficult to determine a general source of the inaccuracies. 
However, an examination of the raw data suggests a tendency for high- 
anxious subjects either to maximise the rating of the other person while 
underrating themselves, or to perceive the performance of the other person in 
as negative a light as that in which they see themselves, underrating both.
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Video feedback appeared to have some slight effects on the self concept 
accuracy of anxious subjects (perhaps in non-verbal behaviour more than 
verbal behaviour or general characteristics) and the combined verbal and 
video feedback appeared to enhance this effect, although the effects if present 
at all, were too weak in general to achieve any significance. There are two 
features of the experimental design which may have contributed to this 
weakness. Firstly, there appeared to be a high proportion of error in the 
scores on the behaviour rating questionnaire, due mainly to the unstructured 
nature of the bipolar rating scale. Subjects appeared to have differing notions 
of “appropriate” behaviour. Perhaps some confused “appropriate” with 
“perfect”; some subjects rated the thirteen aspects of the other's non-verbal 
and verbal behaviour without exceeding the score of five, while others, after a 
similarly productive conversation, rated these aspects without scoring lower 
than five. [Remarkably, in practice almost all participants conducted a rapid, 
fluent and equally shared conversation for the entire allocated time -  and 
often beyond!] In this way differences between rater's scores (i.e. those 
contributing to discrepancy scores) may survive the error of this wide variation 
in scoring styles, but differences between treatments of the same rafer are 
more likely to be lost in it. For example, subjects rating themselves in a band 
of two or three points around a score of 2 may show a difference from others 
who rate themselves in a band of two or three points around a score of 5, but 
if these subjects, following feedback, experience the beginning of an attitude 
change, and continuously rate themselves a point higher, this change will go 
unnoticed in the wider range of scores due merely to the variability of subjects 
scores.
Thus perhaps a rating scale with a behavioural description of each point would 
produce a more limited variety in subjects’ rating, and allow for the detection 
of small changes.
Secondly, the amount of feedback given was minimal, and, more importantly, 
the difference between feedback conditions, i.e. the addition of verbal 
feedback, was limited. While a three minute sample of behaviour may be
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sufficient to observe examples of the behavioural aspects identified on the 
rating scale, it was anticipated before the experiment that patients may show a 
resistance to changing perceptions in the form of a self-serving bias, either by 
attending, from a ‘private perspective', uncritically, or more usually negatively, 
to the whole presentation, or by selectively attending to irrelevant aspects, 
usually imperfections, unnoticed by other observers (see Introduction). So a 
limited effect of video feedback alone is neither unexpected (nor, in one sense 
unwelcome, since associated with this a priori anticipation was the possibility 
of an anti-therapeutically negative reaction to the raw feedback by over 
sensitive subjects, and de facto, this anticipation is unsupported). However, 
the argument for video feedback is that such resistance on the part of the 
patient can be overcome by the skill of the therapist in the guidance of the 
subject’s perception to the most salient aspects of behaviour as seen by 
others, and in the disputation, using the objective evidence of the recording, of 
the subject’s distorted private perspective. It is this intervention by the 
therapist which is insufficiently represented by the addition of verbal feedback 
to the video feedback condition. Subjects were given brief resumes of the 
pattern of ratings by the other person with reference to some of the 
behavioural aspects. Even less detail was given concerning the general 
qualities, for reasons given earlier (see Experimental Design). The limited 
time allowed and the absence of a follow-up mechanism to deal with distorted 
interpretations of this feedback made hazardous the possibility of feedback 
which was more than superficial, and imposed a low limit on the extent to 
which feedback could be allowed to be negative.
Furthermore, the verbal feedback was added on to, but remained separate 
from, the recorded evidence, rather than being used in conjunction with it, as it 
should be clinically in order systematically to dispute the erroneous 
perceptions of the subject. Again limited time and the standardised nature of 
the experimental treatment precluded such a thorough cross-examination of 
the subjects’ private perspective. Thus perhaps a more longitudinal design 
might allow for more thorough feedback, and an increase in the likelihood of 
attitude change.
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The effect of guided video feedback on the distorted perceptions of anxious 
individuals remains, unfortunately, rather uncertain after this investigation. 
Having established that self concept inaccuracy is associated with neurotic 
self-, and other- perceptions, in order to justify its measurement it is necessary 
to show that therapeutic change is indicated by reduction in such inaccuracy. 
Furthermore, if it were established that guided video feedback effectively 
reduced this inaccuracy, in order to justify its use, it would be necessary to 
show that such a reduction promotes therapeutic change. Neither of these 
potential demonstrations could be observed by the examination of a 
transverse slice of interpersonal perceptions, which was made by the present 
investigation. It is perhaps along these lines, rather than across them, that 
further research might be conducted.
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